Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rdxmf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-24T18:02:14.942Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Omitted Variables, Intent, and Counterfactuals: A Response to Michael H. Nelson

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2016

Allen Hicken
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

I have written elsewhere: “Where there exists a critical mass of scholars working on similar sets of questions—critiquing and building on one another's work—knowledge accumulation is more likely to occur.”1 It is with this statement in mind that I proceed with my response to Michael Nelson's thoughtful critique on my previous article (see Allen Hicken, “Party Fabrication: Constitutional Reform and the Rise of Thai Rack Thai,” Journal of East Asian Studies 6, no. 3 [2006]: 381–407). Rather than a point-by-point rebuttal, I will focus on three of the most interesting and challenging of Nelson's theoretical critiques. The first substantive issue concerns the charge of omitted variable bias—specifically, in reference to the omission of local political groups from a macro-institutional account. The second and third criticisms are more methodological. First, can we or should we ascribe motives to political actors? Second, how can we use counterfactuals to solve problems of observational equivalence?

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of East Asian Studies , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , April 2007 , pp. 149 - 158
Copyright
Copyright © East Asia Institute 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Notes

1. Hicken, Allen, “Developing Democracies in Southeast Asia: Theorizing the Role of Parties and Elections,” in Kuhonta, Erik, Slater, Daniel, and Vu, Tuong, eds., Southeast Asia and Political Science: Theory, Region, and Method (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, forthcoming).Google Scholar

2. Nelson cites confusion with the fact that I argue that MMCs undermined the value of party label while simultaneously stating that incentives for establishing personal networks still exist under SMCs. However, my argument that the elimination of MMCs reduces incentives to put person before party does not assume that MMCs were the “root” cause of such incentives, nor do I argue that such incentives have completely disappeared. Instead, mine is a ceteris paribus argument. For a discussion of the way in which MMCs exacerbated preexisting weaknesses in the Thai party system and combined with them to help prevent the emergence of stronger, more meaningful political parties, see Hicken, Allen, “Parties, Pork, and Policy: Policymaking in Developing Democracies” (PhD diss., University of California-San Diego, 2002).Google Scholar

3. Nelson, Michael H., Central Authority and Local Democratization in Thailand: A Case Study from Chachoengsao Province (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1998).Google Scholar

4. More technically, because it does not vary, it covaries with neither the dependent nor the included independent variables. As a result, its omission does not introduce bias.Google Scholar

5. Assuming that the pre-reform MMC contained the same number of phuak. Google Scholar

6. Personal incentives still exist under SMCs, and these were exacerbated in Thailand given the small district size and small number of votes needed to win elections. Hicken, Allen, “How Effective Are Institutional Reforms?” in Schaffer, Frederic C., ed., Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007).Google Scholar

7. Note too that phuak not only mediate the impact of macro variables such as institutional reform or the rise of a charismatic leader, they are also shaped by them.Google Scholar

8. Nelson makes no mention of the crisis, and I mention it only briefly in reference to the effect of the crisis on the strength of opposition parties and the role of business interests in politics. For more details, see Hewison, Kevin, “Crafting Thailand's New Social Contract,” Pacific Review 17, no. 4 (2004): 503–522. Also see Hewison, Kevin, “Neo-liberalism and Domestic Capital: The Political Outcomes of the Economic Crisis in Thailand,” Journal of Development Studies 41, no. 2 (2005): 310–330.Google Scholar

9. I do note in the article that the effects of greater powers for the prime minister on the number of parties seems not to have been anticipated by the drafters.Google Scholar

10. An example of the latter would be identifying a puzzle to be explored (e.g., the drafters expected reforms to lead to X, but we observe Y. What happened?).Google Scholar

11. Fearon, James D., “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” World Politics 43, no. 2 (1991): 169.Google Scholar

12. Note that in arguing that without the reforms Thaksin would not have had the “additional benefit” of party-list votes and would have needed to “spend even more money,” Nelson acknowledges that the reforms had some effect on actors' strategies and behavior, though not as strong an effect as I claim.Google Scholar

13. Vatikiotis, Michael and Tasker, Rodney, “Thailand: Prickly Premier,” Far Eastern Economic Review , April 11, 2002.Google Scholar

14. Tumcharoen, Surasak, “Banharn Left to Pick up the Pieces After Desertions,” Bangkok Post , July 27, 2004.Google Scholar

15. Bangprapa, Mongkol and Ruangdit, Pradit, “Thai Rak Thai Party No Better than a ‘Prison,’ Vows to Fight Abuse of Sovereign Power,” Bangkok Post , June 9, 2005.Google Scholar

16. Vatikiotis, and Tasker, , 2002.Google Scholar

17. Mongkol, and Pradit, , 2005.Google Scholar

18. While I have been unable to locate any statements directly from Sanoh on why he did not leave TRT earlier, we do have statements from other members of his faction that tend to support my argument. For example, faction member Burin Hiranaburanam, speaking of the faction's support of a constitution amendment to loosen party switching restrictions, stated “the 90-day membership requirement is like a lock, preventing them from choosing a party more suited to their views.” Quoted in Vatikiotis, and Tasker, , 2002.Google Scholar