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Knowledge and its relation to the status of theology according to Ockham1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2011

Gordon Leff
Affiliation:
Reader in History, University of York

Extract

Ockhamism was a radical restatement of the relation of revealed truth to natural experience. Its force lay in the systematic application—one might say exploitation—of the different criteria appropriate to each. That they were different was universally accepted; but not until Ockham were their differences methodically shown to be unassimilable. The reasons were not only epistemological; they were also theological. The limits to natural knowledge set by Ockham's insistence upon verification had their counterpart in the absence of limits to God's omnipotence—save self-contradiction. Ockhamism was not just empiricism; it was an extreme restatement of Christian belief in divine omnipotence and the contingency of creation. The disruptive effects lay not in the belief itself but in the play upon it, especially by Ockham's followers.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1969

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References

page 7 note 2 This was first recognised by Crombie, A. C., Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science, 1100–1700, Oxford 1953, 169 ffGoogle Scholar. See also my Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, New York 1968, ch. 5.Google Scholar

page 7 note 3 Op. cit., 53 ff.; also a resumé by the same author in Robert Grosseteste: scholar and Bishop, ed. Callus, D., Oxford 1955, 98120.Google Scholar

page 8 note 1 Crombie, Robert Grosseteste, 55.

page 8 note 2 Prologue, q. 1, 5–6. (All references are to G. de Ockham, Opera Philosphica et Theologica, I, ed. Gál, G. and Brown, S., St. Bonaventure, New York 1967).Google Scholar

page 8 note 3 Ibid., 6.

page 9 note 1 Ibid., q. 2, 76.

page 9 note 2 Ibid., 77.

page 9 note 3 Ibid., 77–8.

page 9 note 4 Ibid., q. 1, 30–2.

page 10 note 1 Ibid., 39–40.

page 10 note 2 Ibid., 22–3.

page 10 note 3 Ibid., 21.

page 10 note 4 Ibid.

page 10 note 5 Ibid. (Ad secundum dubium), 58–60.

page 11 note 1 Ibid., 41–4.

page 11 note 2 Ibid. (Ad quintum dubium), 69.

page 11 note 3 Ibid., q. 2, 83–4.

page 11 note 4 Ibid., 90–1.

page 12 note 1 Ibid., q. 5, 170–1.

page 12 note 2 Ibid., q. 8, 144–52.

page 12 note 3 Ibid., and also q. 2, 83: Ad aliam propositionem dico quod non omnis passio est demonstrabilis de suo subiecto nisi precise per experientiam, et nullo modo per demonstrationem. Et hoc non tantum est verum de propositionibus per se nota in qua predicatur passio de suo subiecto, sed etiam de propositione frequenter non per se nota, sicut de ista, ‘calor est califactivus’, et de similibus.

page 13 note 1 Ibid., q. 9, 242–3.

page 13 note 2 Ibid., 264.

page 13 note 3 Ibid., q. 8, 213.

page 13 note 4 Ibid., also. 9, 234–5.

page 13 note 5 Ibid., q. 9, 254 and 264.

page 13 note 6 Ibid., q. 7, 193.

page 13 note 7 Ibid., q. 5, 187. i.e. God could override the dispensation he had ordained for this world (by his potentia ordinata) and do differently or directly what was normally done by secondary causes. See my Bradwardine and the Pelagians, Cambridge 1957, and Gregory of Rimini, Manchester 1961.

page 14 note 1 Ibid., 188.

page 14 note 2 Ibid., q. 9, 235.

page 14 note 3 Ibid., q. 1, 7.

page 14 note 4 Ibid., 10–11.

page 14 note 5 Ibid., 11.

page 14 note 6 Ibid., q. 9 (Ad 2m et 3m argumenta principalia), 275–6.

page 14 note 7 Ibid., q. 1, 9–10.

page 14 note 8 Ibid., 12–13.

page 14 note 9 Ibid., q. 2, 119–27.

page 15 note 1 Ibid., 121–2.

page 15 note 2 Ibid., 127.

page 15 note 3 Ibid., q. 1, 48.

page 15 note 4 Ibid., 49.

page 15 note 5 Ibid., 72–3 (Ad argumenta principalia).

page 15 note 6 Ibid., q. 7, 202–3.

page 15 note 7 Ibid., q. 9, 266–8.

page 15 note 8 Ibid., q. 2 (conclusiones 1–3) 111–15.

page 15 note 9 Ibid. (conc. 4), 115.

page 15 note 10 Ibid. (conc. 5), 116–17.

page 16 note 1 Ibid., q. 9, 268–9.

page 16 note 2 Ibid., q. 8, 220.

page 16 note 3 Ibid.

page 16 note 4 Ibid. (Ad primum principale), 275.

page 16 note 5 Ibid., 273.

page 17 note 1 Ibid., 273–4.

page 17 note 2 Ibid., 274.

page 17 note 3 Ibid.

page 17 note 4 Ibid., q. 2, 71–2 (Ad nonum dubium).