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Economic Sophistication in Nineteenth Century Congressional Tariff Debates

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2011

Richard C. Edwards
Richard C. Edwards
Affiliation:
Harvard University
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Extract

One of the most controversial economic issues confronting the American public during the nineteenth century was that of protection. The plea for a protective tariff had been raised as soon as the First Congress met in 1789. The issue was sharply debated off and on throughout the nineteenth century but never finally resolved. There is now a large literature relating the outcome of this issue to the economic and political interests of various involved groups.

Type
Articles
Information
The Journal of Economic History , Volume 30 , Issue 4 , December 1970 , pp. 802 - 838
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 1970

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References

The author wishes to thank Professor Alexander Gerschenkron, who first inspired this paper and for whose course an early version was written. Carolyn Pope Edwards and a referee greatly improved the paper's prose.

1 If our concern were behavioral, we should have to investigate the considerable power of unsystematized ideas, even quite unsophisticated ones, to accomplish political objectives in a society which historically has been notable for its distrust of systematic thought.

2 Congressional Record: Containing the Proceedings and Debates of the Fifty Third Congress, Second Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1894), Parts I, II, and Appendix, Part I.

3 The Annals of the Congress of the United States, Eighteenth Congress, First Session (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1854)Google Scholar, Volumes 41 and 42.

4 Rhode Island, Connecticut, Vermont, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Deleware, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri.

5 Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.

6 The final vote is reported in Annals, pp. 2429–2430. Congressmen can be identified from D., Rapine, Congressional Directory, for the Second Session of the Eighteenth Congress of the United States, (Washington City, 1824Google Scholar).

7 Annals, pp. 1559, 1678, 2178, 2222, 2233, 2372, 2391, 2403.

8 Ibid., p. 1476.

9 Ibid., pp. 2144, 2233, 2235, 2372.

10 Ibid., p. 1682.

11 Ibid., p. 2069.

12 ibid., p. 1474.

13 See Sen, S. R., The Economics of Sir James Steuart (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957Google Scholar).

14 Buchanan quoting Webster, Annals, p. 1891.

15 Ibid., pp. 1923,1931, 1940,1974,1997, 2021, 2071.

16 Ibid., p. 2248.

17 Schumpeter, J. A., History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 522nGoogle Scholar.

18 Annals, George McDuffie (S.C.), p. 2402.

19 While there is no explicit mention of an income flow, it is evident from the speeches that the concept of increases in stock approximates a modern flow=of=income wealth definition; the stock=flow problem was simply not recognized by the Congress.

20 Annals, Christopher Rankin (Miss.), p. 2019.

21 Ibid., Daniel Webster (Mass.), p. 2046.

22 Ibid., p. 2046.

23 Ibid., Daniel Webster (Mass.), p. 2046.

24 Ibid., Robert Garnett (Va.), p. 2093.

25 Ibid., P. P. Barbour (Va.), p. 1923.

26 Ibid., Samuel Foot (Conn.), p. 2297.

27 See for example Ibid., p. 1923 ff.

28 Ibid., Christopher Rankin (Miss.), p. 2005.

29 Ibid., George McDuffie (S.C.), p. 2407.

30 Ibid., p. 2180.

31 Ibid., Timothy Fuller (Mass.), p. 1706. An even more explicit statement comes from the tariff side: “in this thinly populated country, labor is what we want.” Ibid., Henry Martindale (N.Y.), p. 1643.

32 Ibid., pp. 1683–84.

33 Ibid., pp. 1935, 2253.

34 Ibid., p. 2020.

35 Ibid., p. 2031.

36 Ibid., Daniel Webster (Mass.), p. 2031.

37 Ibid., p. 2050.

38 Ibid., p. 1940.

39 Ibid., p. 2019.

40 Ibid., p. 2053.

41 Ibid., Lewis Williams (N.C.), p. 2111.

42 Ibid., p. 1925.

43 Ibid., p. 2086.

44 Ibid., p. 2062.

45 Ibid., Henry Martindale (N.Y.), p. 1655.

46 Ibid., Henry Martindale (N.Y.), p. 1644.

47 Ibid., Salas Wood (N.Y.), p. 2073.

48 Ibid., Henry Clay (Ky.), p. 1966. Also: “Production will exceed the consumption of the country and new branches of industry will become necessary.” Ibid., Salas Wood(N.Y.), p. 2072.

49 Ibid., James Strong (N.Y.), p. 2127.

50 Ibid., Salas Wood (N.Y.), p. 2073.

51 Ibid., Henry Martindale (N.Y.), p. 1634. See also p. 1965 for similar statements by Henry Clay.

52 Ibid., Salas Wood (N.Y.), p. 2072.

53 Ibid., Salas Wood (N.Y.), p. 2074.

54 Ibid., Henry Martindale (N.Y.), p. 1633.

55 Ibid., George McDuffie (S.C.), p. 2406.

56 It does not do great injustice to the tariff advocates’ position to make exports exogenous, since American trade was seen as a small part of total world trade; however, to satisfactorily account for their view of both exports and imports, one would logically need to introduce the entire monetary sector into the model. Basically, specie flow was seen as the regulator forcing nations to purchase abroad only to the extent that they sold abroad. However, these views were never systematized. See, for example, Ibid., Henry Clay, p. 1962 ff. and Salas Wood, p. 2068 ff.

57 We must remember that in none of these speeches was there any open attempt to create such a model; in this sense, all of the passages from the debates are taken out of their contexts. But the purpose of this paper is to go behind (or outside of) the context to see what notions the Congress had about the economy.

58 Annals, pp. 2406, 2020, 1965.

59 Ibid., p. 1965.

60 Ibid., Henry Clay (Ky.), p. 1973. Compare Clay's statement with the following by Ricardo (Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, London, 1817, Chapter I, Section III): “The exchangeable value of the commodities produced would be in proportion to the labor bestowed on their production; not on their immediate production only, but on all those implements or machines required to give to the particular labor.…”

61 Annals, Salas Wood (N.Y.), p. 2017.

62 Ibid., John Wright (Ohio), p. 1502. See also pp. 1964, 1642, 2407.

63 See Hamilton's Report on Manufactures of December 5, 1791 (reprinted in McKee, Samuel Jr, Papers on Public Credit, Commerce, and Finance by Alexander Hamilton; New York: Columbia University Press, 1934Google Scholar); especially pages 203–206.

64 Annals, pp. 1472, 1553, 1990, 2071, 2263.

65 Ibid., John Tod (Pa.), p. 1473.

66 Keynes, J. M., The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936Google Scholar) Chapter 23, section IV. J. A. Schumpeter, in History of Economic Analysis, gives a somewhat fuller description of mercantilist thought on the employment problem; he concludes that “some of the mercantilist writers went to surprising, in fact to Keynesian, lengths.” (p. 350). The present case seems a good example of that.

67 That, for example, is how the Democratic votes against the bill can be explained.

68 The vote is reported in Record, p. 1994. Congressmen can be identified by party in the Joint Committee on Printing, U.S. Congress, Official Congressional Directory, Fifty=Third Congress, Second Session (Washington, 1894).

69 Record, p. 711.

70 Ibid., p. 802.

71 Ibid., p. 805.

72 Ibid., Charles Bell (Texas), p. 551.

73 Ibid., W. B. Cockran (N.Y.), Appendix, p. 16.

74 Ibid., John Dalzell (Pa.), p. 652. All of the quotations in this section are taken from speeches by Republican Congressmen.

75 Ibid., Myron Wright (Pa.), p. 811.

76 See Ibid., p. 771.

77 Ibid., Charles Daniels (N.Y.), p. 779.

78 Ibid., Nelson Dingley (Maine), p. 731.

79 Ibid., Nelson Dingley (Maine), p. 733.

80 See for example Ibid., pp. 731, 768, 638.

81 Ibid., Nelson Dingley (Maine), p. 730.

82 For any individual good, the American (real) labor cost might be lower, higher, or the same as labor costs abroad, depending on the relevant technology and resources; and this relationship should determine whether the good gets traded or not. However, taking all goods, general productivity differentials favorable to American labor were explicitly denied; See Ibid., pp. 653, 731, 768, 638.

88 Ibid., John Dalzell (Pa.), p. 651.

84 Ibid., Nelson Dlngley (Maine), p. 727.

85 Ibid., William Draper (Mass.), p. 802.

86 Ibid., William Draper (Mass.), p. 805.

87 Ibid., Julius Burrows (Mich.), p. 577.

88 Ibid., William Draper (Mass.), p. 802.

89 Ibid., Binger Hermann (Iowa), Appendix, p. 508.

90 Ibid., Albert Hopkins (Pa.), p. 638.

91 Ibid., Marriott Brosius (Pa.), p. 746. See also p. 607.

92 Ellsworth, P. T., The International Economy, 3rd Edition. (New York: The Macmillan Company), 1964, pp. 227–230Google Scholar.

93 This is a confusion that the Congress of 1824 avoided by refusing to discuss money variables; it documents the argument made above that consideration only of real values was a tremendous and important simplification for that Congress.

94 Record, William Wilson (W. Va.), Appendix, p. 196. All of the quotations in this section are taken from speeches by Democratic Congressmen.

95 Ibid., Charles Bell (Texas), p. 550.

96 Ibid., W. B. Cockran (N.Y.), Appendix, p. 16.

97 ibid., W. B, Cockran (N.Y.), Appendix, p. 17.

98 This dubious assumption is investigated more fully below.

99 Certainly if there were unemployed labor resources, adjustment (2) would be beneficial; in fact, it was recognized as a possibility: “If production be unrestricted by law we believe trade [i.e., production] will increase so that the demand for labor in this country will exceed the supply … and the result of the competition will be to raise his wages and improve his condition.…” Record, W. B. Cockran (N.Y.), Appendix, p. 18.

100 ibid., Michael Harter (N.Y.), p. 740.

101 Ibid., Charles Bell (Texas), p. 550.

102 Ibid., William Breckinridge (Ky.), p. 718.

103 Ibid., W. B. Cockran (N.Y.), Appendix, p. 16.

104 ibid., Charles Bell (Texas), p. 555.

105 Ibid., p. 555.

106 Ibid., Charles Bell (Texas), p. 550.

107 Ibid., W. B. Cockran (N.Y.), Appendix, p. 14.

108 Ibid., William Breckinridge (KyO, p. 711.

109 Ibid., W. B. Cockran (N.Y.), Appendix, p. 16. See also pp. 740, 659.

110 Ibid., p. 740.

111 Ibid., John Warner (N.Y.), p. 660.

112 For this view, see Stanwood, Edward, American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1903), pp. 204–207Google Scholar.