The role of culture in economic development is experiencing renewed interest among scholars. This study proposes high intercultural transactions costs as a reason for the enduring scarcity of modem capital and technology in poor countries and conducts a statistical test based on the premise that cultural diffusion reduces these costs. The stock of direct investment in poor countries at the end of the colonial era is shown, as predicted, to be directly correlated with the diffusion of Westem culture in the European empires and elsewhere.

Conventional wisdom holds that output per capita in colonial British America increased between 0.3 and 0.6 percent per year. Our conjectural estimates challenge this view, suggesting instead that such growth was unlikely. We show that the most likely rate of economic growth was much lower, probably close to zero. We argue further that to understand the performance of the colonial economy it is necessary to include the economic activity of Native American Indians. When this is done, we estimate that the economy may have grown at the rate suggested by previous researchers.

The wage book of a Derbyshire farm, which includes payments to laborers for 1772 to 1775 and 1831 to 1845, allows me to examine the employment patterns of male and female day-laborers at this farm before and after important innovations in agriculture. I find a fall in relative female employment which appears to be due to a fall in demand. Male employment shifted to the spring, but female employment maintained the same seasonal pattern. These seasonal and sexual shifts in the demand for labor probably resulted from the changes in animal husbandry that followed enclosure.

I examine prenuptial contracting behavior in early-nineteenth-centuiy Quebec to explore property rights within families and the efficacy of marital property laws. Drawing on a transaction cost framework, I examine the decision to sign a contract and couples' property rights choices. I find, for example, that couples signing contracts tended to choose joint ownership of property when wives were particularly important to the household. These findings illustrate the potential effects of legal institutions on individuals' behavior (such as the importance of family labor, human capital acquisition, and even mating decisions) and the value of a flexible legal environment.

This article examines the role of dowries and highlights the variables that affected the size of dowries in fifteenth-century Tuscany. The estimation, which matches the households found in the marriage contrascts with the corresponding households in the Florentine Catasto of 1427, offers support for the present net value hypothesis and for the altruism model. Results indicate a positive correlation between a bride's dowry size and her age when used as peoxy for her contribution to the marital household. Parents also provided their daughters with larger dowries when they married “down” into relatively less wealthy or socially prominent households.

Governments frequently establish institutions to govern the transition in property rights when they acquire territory or experience radical changes in political regimes. By examining a specific example—the United States' acquisition of California from Mexico in 1848, this article investigates general questions about these institutions and institutional choice. The article fmds that the specific institution that Congress chose for California best balanced the interests of the federal government, American owners of land grants, and American squatters and settlers. Further, despite the lobbying, litigation, and delay associated with the institution, the institution was more efficient than prior institutions.

We examine the Austro-Hungarian bentwood furniture industry as a case study for modem industrialization during the second half of the nineteenth centuly. We establish that, through the implementation of innovative production methods and aggressive and insightful marketing strategies, this industry constitutes an important example of the modem industrial enterprise. Furthermore, we find evidence of cooperative behavior in the industry, making it an interesting case study in the history of industrial organization.

Prices rose in most years between 1933 and 1941 even though output was substantially below trend. This inflation cannot be explained as simply the effect of devaluation and changes in expectations. Rather, because prewar price changes depended significantly on the growth rate of real output, the extraordinarily rapid growth after 1933 was an important force leading to inflation. At the same time, the NIRA, by encouraging minimum wages and collusive pricing arrangements, caused a crucial diminution of the usual deviation-from-trend effect. The conjunction of these forces caused inflation at a time when the U.S. economy remained depressed.