Three important features of Indian labor markets enduringly coexist: rent-seeking, occupational immobility, and caste. These facts are puzzling, given theories that predict static, equilibrium social inequality without conflict. Our model explains these facts as an equilibrium outcome. Some people switch caste-associated occupations for an easier source of rents, rather than for productivity. This undermines trust between castes and shuts down occupational mobility, which further encourages rent-seeking due to an inability of workers to sort into occupations. We motivate our contribution with novel stylized facts exploiting a unique survey question on casteism in India, which we show is associated with rent-seeking.

We develop a method which assumes that marital preferences are characterized either by the scalar-valued measure proposed by Liu and Lu, or by the matrix-valued generalized Liu–Lu measure. The new method transforms an observed contingency table into a counterfactual table while preserving its (generalized) Liu–Lu value. After exploring some analytical properties of the new method, we illustrate its application by decomposing changes in the prevalence of homogamy in the US between 1980 and 2010. We perform this decomposition with two alternative transformation methods as well where both methods capture preferences differently from Liu and Lu. Finally, we use survey evidence to support our claim that out of the three considered methods, the new transformation method is the most suitable for identifying the role of marital preferences at shaping marriage patterns. These data are also in favor of measuring assortativity in preferences à la Liu and Lu.

The paper investigates the relation between overeducation and self-employment, in a comparative analysis between immigrants and natives. Using the EU Labour Force Survey for the year 2012 and controlling for a list of demographic characteristics and general characteristics of 30 destination countries, it finds that the likelihood of being overeducated decreases for self-employed immigrants, with inconclusive results for self-employed natives. The results shed light on the extent to which immigrants adjust to labor market imperfections and barriers to employment and might help explain the higher incidence of self-employment that immigrants exhibit, when compared to natives. This is the first study to systematically study the nexus between overeducation and self-employment in a comparative framework. Moreover, the paper tests the robustness of the results by employing two different measures of overeducation, contributing to the literature of the measurement of overeducation.

Reproductive externalities are important for fertility behavior in Kenya. We identify from anthropology structural forms of social interaction operating across individuals belonging to different ethnic and religious groups on the number of children ever born. We use the 1998 Demographic and Health Survey, combined with primary meteorological data on Kenya, and GMM methods, to show that social interaction effects by ethnicity are important over and above an individual's characteristics such as their religion to explain variations in fertility. Our findings have implications for policy debates in Kenya and in other developing countries about ethnic, religious, and other differences in fertility behavior.

We provide, for the first time, a detailed and comprehensive overview of the demography of more than 50,000 towns, villages, and manors in 1871 Prussia. We study religion, literacy, fertility, and group segregation by location type (town, village, and manor). We find that Jews live predominantly in towns. Villages and manors are substantially segregated by denomination, whereas towns are less segregated. Yet, we find relatively lower levels of segregation by literacy. Regression analyses with county-fixed effects show that a larger share of Protestants is associated with higher literacy rates across all location types. A larger share of Jews relative to Catholics is not significantly associated with higher literacy in towns, but it is in villages and manors. Finally, a larger share of Jews is associated with lower fertility in towns, which is not explained by differences in literacy.

Migration is a human capital investment in which parents bear costs and children share returns. Therefore, migrants from a population with heterogeneous intergenerational discount rates will self-select on intergenerational altruism. Intergenerational altruism and fertility are arguably linked, therefore immigrants might self-select on eventual fertility. Soviet Jews who migrated to Israel despite high migration costs averaged almost one child more than members of the same birth cohorts who migrated later, at lower cost. Distinguishing selection from treatment effects using mothers' age at migration, selection accounts for most of that difference (the proportion varies with specification), even with controls for religion and religiosity. Selection on fertility may have other explanations, including cultural preservation. To probe, we conduct an alternative empirical test of immigrant selection on altruism, finding that U.S. immigrants spend more time with grandchildren than do natives. Additionally, immigrant self-selection on fertility provides an alternative explanation for Chiswick's (1978, Journal of Political Economy86(5), 897–921) earnings-overtaking result.

We link causally the riskiness of men's management of their finances with the probability of their experiencing a divorce. Our point of departure is that when comparing single men to married men, the former manage their finances in a more aggressive (that is, riskier) manner. Assuming that single men believe that low relative wealth has a negative effect on their standing in the marriage market and that they care about their standing in that market more than married men do, we find that a stronger distaste for low relative wealth translates into reduced relative risk aversion and, consequently, into riskier financial behavior. With this relationship in place we show how this difference varies depending on the “background” likelihood of divorce and, hence, on the likelihood of re-entry into the marriage market: married men in environments that are more prone to divorce exhibit risk-taking behavior that is more similar to that of single men than married men in environments that are little prone to divorce. We offer a theoretical contribution that helps inform and interpret empirical observations and regularities and can serve as a guide for follow-up empirical work, having established and identified the direction of causality.

This study employs a two-way fixed effects research design to measure the mortality impact and cost-effectiveness of cancer drugs: It analyzes the correlation across 36 countries between the relative mortality from 19 types of cancer in 2015 and the relative number of drugs previously launched in that country to treat that type of cancer, controlling for relative incidence. The sample size (both in terms of number of observations and population covered) of this study is considerably larger than the sample sizes of previous studies; a new and improved method of analyzing the lag structure of the relationship between drug launches and life-years lost is used; and a larger set of measures of the burden of cancer is analyzed. The number of DALYs and life-years lost are unrelated to drug launches 0–4 years earlier. This is not surprising, since utilization of a drug tends to be quite low during the first few post-launch years. Moreover, there is likely to be a lag of several years between utilization of a drug and its impact on mortality. However, mortality is significantly inversely related to the number of drug launches at least 5 years earlier, especially to drug launches 5–9 years earlier. One additional drug for a cancer site launched during 2006–2010 is estimated to have reduced the number of 2015 DALYs due to cancer at that site by 5.8%;; one additional drug launched during 1982–2005 is estimated to have reduced the number of 2015 DALYs by about 2.6%. Lower quality (or effectiveness) of earlier vintage drugs may account for their smaller estimated effect. We estimate that drugs launched during the entire 1982–2010 period reduced the number of cancer DALYs in 2015 by about 23.0%, and that, in the absence of new drug launches during 1982–2010, there would have been 26.3 million additional DALYs in 2015. Also, the nine countries with the largest number of drug launches during 1982–2010 are estimated to have had 14% fewer cancer DALYs (controlling for incidence) in 2015 than the nine countries with the smallest number of drug launches during 1982–2010. Estimates of the cost per life-year gained in 2015 from drugs launched during 2006–2010 range between $1,635 (life-years gained at all ages) and $2,820 (life-years gained before age 65). These estimates are similar to those obtained in previous country-specific studies of Belgium, Canada, and Mexico, and are well below the estimate obtained in one study of Switzerland. Mortality in 2015 is strongly inversely related to the number of drug launches in 2006–2010. If the relationship between mortality in 2020 and the number of drug launches in 2011–2015 is similar, drug launches 5–9 years earlier will reduce mortality even more (by 9.9%) between 2015 and 2020 than they did (by 8.4%) between 2010 and 2015.