In a notable article published in 1955, Robert A. Lively analyzed the body of new writing on “the role of government in the antebellum economy.” In it he coined the term, “The American System,” to describe the characteristic pattern of “public support for business development” or government “partnership with enterprise.” The greater part of the literature covered dealt with the government promotion of canals and railroads, and he credited the writers with achieving “the rescue of the internal improvements movement from the political historian.” Another bench mark is provided by the appearance in 1969 of the fourth edition of Edward C. Kirkland's History of American Economic Life. The revision devotes attention to the new trends that have appeared in the writing of economic history since the first edition in 1932, and Kirkland declares that the one that interested him the most was “the increasing attention to the interrelationships between government and economic activity.” His chapter on “Internal Improvements and Domestic Commerce” makes full use of the research on the role of governments in the promotion of canals and railroads but ends with the judgment that recent writers have tended to overstate the supposed social gains and to disregard the traditional but still valid concern with the financial losses. Meanwhile, Albert Fishlow, in his admirable book, American Railroads and the Transformation of the Ante-Bellum Economy, had challenged the writers on the American System on a number of issues, including the commonly accepted theory that railroads were built ahead of demand. His critique is summarized in the following statement: “the recent useful destruction of the myth of ideological laissez faire must not give rise to the equally erroneous impression of all-embracing, and essential, public promotion.”

My object in this article is to use the historical evidence of one man's life to raise questions concerning the way we have come to understand our technological history. Inventors and mechanicians have long occupied a prominent place in American history. However, the bases for selecting and certifying these national heroes have resulted in a curious record of achievement and considerable distortion in our understanding of the development of American manufacturing technology. The principal historical perspective that enshrined the names of Evans, Whitney, Perkins, etc. has been first, the emphasis on originality of invention or “dramatic newness,” and, secondly, the attempt by historians to confine mechanical genius or creativity within national boundaries—Slater and DuPont, of course, being the exceptions to this generalization. Thus we speak quite naturally of American inventors, British inventors, and so on.

How much of the increased consumption of machine-made cotton yarn and cloth in nineteenth- and twentieth-century China represented a net increase in the total consumption of cotton goods? What part of the increment merely denoted a shift of the source of supply from rural handicraft to factory production—in Shanghai and Tientsin and, in the form of imports, in overseas mills? These questions, of course, are only part of the more inclusive problem of the effects of expanding foreign trade and the beginnings of domestic industrialization upon the agricultural sector in modern China. The most important household handicraft in rural China was, however, the spinning and weaving of cotton. An examination of its fate, while it will not dispose entirely of the larger problem, is a critical step toward that end.

ONE of the more perplexing problems facing the United States in the twentieth century has been that of selecting fairly which citizens shall serve in the armed forces. Today controversy surrounds the application of the Selective Service System to them raising of troops for the Vietnam War. Thus far, however, the hostilities in Vietnam have not posed one difficulty for the Selective Service System that existed during World War II, namely, the necessity of granting substantial numbers of industrial and occupational deferments, except insofar as educational deferments are a form of industrial ones. Such deferments have grown more important during the world wars of the twentieth century as nations engaged in full-scale hostilities have been forced to rely heavily on them in order to maintain the industrial and economic strength of the nation.

Two events combined at the middle of the nineteenth century to draw the attention of British economists to Australia. The first was the grant of increased local autonomy through the Australian Colonies Government Act of 1850 and subsequent legislation. The prospect of colonists, rather than the British Parliament, determining colonial affairs shifted the focus of economists' interest from London overseas and caused them to ponder seriously what Britain stood to gain or lose from this transfer of authority. British musings over the virtues of self-government and the value of the colonies were given a sudden impulse by a second event, the discovery of large quantities of gold in New South Wales and Victoria in 1851.

In the December 1968 issue of this Journal, Professors Officer and Smith question the “classical and generally accepted view of Reciprocity.” A careful reading of earlier writing on this subject casts doubt upon the novelty of their conclusions. D. C. Masters, one of their authorities, was aware of the limited effects of the Treaty. In Reciprocity, 1846-1911, he writes, “To a considerable extent the prosperity of the period, including the increase in American-colonial trade, was the result of factors other than the treaty itself.” My note raises questions about the authors' use of customs union theory (Part I) and their interpretation of the data (Part II).

In his comment “Canadian-American Reciprocity,” R. E. Ankli raises a number of conceptual, methodological, statistical, and interpretive issues about our article, “The Canadian-American Reciprocity Treaty of 1855 to 1866.” Although some points are well raised, the majority appear to stem from a misunderstanding of our work. Nevertheless, it should be stated at the outset that despite his criticisms, Ankli does not quarrel with our conclusions that (1) Reciprocity cannot conclusively be said to have benefited Canada; (2) Reciprocity alone did not appreciably increase Canadian trade; and (3) Reciprocity was not necessarily beneficial from a welfare standpoint. In fact, Ankli seems concerned that others may have hinted at these conclusions previously. While we feel our conclusions do differ essentially from the traditionally-stated views, our purpose was not to quibble over who first said what, but rather to introduce more meaningful and comprehensive data and to analyze the question in the context of modern trade theory.

The recent contribution by Knauerhase in this Journal raises some important issues regarding productivity change in ocean shipping in the late nineteenth century. The study is limited to the German fleet for the period from 1871 to 1887, but the findings do bear on the decline of freight rates after 1870. The traditional argument, which is now less in vogue, is that steam played the significant role in the last half of the nineteenth century and was the main source of advancing productivity. The novelty and importance of the findings by Knauerhase is that they support this hypothesis. The evidence given by Graham, on the other hand, points to the 1870's as a period when the sailing vessel underwent significant productivity change and experienced revived growth. This position has been buttressed by North, who argues that sail dominated the long-haul routes where most of the goods were carried and where the reduction in freight rates was most dramatic.

The Resnick paper is a report on the working out of comparative advantage in the three countries over nearly seventy years. It starts out with a model based on production possibilities curve analysis, terms of trade shifts, and income and substitution effects. An offer curve results that implies that, at least within a range, labor and other resources shift from cottage and craft production (Z goods) to farm production (F) in which there is comparative advantage and which is exported in exchange for increased imports (M). In each of the three countries statistics and descriptive material are interpreted in terms of the model.