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Market Structure and the Profits of the British African Trade in the Late Eighteenth Century

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 March 2009

J. E. Inikori
J. E. Inikori
Affiliation:
Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Federal Republic of Nigeria.
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Abstract

The pendulum of scholarship has swung too far towards the position that the profits from slaving were small. Thomas and Bean in concept and Anstey and Richardson in practice have reckoned them too small. The detailed accounts of several dozen ventures in the late eighteenth century show that the trade was difficult to enter, dominated by a few large merchants, and subject to long runs of high “short-run” profits, as in 1779–1788: The best firms earned upwards of 50 percent on their investments, well above the normal profits of an easy trade.

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Articles
Information
The Journal of Economic History , Volume 41 , Issue 4 , December 1981 , pp. 745 - 776
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 1981

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References

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5 In the second half of the eighteenth century over 90 percent of the British African trade as recorded in the British Customs books was made up of slave trade. See Inikori, J. E., “West African Import and Export Trade 1750–1807: Volume and Structure,” in Essays in Honour of Professor K. O. Dike, Ikime, Obaro, ed. (Ibadan, forthcoming). The British African trade during this period was therefore nothing but the slave trade. In fact, the terms “African trade” and “slave trade” were used interchangeably in eighteenth-century Britain. This is the usage adopted in this paper.Google Scholar

6 Thomas and Bean, “The Fishers of Men,” p. 886. The authors define “economic profit” as “the returns to a factor of production above the returns which could be earned in the next best alternative use of that factor. ‘Normal profit’ is the return to a factor just equal to its next best alternative use—i.e., just equal to the opportunity cost.” (p. 886, fn. 7).Google Scholar

7 Ibid., p. 888.

8 Ibid., p. 894.

9 Ibid., p. 914.

10 Wallace, James, A General and Descriptive History of the Ancient and Present State of the Town of Liverpool (Liverpool, 1795).Google Scholar

11 Ibid., pp. 230–31.

12 Ibid., p. 222, fn.

13 British Parliamentary Papers, Accounts and Papers, 1792, vol. 93, no. 768, pp. 1–9. This document shows the names of the vessels cleared out to Africa from Liverpool, Bristol, and London, in each of the three years. The tonnage of the vessels and all the names of the owners of each vessel are stated. From this list the character of the slave-trading firms, together with the volume and regularity of their trade, can be observed. There is a parallel list in T.64/286 covering a longer period, 1789–1794, extending to 1795 for Bristol.Google Scholar

14 These 14 are John Dawson, William Boates, Thomas Seaman, James Percival, Thomas Tarleton, John Tarleton, Clayton Tarleton, Daniel Backhouse, William Harper, Robert Brade, Thomas Leyland, Thomas Molyneux, William Dickson, and Robert Bostock.Google Scholar

15 Wallace, A General and Descriptive History.Google Scholar

16 Richardson, “Profits in the Liverpool Slave Trade,” p. 68. It has also been said that the French slave trade of the eighteenth century was dominated by “a small group of specialists.”Google ScholarStein, Robert Louis, The French Slave Trade of the Eighteenth Century: An Old Regime Business (Madison, Wisconsin, 1980), p. 152.Google Scholar

17 Samuel Galton to Mr. Farmer, 19 September 1754, Galton Papers, Galt. 405/1, Birmingham Reference Library.Google Scholar

18 Galton to Farmer, 22 September 1754, Galton Papers. Galt. 405/1.Google Scholar

19 Galton to Farmer, 9 December 1754, Galton Papers, Galt. 405/1.Google Scholar

20 Public Record Office, London (henceforth PRO), C.107/5, Galton & Son to Rogers & Co., Birmingham, 30 June 1792.Google Scholar

21 PRO, C.107/10, Galton & Son to James Rogers & Co., Birmingham, 27 June 1792. Mr. Whately mentioned here was another large gun manufacturer for the African trade.Google Scholar See Inikori, J. E., “The Import of Firearms into West Africa, 1750–1807: A Quantitative Analysis,” Journal of African History, 18, no. 3 (1977), 341–43, for further evidence on the problem of gun supply.Google Scholar

22 PRO, C.107/13, Woodville, Captain William to Rogers, James, Manchester, 29 January 1790.Google Scholar

23 PRO, C.107/13, Caton, Joseph to Rogers, James, Liverpool, 2 December 1790.Google Scholar

24 PRO, C. 107/7, Part I, Robinson & Heywood to James Rogers & Co., Manchester, 9 April 1792.Google Scholar

25 PRO, C.107/10, Green, William to James Rogers & Co., Manchester, 23 November 1792.Google Scholar

26 PRO, C. 107/8, Robinson & Heywood to James Rogers & Co., Manchester, 13 May 1791.Google Scholar

27 PRO, T.1/447/LA17, Memorial of the Merchants of Liverpool Trading to Africa to the Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, Read 16 March 1765.Google Scholar

28 See Inikori, J. E., “English Trade to Guinea: A Study in the Impact of Foreign Trade on the English Economy, 1750–1807” (Ph.D. diss., University of Ibadan, 1973), pp. 365–71.Google Scholar

29 House of Commons Journal, vol. 47, 27 April 1792, pp. 742–43.Google Scholar

30 Inikori, “English Trade to Guinea,” Table VII(b), pp. 395–99.Google Scholar

31 Ibid., p. 373.

32 Ibid., Table VII(c), pp. 400–05. PRO, C.107/4. As of 1793 James Rogers & Co. was indebted to the banking firm of James Cross & Co. to the sum of £27, 205: 19: 10d. Extracts from the ledgers of the bank contained in this source show several bill discounting transactions between James Rogers & Co. and the bank.

33 Galton to Mr Parr, Birmingham, 13 July 1754, Galton Papers, Gait. 405/1. In September 1755 Galton wrote again to Mr. Parr: “I am at times a good deal distressed for want of regular remittances and besides what is necessary for the circulation of my business I am obliged shortly to advance nigh £3,000 which obliges me to write in a more pressing manner than otherwise I should…” Galton to Parr, 27 September 1755, Gait. 405/2.Google Scholar

34 PRO, C.107/7 Part I, Whately, Henry P. to James Rogers & Co., Birmingham, 18 January 1793. The letter implies that the great demand for guns led to a great demand for gunworkers which encouraged the latter to ask for more money, creating a problem of circulating capital for the firm. As the firm could not tackle this problem while at the same time extending credit to the merchant exporters, the restricted mode of operation was adopted as a temporary measure. This shows the limit to the ability of the export suppliers to extend credit to the slave traders.Google Scholar

35 Galton to Mr Farmer, c. June 1755, Galton Papers, Galt. 405/2.Google Scholar

36 PRO, C.109/401. For the ventures made by Samuel Sandys & Co. of Liverpool in 1771, Falkner, Thomas of Liverpool supplied guns to the tune of £2,657: 18:4d. The total discount made on this for “ready money” amounted to £465.Google ScholarFarmer & Galton, Adams, Joseph (both of Birmingham), and John Parr of Liverpool also supplied the firm with guns, all making a discount of 17½ percent for cash payment.Google Scholar

37 PRO, C.107/7, Part I, William & Samuel Rawlinson to Messrs. Richard Fydell & Co., Manchester, 11 June 1787. The Rawlinsons stated in this letter that “The credit of this place is generally 12 months but the payment for African goods has been extended much longer even to 18 months by some Houses. We allow £10 per cent on an early remittance say in course of a month and Bill agreeable to what you mention.”Google Scholar For 1803, see Liverpool Record Office, 387 MD 43, invoice of goods shipped by Leyland, Thomas on board the ship Enterprize. For this venture undertaken in 1803, Thomas Leyland bought cotton textiles from Taylors & Withington and Robinsons & Co., all of Manchester, to the sum of £711:13:0d. On this amount Leyland got a discount of £106: 14:9d, being 15 percent of the gross amount (based on the marked price).Google Scholar

38 British Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers, 1789, vol. 82, no. 633, Evidence of Norris, Robert, 2 June 1788, p. 8. This statement by Norris implies that the level of profit in the slave trade had to be double the level of profits that could be had in Britain to induce investors to risk their capital in the trade.Google Scholar

39 Ibid., Evidence of John Tarleton, 06 1788, p. 50.

40 British Library, Add. MSS. 38,416, folios 204–205.Google Scholar

41 See fn. 6 above. For example of traders' statements, see the statement by Robert Norris in above text and my comment in fn. 38.Google Scholar

42 PRO, T.70/1534, Cockburn, John to a trader on the Guinea Coast, Bristol, 30 November 1776.Google Scholar

43 French planters received slaves from British traders either through re-exports from Jamaica or directly through smuggling and various underground arrangements. This went on even when Britain and France were at war.Google Scholar

44 PRO, T.70/1539, Stubbs, Robert to Court, Christopher, Annamaboe Fort, 28 October 1780.Google Scholar

45 PRO, T. 70/1549 (l), Wilding, Richard to Miles, Richard, Liverpool, 31 January 1783.Google Scholar

46 Ibid., John & Thomas Hodgson to Richard Miles, Liverpool, 17 02 1783.

47 Ibid., Thomas Hodgson to Richard Miles, Liverpool, 18 02 1783.

48 Liverpool Record Office, 920 TAR. 4/32, Tarleton, Clayton to Tarleton, Thomas, 24 September 1792.Google Scholar

49 British Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers, 1789, vol. 84, no. 646a, Letter on the subject of the Trade to Africa, (no. 13),Google Scholar Letter addressed to the Right Honourable Hawkesbury, Lord, London, 27 February 1788. This letter was written by Edgar Corrie of Liverpool, and enclosed in a letter to Lord Hawkesbury by the same writer, dated 24 February 1788. The original letters can be found in the British Library, Add. MSS. 38,416 folios 35–42.Google ScholarCorrie, Edgar asked Hawkesbury, Lord to date the present letter London, 27 February 1788, and to make it anonymous because he ran a business which would be jeopardized if it was publicly known that he was giving out information favorable to the abolition of the slave trade. As a supporter of abolition, Corrie would ordinarily be expected to play down the profits of the slave trade. For that reason his statement is important to this argument.Google Scholar

50 William Davenport's Papers are in the Raymond Richards Collection, University of Keele Library, Keele, England. Accounts of five of the ventures are in the Liverpool City Museum.Google Scholar

51 See Inikori, “English Trade to Guinea,” Table VIII, pp. 439–44. The profits for the period 1779–1784 include the value of a prize made by the ship Hawke in 1780, amounting to £2,397.5. Even if this amount is deducted as fortuitous, the average profit still remains large, 46.3 percent. In fact, it cannot be deducted because the ship Hawke was itself captured by the enemy in 1781, leading to a loss of £6,296 included in the calculations, since we have no evidence of insurance claims.Google Scholar

52 The inaccuracy of Roger Anstey's estimate of the profits of the British slave trade from 1761 to 1807 is underlined by the failure of the estimate to show a higher rate of profit for the decade 1781–1790 than the rate for the preceding decade. The decennial rates of profits produced by Anstey are: See Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade, Table 1, p. 47. One factor which affected the estimates generally is that the number of slaves employed is too low.Google Scholar See Inikori, J. E., “Measuring the Atlantic Slave Trade: An Assessment of Curtin and Anstey,” Journal of African History, 17, no. 2 (1976), pp. 197–223Google Scholar and the “Discussion” which followed, Journal of African History, 17, no. 4 (1976), pp. 595–627. Another important factor specifically affecting the estimate for the decade 1781–1790 is the low average slave price used by Anstey, this being £36. All evidence from the private letters of the merchants and the private accounts of factors in the New World shows that slave prices were generally above £40 (sterling) per head in the British colonies during this period. The prices stated in the private correspondence of Richard Miles at the beginning of the period were close to £50 (sterling). (See quotations from these letters above.) The private accounts of the slave factors, Barrett and Parkinson, and Allan, White & Co., show that the average prices of the slaves they sold at the end of the period ranged from £47 to £65 (sterling). See C.O. 137/91, Appendix no. IV, V. Taking into account the much higher prices of the slaves sold by the British slave traders directly in the non-British territories, the average price of slaves sold by the British traders in this decade could not have been less than £50 (sterling). This was the price used by Wallace, A General and Descriptive History, which agrees more with the evidence tlan Anstey's £36. This use of a slave price that is substantially too low accounts for much of the more defective estimates for this decade in relation to the others. But added to the low slave price, Anstey also assumed wrongly that “for that substantial portion of the British slave-trading fleet which supplied foreigners, there could be no question of a return lading in foreign-grown tropical produce…”Google ScholarAnstey, Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 42. But John Dawson of Liverpool who traded extensively to these foreign territories stated in 1789 that he regularly brought raw materials from the Spanish colonies. (See below.)Google Scholar And Thomas Leyland's Enterprize brought 906 boxes of sugar and over 772 quintals of logwood from Havanna in 1804. See 387 MD 43, Liverpool Record Office. There are other difficulties with the Anstey estimates.Google Scholar

53 PRO, C.107/13, Woodville, Captain William to Rogers, James, Liverpool, 29 January 1790. My italics.Google Scholar

54 Ibid., Joseph Caton to James Rogers, Liverpool, 27 01 1790. The Rodney is the Bristol ship operating from Liverpool, and William Woodville was the captain. The ship originally belonged to Parke & Heywood of Liverpool and was sold to James Rogers & Co. of Bristol, but it continued to operate from Liverpool under the care of Joseph Caton of Liverpool. See PRO, C.107/13, Caton, Joseph to Rogers, James, Liverpool, 2 December 1790. My italics.Google Scholar

55 Ibid., Joseph Caton to James Rogers, Liverpool, 11 January 1790. Joseph Caton was one of the small slave traders in Liverpool. See Table 2. James Rogers & Co. was a badly managed slavetrade firm in Bristol which became bankrupt in the 1790s.

56 Inikori, “English Trade to Guinea,” Table V(b), pp. 254–57.Google Scholar

57 Liverpool Record Office, 387 MD 40–44.Google Scholar

58 Ibid., 387 MD 43, Leyland's, Thomas instructions to Captain Caesar Lawson, Liverpool, 8 July 1803.Google Scholar

59 For the large-scale traders, loss of claims in some ventures would be more than offset by insurance gains from other ventures. But a small trader may be completely wiped out by the loss of one ship and cargo if he insured himself.Google Scholar

60 A manuscript in the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, LOG/M/21 MS 53/035, contains an oil painting of this establishment by a ship captain who traded there in 1793–1794. The trade of this firm is greater than the records in Britain indicate because much of its trade was conducted between the establishment and the New World, goods being brought from Europe on freight.Google Scholar

61 House of Commons Journal, vol. 54, 19 March 1799, Petition of Dawson, John of Liverpool.Google Scholar

62 Colonial Office, 267/9, Norris, Robert to Secretary of State, 29 May 1790.Google Scholar

63 House of Commons Journal, vol. 53, 25 May 1798, p. 624.Google Scholar

64 Board of Trade, 6/11, Evidence taken before a Committee of the Privy Council on the State of the African Trade, Evidence of Dawson, John, 17 January 1789.Google Scholar

65 Ibid.

66 British Library, Add. MSS. 38,416, folio 216.Google Scholar

67 Ibid., Report of the African Committee on several matters referred to them by order of Committee for Trade on 12 02 1788. Dated African Office, 19 02 1788, p. 26. Certainly the small traders did not possess the resources for the scale of operation required by these contracts.

68 House of Commons Journal, vol. 47, 27 April 1792, Petition of Dawson, John, pp. 742–43.Google Scholar

69 Liverpool Record Office, 920 TAR. 4/8, Tarleton, John to Tarleton, Clayton, 29 April 1790.Google Scholar

70 Drescher, Seymour, Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of Abolition (Pittsburgh, 1977), p. 212.Google Scholar

71 Liverpool Record Office, 387 MD 43, Account Book of Ship Enterprize, Sales Account by Joaquin Perez de Urria, Havanna, 22 April 1804.Google Scholar

72 39 Geo. 3 Cap. 80.Google Scholar

73 There is something intriguing in Leyland's, Thomas instruction to the captain of the Enterprize that the ship was allowed by law to carry 400 slaves. With a tonnage of 229 this means over 1.7 slaves per ton, which even the law of 1788 did not allow, let alone that of 1799. This seems to suggest that the extremely influential managing directors of the capital firms often succeeded in getting the British Customs officials to inflate the number of slaves their vessels wre legally allowed to carry. And the Enterprize in the end even exceeded the inflated number.Google Scholar

74 PRO, C.114/3, Pince v. Lumley.Google Scholar

75 Inikori, “English Trade to Guinea,” Table VIII; pp. 439–44.Google Scholar

76 Richardson, “Profitability in the Bristol-Liverpool Slave Trade,” p. 304.Google Scholar

77 Inikori, “English Trade to Guinea,” pp. 439–42. These include the ventures of the Eadith (1760 and 1761), the Chesterfield (1757 and 1759), and the Calveley (1758), whose accounts are in the Liverpool Museum.Google Scholar

78 Richardson, “Profits in the Liverpool Slave Trade.”Google Scholar

79 For example, the discount on firearms was 17½ percent in the 1770s, and that on Manchester cottons was 10 percent in the 1780s. Textiles and firearms formed over three-quarters of the value of cargo for each venture.Google Scholar

80 In this case, the discount on goods purchased on credit which Richardson deducts from the outward cost is added to the outward cost, being what the slave traders actuafly paid for buying those goods on credit. This raises the total outward cost to £369,457 instead of Richardson's £362,000. When the higher outward cost is deducted from Richardson's discounted net insets of £391,111, the result is £21,654, being the profit. Total credit purchases amount to £157,056, so that the actual total cash outlay by the merchants for the 74 ventures was £212,383. For this they earned £21,654 after 12 months, which is 10.2 percent of their actual investment. Taking into account the depressing effect of Richardson's calculations mentioned earlier, the merchants may have actually earned an annual profit rate not less than 12 percent of their cash outlay in these 74 ventures.Google Scholar

81 If the Richardson's calculations are modified, as I have done, without the net insets being discounted after 12 months, the rate of profit becomes 14.8 percent for the 18 months of the venture.Google Scholar

82 This has a depressing effect on the level of profits, because in some cases where the value of the ship as it returned from the voyage is stated by the traders this value is sometimes higher than the stated original value of the hull because of the usual costly outfit of slave vessels.Google Scholar

83 Davenport's Papers, University of Keele Library.Google Scholar

84 See Table 2. It would seem that by 1790 the Heywoods had considerably moved away from direct involvement in the slave trade to their banking business (heavily involved in the discounting of bills directly and indirectly related to the slave trade) and the manufacturing of cotton goods for the slave trade. This may be the reason why they sold some of their slave ships in 1790. (see fn. 54 above.) Hence, the list in Table 2 does not show the Heywoods, although Thomas Parke is shown with a considerably reduced investment in the slave trade. Thomas Parke himself seems to have become much involved in the production of cotton goods for the slave trade, as his son is reported in 1790 to have begun business in this line. See PRO, C.107/13, Caton, Joseph to Rogers, James, Liverpool, 2 December 1790. See also the quotation from a letter of November 1792, referring to the cotton textile business of Mr. Parke, fn. 25 above.Google Scholar

85 PRO, C.O.137/38, fo. 5.Google Scholar

86 These ventures are as follows: The profits of the ship Hawke in 1780 included a prize taken by the ship, valued at £2,397.5.Google Scholar

87 PRO, C.114/157, Ramsden, John to Cass, William, Hammersmith, 1 September 1814. Some of the papers among these records show that the first two ventures of the Bedford (in 1803 and 1804) recorded profits of £2, 126:10:4d and £2,412:2:½d. These have not been included in Table 5 because of the contradictions mentioned in the letter. See PRO, C.114/158.Google Scholar

88 Wallace, A General and Descriptive History, pp. 222, 230.Google Scholar

89 The wills of the principal traders would have given some indication of the fortunes made from the trade if total worth at the time of death was stated in money terms. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The wills do suggest, however, that the principal traders were quite wealthy at the time of their deaths. The will of William Boates of Liverpool shows that he bequeathed to his two daughters £13,000 each; to his friend and partner, Thomas Seaman, £105; to each of Seaman's servants £5.5/- each; “and as for and concerning all the Rest, Residue and Remainder of my real and personal estates and effects whatsoever and wheresoever, I give devise and bequeath the same and every part thereof unto and to the use of my son, Henry Ellis Boates…” (See PRO, PROB.11/1263 Folio No. 431, Will of William Boates of Liverpool, Merchant.) In his will, James Jones of Bristol gave to his wife an annuity of £200 a year, in addition to an estate that would come to her possession after her mother's death. Jones stated, “I give, devise and bequeath all my freehold, Real and Leasehold estates, Messuages, Land, Tenements and Hereditaments and all my monies and securities for money and also all other my personal estate whatsoever not before bequeathed and charged with and subject to the said annuities to my wife unto and between all and every one of my children…” He appointed Thomas Jones, his brother, and William Powell, his friend, to be guardians of the persons and fortunes of his children during their minorities and to be attentive to their education and “to the management and improvement of their fortunes.” (See PRO, PROB.11/1259 Folio No. 260, Will of James Jones of Bristo, Merchant.) We have not been able to locate the will of the greatest British slave trader of the late eighteenth century, John Dawson. But, as he graduated from being a captain of slave ships to become a slave merchant, his total investment of over £500, 000 in connection with the slave trade by 1792 is an indication of the level of his profits (See House of Commons Journals, vol. 47, 27 April 1792, pp. 742–43.)Google Scholar

90 Thomas and Bean, “The Fishers of Men,” p. 897.Google Scholar

91 Williams, Gomer, History of the Liverpool Privateers and Letters of Marque with an account of the Liverpool Slave Trade (London, 1897).Google Scholar

92 The late Professor F. E. Hyde once told me that much of the slave traders' records could still be found among private family papers in Liverpool. It would be a great contribution to the study of the subject if these records were made available to researchers.Google Scholar