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Institutional Incentives and Informal Local Political Groups (Phuak) in Thailand: Comments on Allen Hicken and Paul Chambers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2016

Michael H. Nelson
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Extract

Post-1997 Thai politics have been shaped by the effects of two momentous events that occurred almost at the same time: the introduction of far-reaching structural changes by the 1997 constitution, and the appearance of a singularly overbearing and centralizing political leader—Thaksin Shinawatra. To political analysts, this situation has provided uniquely rich opportunities to observe over a number of years whether constitutional engineering had the envisaged effect of restricting the politicians' “undesirable” actions, and whether the intended institutional change was realized. However, the coincidence of constitutional change and the occurrence of Thaksin has also made it necessary to distinguish the effects of structural changes from the effects of the new form of political leadership.

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Articles
Information
Journal of East Asian Studies , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , April 2007 , pp. 125 - 147
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Copyright © East Asia Institute 

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References

Notes

1. Khosanoe nai kanpattirup kanmueng thai [Recommendations for the Reform of Thai Politics] (Krungthep: Khanakammakan Patthana Prachathipattai, 1995), p. 77.Google Scholar

2. Krob bueangton rang ratthathammanun chabap prachachon (Krungthep: Khanakammithikan Prachasamphan Sapha Rang Ratthathammanun, 1997), p. 47.Google Scholar

3. Standard references that focus on Thaksin as political leader are Phongpaichit, Pasuk and Baker, Chris, Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand (Chiang Mai: Silkworm, 2004); and McCargo, Duncan and Pathamanand, Ukrist, The Thaksinization of Thailand (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2005). It is probably not due to any self-delusion on the side of these authors that they chose to focus on Thaksin instead of on Thai Rak Thai or on constitutional changes that were supposedly “necessary” for the creation of Thaksin. See also Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Thailand: Democratic Authoritarianism,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2003 (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), pp. 277–290; and Bowornwathana, Bidhya, “Thaksin's Model of Government Reform: Prime Ministerialisation Through ‘A Country Is My Company’ Approach,” Asian Journal of Political Science 12, no. 1 (2004): 135–153.Google Scholar

4. A more systematic initial statement can be found in Nelson, Michael H., “Analyzing Provincial Political Structures in Thailand: Phuak, Trakun, and Hua Khanaen” SEARC Working Paper No. 79, 2005.Google Scholar

5. Obviously, one could reformulate these two sentences to emphasize the role of the leader and thereby reduce the phuak-related group character. However, one cannot go as far as reducing these groupings to a collection of separate dyadic patron-client relationships. Phuak do have collective identities. In any case, without a strong leader, no phuak would exist. It is he who has built it over many years and elections, at the constituency level using his territorial location (the wider vicinity of his residence) for the creation of personal loyalties and the sharing of benefits. With the leader's departure, phuak mostly disintegrate and reorganize into one or more phuak under different leaders.Google Scholar

6. Hicken mixes up decentralization (the transfer of power, personnel, and money from state agencies to autonomous local government units) with the CEO-governor issue. These are separate subjects, since the governors belong to the central state administration. As such, they are part of deconcentration. They are designed to introduce some degree of horizontal integration to the state's highly fragmented field agencies at the provincial level. Formally, governors are not “appointed and removed by Thaksin,” but by the minister of the interior. Informally, even Thaksin's wife participates in such appointments. In short, the CEO governors are about centralization, not decentralization. For some initial information see Nelson, Michael H., “Thailand: Problems with Decentralization?” in Nelson, Michael H., ed., Thailand's New Politics: KPI Yearbook 2001 (Nonthaburi: King Prajadhipok's Institute and White Lotus Press, 2002), pp. 219–281.Google Scholar

7. Election campaigns to Tambon administrative organizations and municipalities mostly do not refer to any political parties. Instead, candidates use locally relevant labels, such as “Group for the Unity of Mukdahan.” These labels, then, might in fact not belong to the candidates in any specific locality but rather be the label of an influential local political group that includes the MP of that area.Google Scholar

8. For a description of the earlier situation, see Nelson, Michael H., Central Authority and Local Democratization in Thailand: A Case Study from Chachoengsao Province (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1998).Google Scholar

9. Pho liang is the northern Thai version of the chao pho, so to speak, but not necessarily with the criminal or “mafia” connotation (although, e.g., Narong Wongwan would have fit this perspective).Google Scholar

10. “Clandestine” because candidates in Senate elections are neither allowed to belong to any political party nor to carry out any election campaign.Google Scholar

11. The Democrat Party is an exception in some respects, since it has been in existence for 60 years and boasts around 170 local party branches. It is an unanswered empirical question whether these branches have had any meaningful political visibility and structural effect in their localities. An indicator might be that the Democrats gained a mere 18 MPs in Bangkok, central Thailand, the north, and the northeast. Even the supposed strength of the party in the south of Thailand, where the party gained 52 MPs, needs to be looked at with a critical perspective. See Askew, Marc, “Culture and Electoral Politics in Southern Thailand: A Study of Party Identity, Group Formation, and the Symbolic Construction of Political Allegiances in Songkhla Province,” research report submitted to King Prajadhipok's Institute, Thailand, August 2005.Google Scholar

12. Among the ten items on the “Wish list for charter changes” printed in the Bangkok Post (February 25, 2006) was “Revoke the requirement for MPs to be members of a political party.” This suggestion was also made when I observed the meetings of an extraordinary committee of the first-elected Senate tasked with studying the effects of the 1997 constitution. Some senators thought that forcing candidates to run as members of political parties restricted both their and the voters' freedom of choice.Google Scholar

13. Krob bueangton rang ratthathammanun chabap prachachon , p. 46f.Google Scholar

14. To understand the historical character of elections, voters, and political parties in European democracies, and thus in Thailand, it is still worth reading a book that was published some decades ago: Rokkan, Stein, Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1970).Google Scholar

15. For more details, see Nelson, , Central Authority and Local Democratization in Thailand , chap. 8.Google Scholar

16. The former position was adopted by McCargo, Duncan, “Thailand's Political Parties: Real, Authentic, and Actual,” in Hewison, Kevin, ed., Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 114–131. The latter was taken by James Ockey, “Change and Continuity in the Thai Political Party System,” Asian Survey 43, no. 4 (2003): 663–680.Google Scholar

17. It has been criticized that Thaksin had variously pointed out that he would preferentially serve areas of the people who voted for him, while people in areas who voted for opposition parties would have to wait in line.Google Scholar

18. Nelson, Michael H., “Thailand's House Elections of 6 January 2001: Thaksin's Landslide Victory and Subsequent Narrow Escape,” in Nelson, , Thailand's New Politics: KPI Yearbook 2001 , pp. 283–441 (293f).Google Scholar

19. The Bangkok Post (August 11, 2006) commented, “In six years in opposition, the Democrats have consistently criticized TRT's grassroots policies as ill-planned, short-sighted and little more than state-supported vote buying. It is a disappointment that the Democrats now want to play TRT's game. And it is a sad indictment of our society that Thailand's democracy appears to depend less on a reasoned debate over sound governance and sustainable policy, than on the question of which party can promise more largesse for votes.” Google Scholar

20. The Nation , October 10, 2001, p. 5A. In the aftermath, Newman, B. I., ed., Handbook of Political Marketing (Thousand Oakes, CA: Sage, 1999) was sought after by many politicians. The book contains a chapter by Kotler entitled “Political Marketing: Generating Effective Candidates, Campaigns, and Causes” (pp. 3–18).Google Scholar

21. “Ban Phitsanulok” is the name of a building in the Government House compound.Google Scholar

22. Hicken, Allen D., “From Phitsanulok to Parliament: Multiple Parties in Pre-1997 Thailand,” in Nelson, , Thailand's New Politics: KPI Yearbook 2001 , pp. 145–176. For some reason, this article is not referred to in his present piece, although both texts together serve as some sort of before/after (the constitutional reform) analyses.Google Scholar

23. Already the first part of this statement might not be accurate. The point was not the number of parties as such, but of parties in Parliament, and especially the instability of coalition governments. The solution was rather seen in strengthening the position of the prime minister. In addition, the drafters expressly aimed at making it easier to found new political parties by eliminating the requirement of fielding a certain number of candidates, and by reducing the costs of running a party (for example, see Krob bueangton rang ratthathammanun chabap prachachon , p. 45).Google Scholar

24. I have had no time yet to analyze the minutes of the CDA meetings. They comprise around 10,000 pages and are available on a CD-ROM produced by the King Prajadhipok's Institute with the financial support of the Asia Foundation. This author was involved in the preparation of the CD.Google Scholar

25. Nitikraiphot, Suraphon, Rabop khuabkhum truatsop ratthaban thong kanmueng thi mosom [An Appropriate Political Accountability System for the Government] (Krungthep: Khanakammakan Patthana Prachathipattai, 1995). The DDC was aided in its work by a set of fifteen reports on main areas of the envisaged constitutional reform. These reports often heavily rely on other existing work in the Thai language, or on the experience of the authors with the foreign countries in which they did their PhDs. Suraphon's main points were about turning the prime minister into a real leader, and the continuity and stability of the government in the context of a “rationalized parliament.”Google Scholar

26. Mewongukote, Boonsri, Kanprapprung rabop phak kanmueng [The Improvement of the Political Party System] (Krungthep: Khanakammakan Patthana Prachathipattai, 1995).Google Scholar

27. “Influential people” is a short cliché version for the phuak system described earlier.Google Scholar

28. These two paragraphs summarize pages 43 and 45 of Bunnawat, Paithun, Rabop kanlueaktang thi lot kansuesiang lae hai okat khon di samak luaektang [An Election System that Reduces Vote-buying and that Provides the Opportunity to Good People to Run in Elections] (Krungthep: Khanakammakan Patthana Prachathipattai, 1995).Google Scholar

29. Khosanoe nai kanpattirup kanmueng thai [Recommendations for the Reform of Thai Politics] (Krungthep: Khanakammakan Patthana Prachathipattai, 1995), p. 53.Google Scholar

30. Ibid., p. 63.Google Scholar

31. Ibid., pp. 74–77.Google Scholar

32. Krob bueangton rang ratthathammanun chabap prachachon , p. 41.Google Scholar

33. The Thai document is “Prachachon dai arai chak (rang) ratthathammanun haeng ratchaanachak thai chabap prachachon singhakhom 2540” (Krungthep: Sapha rang ratthathammanun). See the English translation in The Nation, August 23, 1997.Google Scholar

34. The formulation “areas where they are strong” signals a reference to phuak. Google Scholar

35. Uwanno, Borwornsak and Burns, Wayne D., “The Thai Constitution of 1997: Sources and Process,” University of British Columbia Law Review 32, no. 2 (1998): 227–247.Google Scholar

36. The Thai document is “Prachachon dai arai chak (rang) ratthathammanun haeng ratchaanachak thai chabap prachachon singhakhom 2540.” Google Scholar

37. The document is “Raingan kanprachum choeng pattibatkan rueng panha lae rabop kanluektang nai prathet thai …” [Report on the Workshop on Problems and the System of Elections in Thailand] (Krungthep: Kumphaphan 2540, 1997), pp. 1-45–1-47.Google Scholar

38. When Thaksin as PDP leader invited the press free of charge to a party in an exclusive Chiang Mai resort, few vegetarian dishes were served, but red wine was in abundance. A report in the Bangkok Post (February 8, 1996, p. 5) summarized the situation: “For those who had covered the party when Maj-Gen Chamlong was the party leader, it was hard to believe changes have been so drastic. Old party members have to adjust to the changes quickly or they would feel bewildered about how to respond to the new situation.” Google Scholar

39. Quoted in Pasuk, and Baker, , Thaksin , p. 63.Google Scholar

40. Thaksin did not take up the invitation from the New Aspiration Party (NAP) to take over from Chavalit Yongchaiyudh ( The Nation , June 15, 1997, p. B8). It was much better to let Sanoh Thienthong and his faction join his TRT than to follow Sanoh's wish and take over NAP—and then have to be grateful to him and deal with his internal party network. Even after Thaksin admitted Sanoh to TRT, he was somewhat difficult to control, although not a serious threat.Google Scholar

41. Printed in The Nation , September 22, 2006. The Thai-language order is reproduced as a pdf file on the coup plotters' website at www.mict.go.th/cdrc/image/pp1.pdf.Google Scholar

42. According to the constitution, MP candidates must have been members of a political party ninety days before they register their candidacy (not before the election, as Hicken also offers).Google Scholar

43. In footnote 61, Hicken attributes the setting of the date of the new election on October 15, 2006, to the need of selecting new election commissioners. This is incorrect. Rather, this date was expressly aimed at lifting the ninety-day limit in order to enable the supposedly great number of dissatisfied TRT members to leave their “prison.” As it turned out, only two insignificant party-list MPs left the party, while a few new faces joined it.Google Scholar