Most historical generalizations must be approached with a wary eye; Kliuchevskii's dictum that “the history of Russia is the history of a country in the process of colonization” is no exception. Taken unjudiciously this dictum grievously compresses time, focuses attention on only a single historical dynamic, lends to the historical process a pre-ordained character which is indeed usually absent. The historian's critical apparatus is dulled, and the delicate nuance and important variant are neglected. Moscow, it has been argued, was a chosen town to lead the southward and eastward expansion of the Great Russian people because of her physical location on the edge of the Valdai hills giving her control of the crucial waterways of European Russia. (Why not, for the same reasons, Vladimir or Rostov, Suzdal or even Uglich?) Muscovite expansion forms the central thread of Russian history, determining the economic and political structure of the state. It was the expansion which fixed and defined the necessity of the “service state,” which in turn subjugated all classes and groups to the all powerful tsardom. (Why not the reverse—the “service state” defining the expansion—and why did not an independent merchant class come to control the expansion, and the towns and politics of Muscovy?) To pursue the argument to a logical conclusion, die modern audioritarian state in Russia (bodi Soviet and Tsarist) is essentially a continuation of old Muscovy. As the latter expanded and colonized, so must the former. (The role of the Party and the Marxist dialectic, by this line of argument, has no fundamental historical significance.)

The significant place of credit in everyday business is not a new phenomenon. If the last few centuries have witnessed a rapid development in the character and extent of credit facilities, it is still far from certain that the relative importance of credit is today greater than it was in the medieval period, or during the intervening centuries. In any case it is undeniable that the business affairs of men, from paupers to princes, have frequently required credit in one form or another. The king with his wars and splendid court, the noble with his extravagant ways, and the merchant with his speculative ventures have been the colorful debtors of history and fiction alike. The Jew, the Lombard, the Medici or Fugger, the goldsmith, and finally the modern professional banker have appeared as the masters of credit. But credit transactions have not been limited to these groups alone. As R. H. Tawney has pointed out, such a society as that of Elizabethan England was composed largely of small property holders, chiefly farmers and artisans. These yeomen, artisans, and small businessmen were often in need of loans to expand or retrieve their estates. Where did they find the credit they required?

The major contrast between preindustrial and modern economies is that the latter enjoy regular and rapid growth, whereas income per capita tends to stagnate in the former. Analysis of the organization of exchange in early Christian Ireland shows that the exchange and therefore the production of material wealth was so thoroughly integrated into securing and exercising power, as well as into establishing and maintaining family and social ties, that any improvements in technology which might have led to economic growth would inevitably have generated prohibitive social costs.

A persistent argument in condemning foreign economic intrusion in China (1840–1937) is that the “traditional” or the “indigenous” sector of the economy was “hampered,” “disrupted,” or even “ruined.” It is maintained that the handicrafts, small mines, native banks, junks, and coolie carriers were all helplessly depressed because of competition from their counterparts in the modern sector of the economy, which was an outgrowth of external trade and foreign investment in China. Some have argued that the supposed decline in the traditional sector was a net loss to China, since the limited development in the modern sector was not large enough to offset losses in the traditional sector, or that gains in the modern sector were primarily reaped by countries which traded with or invested in China. Others have taken a more moderate view: that the net effect of foreign economic penetration in China cannot be ascertained, because gains and losses in the two sectors cannot be compared quantitatively. But in either case there is the assertion that there was a decline in the traditional sector.

Does the prosperity of medieval manors depend on their position in the feudal system? How large are these effects? And what are the underlying economic mechanisms? Using Domesday Book, a unique country-wide survey conducted by William the Conqueror, we reinterpret the eleventh-century English feudal system as a network in which manors are linked to one another based on their common ownership structure. Both a reduced-form and a more structural approach reveal the existence of external economies of scale: manorial prosperity was closely intertwined with the fortune of feudal peers. Our findings quantitatively establish the existence of feudal coordination in High-Medieval agricultural activities, revealing how institutionalized interactions could serve to mitigate transaction costs.

While it is inevitable that the word “capitalism” will be used by various participants at the Congress in various senses, some mutual understandings concerning the different meanings likely to be intended may help to clarify the discussions. The following is an attempt (a) to indicate the different usages which will probably occur, (b) to suggest modifying adjectives or substitute terms by which the different meanings may be distinguished, and (c) to indicate relevant historical questions.

Alfred Marshall argued that the malaise of public companies in Edwardian Britain was due to the separation of ownership from control and a lack of professional management. In this paper, we examine the ownership and control of the c.1,700 largest British companies in 1911. We find that most public companies had a separation of ownership and control, but that this had little effect on their performance. We also find that manager characteristics that proxy for amateurism are uncorrelated with performance. Ultimately, our evidence suggests that, if Marshall was correct in identifying a corporate malaise in Britain, its source lay elsewhere.

The production of economic history, like that in many fields of scholarly endeavor, increased sharply in the past quarter-century, compared to the rate of output in earlier eras. While the “new” economic history, with its emphasis on economic theory and measurement, has attracted considerable attention during the last decade, “traditional” economic history, written along institutional lines, has continued to be significant, both quantitatively (in terms of numbers of books and articles) and qualitatively (as assessed by contributions to our understanding of economic processes.)

This paper is in no way a definitive study of classes, especially of the business classes, in the city of Genoa in the thirteenth century. The materials for such a study do exist in the notarial archives and in earlier publications on this and related subjects. Rather, this is a report drawn from “work resumed” and work in its early stages at that.

The task of discussing sociological changes in the field of European enterpreneurship is not an easy one, mainly because of the scarcity of historical data of the earliest period and the fact that there has been comparatively little individual biographical research relating to that period. These changes can perhaps best be illustrated by attempting to define the individual typifying the entrepreneur in each of the three economic periods that Sombart has designated as early, middle or mature, and late capitalism.

This article argues that the development of the peasant commune in Russia, with its periodic repartition of serf holdings, hierarchy of authority, and dependence on corvee as a form of obligation, was a consequence of enslavement of the Russian peasant. These features of the commune are seen as reducing the costs of both monitoring labor effort, and maintaining the productive capacity of the serf. The chronology of their development and their association with the more fertile land of European Russia and with private as opposed to state ownership provide evidence for the argument.

What was the impact of urban political structure on preindustrial wealth inequality? I document that more closed political institutions were associated with higher inequality in a panel of early-modern German cities. To investigate the mechanisms behind that macro-relationship, I construct a unique individual-level panel dataset on personal wealth and political office-holding in the city-state of Nördlingen (1579–1700). I employ a difference-in-differences setting to show that political elites enriched themselves substantially, increasing inequality. To address endogeneity concerns, I exploit the Thirty-Years’ War as a shock to elites’ potential for enrichment from public office. Officials manipulated this crisis to enrich themselves further.

Was there an ample supply of low-skilled, free labor in the antebellum Southeast to develop a textile industry producing coarser goods? Using county-level data from the 1850 and 1860 manuscript censuses and other historical sources, we found there was a surplus of low-skilled, free (mostly white) labor in Edgefield County, South Carolina, where the textile industry was firmly established before the Civil War. If Edgefield County was not a unique case, then potential investors in southern textiles were probably not restrained by an inadequate labor force. Moreover, our Edgefield study reinforces other analyses which indicate that many whites hovered on the margins of southern society even in its most prosperous decade before the Civil War.

I was asked to illustrate the effects of the economic leadership of adAvanced nations by an example drawn from English economic history in the Middle Ages. I have accordingly chosen the subject of Italian contribution to the economic development of medieval England. What prompted this choice was not only the contribution that the Italians in fact made but also the contribution that they are reputed to have made. Indeed their reputation for economic leadership interests me as much as their achievement. For if their reputation and their achievement are collated, something more interesting than a mere illustration of economic leadership may emerge. The illustration may well turn into a cautionary example. I hope I shall not appear immodest or perverse if I suggest that the Italian example may help to circumscribe the historical and the logical validity of the entire concept of economic leadership. For the concept that appears to mean something in historical accounts of economic forms is apt to dissolve as soon as we reach out to the fundamental forces and processes of economic growth.

This paper reexamines the extent to which the giant corporations cooperated with wage and price controls during World War II, an issue to which Galbraith first drew attention. Two forms of evidence are explored: a sample of court cases involving the Office of Price Administration and large corporations, and the monographs in which former administrators reflected on their wartime experiences. The conclusion is that the compliance record could be characterized as a good one, but that this achievement depended on the constraints on allocation and collective bargaining that existed during the war.

The problem of the distribution of the agrarian product in feudalism is not at all new. It has been raised frequently by European historians and at the beginning of the 1930's led to a scientific controversy in Poland. The following article sets itself two tasks: first, to acquaint the American reader with contributions to the subject that may not be known in this country; second, to suggest an economic theory applicable to the problem. Not being an economist by profession, I will not attempt a theoretical analysis at length, but I hope, by a discussion of various approaches to the problem, to bring us closer to a solution.

In the 1770s Philadelphia had a well developed indentured servant market which served the city and the surrounding region. This market had many attributes of rational labor and physical capital markets and provided a means for financing migration and education. This study is of indenture records which include prices, term lengths, employer-provided amenities, and servant attributes to test hypotheses based on a rational buyer model. Results indicate that in response to the riskiness of a servant, the buyer used indexes of servant productivity and reliability; that the servant paid for amenities offered by the master, such as general education; and that there was a seasonal pattern of prices corresponding to seasonal activities of agriculture.