Migration is a human capital investment in which parents bear costs and children share returns. Therefore, migrants from a population with heterogeneous intergenerational discount rates will self-select on intergenerational altruism. Intergenerational altruism and fertility are arguably linked, therefore immigrants might self-select on eventual fertility. Soviet Jews who migrated to Israel despite high migration costs averaged almost one child more than members of the same birth cohorts who migrated later, at lower cost. Distinguishing selection from treatment effects using mothers' age at migration, selection accounts for most of that difference (the proportion varies with specification), even with controls for religion and religiosity. Selection on fertility may have other explanations, including cultural preservation. To probe, we conduct an alternative empirical test of immigrant selection on altruism, finding that U.S. immigrants spend more time with grandchildren than do natives. Additionally, immigrant self-selection on fertility provides an alternative explanation for Chiswick's (1978, Journal of Political Economy86(5), 897–921) earnings-overtaking result.

We study changes in educational homogamy in the US and four European countries over the decade covering the Great Recession. The marital preferences identified point to the widening of the social gap between different educational groups since these preferences have increased the inclination of the individuals to match with others of similar educational traits in all five countries. We obtain this finding with an aggregate measure characterizing revealed preferences of individuals in relationship. We apply a novel approach for validating our finding: we compare our aggregate measure with dating data informative about the reservation points not only of those people who will be in a couple, but also those who will remain single. Finally, we challenge a commonly held view: we argue that marital preferences should not be blamed for the documented increase of the social gap since preferences are not exogenous, but are shaped by changes in the employment prospects of the potential partners.

This study examines the degree of educational assortative mating, its evolution, and its relationship with income inequality in Thailand using national labor force survey data from 1985 to 2016. Since the 1990s, Thailand shows a trend of decreasing educational homogamy, but there is evidence of continuing educational hypergamy in Thai households. Using the semiparametric decomposition method of DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), the study finds that educational assortative mating has affected changes in household income inequality over time. Furthermore, there exists a negative relationship between income inequality and marital sorting with same education, which contradicts evidence found in developed countries.

While the relationship between socioeconomic status and child health has been studied extensively in developed countries, evidence is limited for developing countries. This study makes an important contribution by examining the relationship between child health and household socioeconomic status in Vietnam, using household expenditure as an alternative measure. This also allows us to explore the mechanisms via which income affects child health, in which household consumption arguably plays a crucial role. We employ different measures of health that allow us to examine both long-run and short-run effects, and two alternative instrumental variables, the unemployment rate and rainfall deviation, to address the potential endogeneity of household expenditure. We find evidence of a strong positive impact of household expenditure on child health and the findings are consistent across age groups. Specifically, a 10% increase in expenditure will result in a weight gain of 213–541 g in a “typical” child. We also explore the effect of a range of exogenous adverse economic shocks on children's health.

We develop a method which assumes that marital preferences are characterized either by the scalar-valued measure proposed by Liu and Lu, or by the matrix-valued generalized Liu–Lu measure. The new method transforms an observed contingency table into a counterfactual table while preserving its (generalized) Liu–Lu value. After exploring some analytical properties of the new method, we illustrate its application by decomposing changes in the prevalence of homogamy in the US between 1980 and 2010. We perform this decomposition with two alternative transformation methods as well where both methods capture preferences differently from Liu and Lu. Finally, we use survey evidence to support our claim that out of the three considered methods, the new transformation method is the most suitable for identifying the role of marital preferences at shaping marriage patterns. These data are also in favor of measuring assortativity in preferences à la Liu and Lu.

This paper provides new insights into the effect of birth cohort size on cohort lifetime wages and its sensitivity to the future trajectories of immigration and fertility. The main innovation is to relax the typical assumption of perfect substitution of labor by age. The effect of imperfect substitution of labor by age is to qualify the standard result that smaller birth cohorts are likely to enjoy relatively high wages since that result depends on the size of co-worker cohorts. The positive small cohort effect on lifetime wages therefore depends on demographic patterns, which are simulated here through low and high fertility and immigration projections. The analysis applies to actual and projected cohorts for Australia and tests the sensitivity to alternative demographic parameters, and the substitution and discount parameters. The effects of imperfect substitution can amount several percentage points of lifetime wages.

The paper explains long-term changes in birth, death rates, and in attitude to personal consumption by evolution of preferences by means of cultural transmission. When communities are culturally isolated, they are focused on population growth, which results in large fertility and welfare transfers to children, limited adult consumption, and lack of old-age support. With increasing cultural contact across communities, successful cultural traits induce their hosts to increase their social visibility by limiting fertility and increasing longevity via higher individual consumption. Empirical analysis confirms that social visibility, as measured by the number of language versions of Wikipedia biographical pages, is associated with fewer children and longer lifespan. The presence of notable individuals precedes reduced aggregate birth rates.

Tolerance of sexual minorities is presumed to matter, but its effects are under-studied. Because tolerance can affect both experiences at work and division of labor in the household, we study the relationship between tolerance and the time cohabiting gay men and lesbian women spend in paid work across the United States. In the average state, the increase in tolerance between 2003 and 2015 is associated with an increase in paid work of about 1 week per year among cohabiting gay men. Though not robustly statistically significant, the increase in tolerance is associated with a decrease in paid work among cohabiting lesbian women relative to heterosexual women.

This paper presents an empirical investigation of the hypothesis that exposure to the restrictive fertility policies of the Chinese “Later, Longer, Fewer” campaign in the 1970s contributes to the dynamics and patterns of elderly suicides in China in the period 2004–2017. We apply an identification strategy that exploits variation in exposure to this policy across birth cohorts that is based on the different timing of the implementation of the fertility policies across Chinese provinces. The results show that cohorts with a greater exposure to the restrictive fertility policy in the 1970s exhibit higher suicide rates during old ages.

Simple ordinary least squares estimates indicate that absent fathers boost probabilities of adolescent criminal behavior by 16–38%, but those numbers likely are biased by unobserved heterogeneity. This paper first presents an economic model explaining that unobserved heterogeneity. Then turning to empirics, fixed effects, which attempt to address that bias, suggest that absent fathers reduce certain types of adolescent crime, while lagged-dependent variable models suggest the opposite. Those conflicting conclusions are resolved by an approach that combines those two estimators using an orthogonal reparameterization approach, with model parameters calculated using a Bayesian algorithm. The main finding is that absent fathers do not appear to directly affect adolescent criminal activity. Rather, families with absent fathers possess traits that appear to correlate with increased adolescent criminal behaviors.

This article analyzes the effect of international migration on the wage gap between women and men who remain in Mexico. We use historical distance to the U.S. border over early twentieth-century railroad networks as an exogenous factor causing changes in the relative supply of men and women, due to predominately male migration. A 10% decrease in the relative labor supply of men tends to increase the wage gap between women and men by approximately 1.1 percentage points, suggesting that they are not perfect substitutes. However, the results imply a greater elasticity of substitution between men and women than that suggested by previous studies.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the role that the marital status of children has in shaping the living arrangements of their widowed mothers and themselves and to explain the increase in the proportion of elderly widows living alone, which grew by 23.2% in the USA between 1970 and 1990. We propose a model where living arrangements are determined as the outcome of a game between the mother and her child, and where the fundamentals of the model depend on children's marital status. We estimate the model using 1970 data. We calculate the accuracy of the estimation and we obtain an excellent fit. Using the same measure of accuracy, the estimated model predicts that changes in the incomes of both the widow and her offspring and changes in the children's marital status generate more than the 83% of the increase in the number of widows living alone.

This paper reexamines the Serendipity Theorem of Samuelson (1975) from the stability viewpoint, and shows that, for the Cobb–Douglas preference and CES technology, the most-golden golden-rule lifetime state being stable depends on parameter values. In some situations, the Serendipity Theorem fails to hold despite the fact that steady-state welfare is maximized at the population growth rate, since the steady state is unstable. Through numerical simulations, a more general case of CES preference and CES technology is also examined, and we discuss the realistic relevance of our results. We present the policy implication of our result, that is, in some cases, the steady state with the highest utility is unstable, and thus a policy that aims to achieve the social optima by manipulating the population growth rate may lead to worse outcomes.

Some studies suggest that resource-rich countries tend to allocate talent and investment toward the resource sector and away from manufacturing or agriculture reducing the competitiveness of these other sectors. Because mining overwhelmingly employs men, when other sectors shrink so do employment opportunities for women (Ross, 2008). This could significantly affect core social structures. Using plausibly exogenous variation in natural resource wealth due to giant oil discoveries and an event study design, this paper finds that giant oil discoveries are associated with relatively worse female outcomes as measured by higher male/female population ratios, higher teen birth rates, and lower educational attendance of tertiary education among women relative to men. However, the impact on health outcomes tapers off within 8 years. Additionally, during periods of increasing oil prices, there is no significant evidence of such effects possibly due to an income effect.

We study the impact of capital and labor taxation in an economy where couples bargain over the intrahousehold allocation under limited commitment. In this framework more wealth improves commitment and gives rise to insurance gains within the household. Our theory motivates these gains by the empirical observation that wealth, in contrast to labor income, is a commonly held resource within households. Based on this observation we study whether eliminating capital taxes from the economy, and raising labor taxes to balance the government’s budget, may generate welfare gains to married households. We illustrate that the quantitative effects from this reform are rather small. We attribute the small effects to the life cycle pattern of wealth accumulation and to the impact of labor income taxes on household risk sharing: In particular, we show that higher labor taxes may make the limited commitment friction more severe, even though they may make the distribution of labor income more equitable within the household.

This paper reviews the scant economic literature on the transformations of farming households under the influence of land pressure, market development or technical change. Theoretical as well as empirical contributions are summarized with a special attention to the African context.

Marriage patterns can be well understood only if researchers employ measures of marriage rates that are appropriate for the question asked. In this paper, we provide evidence that the two classes of measures typically used in the literature, the number of new marriages per population and the share of individuals currently or ever married within an age range, generally lead to misleading inference when used to study the probability someone marries during his or her life or fertile life, how it evolves, and how it differs across populations. An alternative measure, the share of individuals ever married in a given cohort by a given age, is better suited for such studies. When researchers are interested in year-on-year changes in marriage probabilities of singles, age-specific marriage hazards are more reliable than population-based measures. We conclude by discussing implications of our findings for studies of the drivers and consequences of marriage formation.

Over the past three decades, educational attainment in Mexico has grown substantially. This increase in educational attainment may affect marriage patterns through the growing supply of individuals with higher education and changing preferences over their partner's education level. We use administrative marriage and birth certificate records to quantify changes in the relative education levels for both married and unmarried couples. Our results suggest that individuals who marry outside their education category prefer to match with a partner with a similar education level. That is, college graduates prefer to match with individuals with a secondary education rather than those with a primary education. We also find that assortativeness among pairs which include college graduates has grown considerably over this time period. Our findings hold across both marriage records and birth certificate records, indicating a parallel increase in assortativeness regardless of marital status.

In this paper, I address the U-shaped dynamics (a decrease followed by an increase) in the age at first marriage during the twentieth century. First, I show that the U-shaped dynamics have been steeper in Western that in other countries. Second, I find that these dynamics in the West are strongly related to the post-World War II (WWII) economic growth. By contrast, in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries age of marriage was much less correlated across Western countries. I propose a simple model where age of marriage is a function of search frictions and married women's labor force participation. Both factors put together generate U-shaped dynamics as a result of an industrial boom that mimics the post-WWII Western economic development.