J. D. Gould in a fairly recent article attempts to explain why Thomas Mun did not develop the “self-regulating mechanism of specie distribution.” I find Mr. Gould's argument unconvincing and while I hesitate to question one point in an otherwise interesting atricle, I think the point merits further discussion.

We study the decisions of state-chartered banks to join the Fed in its first decade. Ours is the first study to combine state regulatory environment characteristics and individual bank characteristics to explain Fed membership choice. Regulatory environments that reduced the benefit of discount window access or increased the regulatory cost of joining the Fed led to fewer banks joining. Individual bank characteristics that affected the magnitude of benefits from accessing the discount window (either passing on liquidity risk reduction to respondents or reducing the member bank’s own seasonal liquidity risk) were even more important in determining which banks joined.

I believe that, through the Federal Reserve Banks, … the better shall we be equipped to cope with the problems ahead of us, of helping ourselves and of helping the world; I believe it to be the duty of every bank in the country to contribute its share in equipping our nation for this task; … I firmly believe that the future will belong to those banks—national or state—that are members of the Federal Reserve System.

—Paul Warburg, Speech at the New York State Bankers’ Association Convention, 9 June 1916

This paper shows that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 broadened access to Parliament for families needing rights to sell land in so-called estate bills. Bills were on average 14–27 percentage points more likely to be for gentry families and not aristocratic families in legislative sessions after the Revolution compared to sessions before. Regression and archival evidence suggest that parliamentary certainty was primarily responsible for improved access by altering families’ entry calculus and brokers’ recruitment of new business. More broadly, the paper provides insight into the ways in which political institutions affect access to and the provision of property rights.

The economic history of the United States is that of Europeans and their institutions. Indigenous nations are absent. This absence is partly due to a lack of data but perhaps also to a perception that Indigenous communities contributed little to U.S. growth. Three case studies explore the economic complexity and social stratification across different nations/regions prior to contact. Migrants to the United States came not to an empty land but one with settled agriculture, complex production processes, and extensive trade relations, upon which Europeans built.

As a multi-faceted socio-political movement in twentieth-century China, the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) witnessed conflict and social upheaval. This paper investigates its economic legacies, exploiting geographic variation in revolutionary intensity, measured by the number of resulting deaths. Using a newly assembled county-level panel dataset over five decades, we find worse-affected areas performed slightly better at baseline, but were slower to industrialize. This effect was large in the early 1980s before diminishing to become insignificant by 2000. Using individual-level census data, we find more-exposed cohorts are less likely to obtain higher education degrees and to work in professional and entrepreneurial occupations.

This paper estimates the causal impact of short-term aggregate fluctuations in Egypt, 1911–48, using global cotton price shocks. Firm entry was procyclical, and exit was acyclical. There were persistent differences between cohorts over the cycle; expansionary cohorts were of lower quality. The evidence supports models of firm entry with ex-ante heterogeneity. The findings highlight the extensive margin of entry as the primary adjustment mechanism. As a result, recessions had a strong “isolation” effect. This nature of firm entry amplified and propagated temporary price shocks.

Cross sections of coal prices in England for 1695, 1795, and 1842 are used to infer transportation rates by sea, river, canal, and road. The effectiveness of monopolies, the degree of market integration, and the patterns of regional supply of each mining district are then established. The growth rates of productivity in sea, river, and road transport from 1695–1842 are computed and combined with a social savings assessment of canals to measure the overall growth in the productivity of shipping coal. Productivity growth was substantial but had a surprisingly limited impact on the geography of production and consumption.

Financially, the Federal Government was more poorly prepared for war in the early months of 1861 than it had been since its establishment. The financial policies of the government in the period preceding the war weakened its credit; and this, along with the urgency of the conflict, was to make short-term borrowing and the printing of paper money attractive but costly wartime expedients. Although the failure to finance the war on a sound basis cannot be ascribed merely to prewar financial conditions and policies, the stage was set by them. The regression to earlier methods of war finance began even before the war.

The aim of this discussion is to elucidate the evolution of the management concepts, organizational patterns, and policies of the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey). In point of fact, these topics are discussed primarily with reference to the origin and development of the Standard Oil combination under its various legal titles prior to 1911. The policies and practices, both sound and unsound, of the men who administered the Jersey Company in its early years were largely those of the men who created the combination.

This paper analyzes 1850 cost data for a sample of 36 steamboats operating on five routes. The results indicate no economies or diseconomies of scale. Substantial differences in the cost per ton-mile are found between routes. These differences are largely explained by differences in capacity utilization.

The importance of the international sector in initiating the nineteenth-century economic development of the United States has been widely acknowledged. Its influence on American economic stability, however, is by no means as well established. Controversy persists concerning the interrelationships between the international flow of liquid funds evidencing balance-of-payments disequilibrium and the American monetary system during the period from the 1830's to the Civil War.

The articles by Harrison and Allen that follow deal with a major episode in economic history, one that offers both rich empirical evidence and challenging theoretic problems. It is now possible to conduct an economic post mortem on seven turbulent decades in the experience of the very large economy that made up the Soviet Union, and these articles examine some key operational issues lying at the heart of that experience. Readers will find the best introduction to these issues in Paul Gregory's masterly monograph, Before Command. My task here is limited to identifying the context for the intellectual action on the stage.

From 1841 throught 1845 and again in 1847 and 1848 ofiicials of the United States patent Office estimated the output of the principal agricultural crops of each state and territory. These estimates have been generally disregarded by economic historians, presumably because their acuracy has been considered questionable. But I have bee unable to find any published, comprehensive evaluation of them. In this note I will briefly examine the methods used to make the crop estimates and apply a few checks againsts the results, with the object of evaluating them, in a preliminary way, as historical data.