The role of capital-labor relations in the transformation of inputs into output is central to the Marxian theory of capitalist development but is neglected by neoclassical theory. By comparing the development of cotton spinning in Britain and the U.S. in the last half of the nineteenth century, this paper analyzes the ways in which capital-labor relations affected the level and structure of wages, labor productivity, and choice of technique. This case study demonstrates the descriptive and predictive limitations of the neoclassical theory of choice of technique while at the same time pointing the way towards the development of a more incisive, and historically relevant, theory.

Premodern human capital accumulation helps to explain the exceptional growth performance of the Japanese economy in the last hundred years. Prior to this century informal institutions were more important for human capital formation than were the more formal ones familiar today. This paper examines a few seminal changes—national market formation, population control, and the involvement of farmers in rural administration—that were primarily responsible for the emergence of economically responsive, more productive individuals in rural Japan.

The worldwide spread of modern economic growth has depended chiefly on the diffusion of a body of knowledge concerning new production techniques. The acquisition and application of this knowledge by different countries has been governed largely by whether their populations have acquired traits and motivations associated with formal schooling. To judge from the historical experience of the world's twenty-five largest nations, the establishment and expansion of formal schooling has depended in large part on political conditions and ideological influences. The limited spread of modern economic growth before World War II has thus been due, at bottom, to important political and ideological differences throughout the world that affected the timing of the establishment and expansion of mass schooling. Since World War II there has been growing uniformity among the nations of the world, modern education systems have been established almost everywhere, and the spread of modern economic growth has noticeably accelerated.

In the early nineteenth century, five versions of stationary steam engines were in widespread use. In America, the high-pressure engine was dominant in the West, but on the eastern seaboard the low-pressure engine was viable. In Britain, the low-pressure engine was overwhelmingly dominant. Here we analyze the evidence on cost and performance of high- and low-pressure engines, and show that fuel-price and interest-rate differentials were sufficient to explain the distribution of steam engine types in America.

This paper offers a new interpretation of Canadian Prairie settlement during the “wheat boom” period. Rather than use a Nerlovian model on which most recent work has been based, I develop a method of simulating the extension of the feasible region of cultivation: the area on which farming is profitable. The model is applied to a wheat-growing district of Saskatchewan that experienced rapid settlement from 1898 to 1911. Comparisons of the actual area of cultivation with the simulated feasible region indicate that settlers responded quickly to changes in the profitability of wheat farming. I also find that the extension of rail lines and the increase in mean wheat yields accounts for nearly all of the increase in the feasible region.

This paper attempts to make a contribution, both in method and in substance, to the debate about the timing and extent of market orientation in pre-industrial New England agriculture. The method consists in testing five quantifiable hypotheses, with data from manuscript account books and daybooks. The results, in repeated trials, confirm the influence of the market on the rural economy of Massachusetts from very early on.

The pendulum of scholarship has swung too far towards the position that the profits from slaving were small. Thomas and Bean in concept and Anstey and Richardson in practice have reckoned them too small. The detailed accounts of several dozen ventures in the late eighteenth century show that the trade was difficult to enter, dominated by a few large merchants, and subject to long runs of high “short-run” profits, as in 1779–1788: The best firms earned upwards of 50 percent on their investments, well above the normal profits of an easy trade.

Before the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1933, several states established deposit guarantee funds. The key factor influencing the adoption of deposit insurance by a state was the structure of its banking industry. In states where small unit banks were dominant, there was strong support for guarantee funds to protect deposits; in other states there was more interest in branch banking. The failure to design the guarantee funds in accordance with sound principles of insurance brought about their demise and led to increased branch banking.

Two ideas contrary to those of the existing literature are advanced. First, the early years of the Hudson's Bay Company/Northwest Company duopoly were characterized by passive rather than by predatory competition. Second, the Hudson's Bay Company initiated the changes that eventually led to predatory competition. The Company's financial crisis of 1809–1810 brought about by the decline in demand due to the Napoleonic Wars shocked it out of complacency and into aggressive competition.

This study is based on the manuscript accounts of the Madrid Treasury for 1784– 1807. It confirms the customary view of an inexorable descent into bankruptcy, but also shows why this situation arose. A detailed analysis of receipts demonstrates the importance of colonial revenues and the stability of traditional income sources. In wartime, such as repeatedly plagued the country, the former was jeopardized and the latter proved too inelastic to respond to rising demand. On balance, the inescapable conclusion is that Spain was a limited fiscal entity which could not meet the challenge of a revolutionary era without breaking decisively with the restrictive structures of the Old Regime.

Problems persist despite efforts to solve them because those efforts are irrelevant, inadequate, or unsupported. A behavioral structure consisting of the philosophy of the system in which the problem resides, its institutions, administration, and the operation that implements its policies is devised to analyze persistent problems such as inequality, underdevelopment, and inflation. As a chronic problem in the United States and other capitalist economies, inflation reflects a contradiction within the behavioral structure. Its resolution requires reinstatement of perfect competition, which is improbable, or change of the philosophy, which is revolutionary and equally improbable; hence, inflation will persist regardless of the measures taken against it.

Certain data from the familial world have value as a means for charting increments in wealth over the long term. Dowries from medieval Ragusa (Dubrovnik), 1235 to 1460, provide such evidence where other surviving records prove inadequate. Social cohesion and endogamy allowed the noble merchant citizenry to utilize dowries to redistribute personal fortunes broadly, thereby creating broad-based wealth. Comparisons with Italian towns indicate dowry increase was widespread but often served different social and economic purposes. Analyzing dotal strategies at Ragusa allows a glimpse of the means a cohesive elite could employ to promote economic growth.

This paper examines the proposition that U.S. manufacturing experienced biased technical change during the period 1850–1919. Tests for bias, in Hicksian terms, are conducted using the translog cost dual. Redefined census data permit these tests to be made at the two-digit level of industry classification and with four inputs considered—labor, capital, materials, and a residual factor input. The tests demonstrate that labor-saving and capital-using biases existed, but material-using biases also were present. Furthermore, the patterns of bias varied considerably from industry to industry and often were of such a magnitude as to overpower ordinary substitution effects.

The market for joint stock shares in eighteenth-century England is often portrayed as an underdeveloped and flawed mechanism for resource allocation, which in turn is cited to explain the paucity of shares actually traded. This article questions that interpretation, both by inquiring whether the requisite institutions for a functional market were present, and by constructing a new time series of eighteenth-century share prices and exposing them to a test of the efficient markets hypothesis. Because the stock exchange is found to exhibit most of the conventionally defined characteristics of an effective market, the article concludes by outlining the case for skepticism with respect to a common theme in economic history: the idea that the purported superiority of market resource allocation over alternative non-market forms (in the absence of rigidities due to underdevelopment or government interference) is an unambiguous conclusion in every historical context.

The technological backwardness of the British cotton industry in the first six decades of this century was due primarily to the structure of industrial organization, characterized by intense competition and specialization, that had developed in the nineteenth century when the industry had no serious international competitors. But with the rise of corporate economies, particularly in Japan and the United States, this structure of industrial organization rendered British cotton managers powerless to create the corporate structures required to meet this challenge. Britain's decline was due to the failure of its managers to create conditions for new profitable opportunities by altering the constraints that they faced.

The origin of the land-equalizing community, the most important system of tenure in the nineteenth-century Levant, has never been explained. The evidence of language and the dynamics of factor relationships concur with the historical record: there was no scarcity of land. On the basis of a systematic comparison with the land-equalizing commune in Russia, the answer to the puzzle looms as the need to equalize a heavy burden of impositions. Indeed, villages whoselocation or political strength helped them resist taxation did not equalize holdings.Equalization was an adaptation to external demands, not a static vestigialinstitution.

Were intracity motor buses economically inferior to electric streetcars and electric buses in the late 1930s and l940s? The contention that they were has recently served as the basis for allegations that the decline of urban public transit was attributable, in large part, to an organized campaign intent on eliminating viable public transit. Aggregate data from trade sources allows a comparative cost and profit analysis of motor buses, electric buses, and electric streetcars for the years 1935–1950. The analysis supports the contention that motor buses were inferior. Questions regarding the applicability of criticisms of market foreclosure theory are also considered.

The present study dealing with Russia and Germany undertakes to investigate the practical effect of tariffs on business and entrepreneur rather than the oft-discussed role of tariffs in international politics. Evidence from German industrial archives demonstrates that businesses were less concerned with tariff issues than one might expect from firms depending on exports. It shows that impediments other than customs duties (expenditures for credit, service, freight, investment, marketing; and competition, restrictions imposed on government orders, subventions, production costs abroad, technological changes) by far overshadowed inhibiting effects of tariffs. Circumspect responses of the entrepreneur helped to minimize the economic role tariffs played.