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Modalities of the Fiscal State in Imperial China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 July 2019

Richard von Glahn
Richard von Glahn*
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

In the past two decades, increasing attention has been paid to the significance of the fiscal capacity of the premodern state to promote or retard economic growth. In particular, scholarship on economic history has stressed the positive impact the emergence of the “fiscal state” had in enhancing economic growth in early modern Europe. Comparative studies have contrasted the administrative efficiency of the emerging European fiscal state with contemporary Asian empires (the Ottomans, Mughals, and the Ming and Qing empires in China). But the Ming-Qing state represents only one version of Chinese state formation under the Chinese empire. This article identifies four basic types of fiscal state that appeared between the Qin unification and the Ming-Qing era, analyzes their ideological foundations, and assesses their implications for economic growth.

Keywords

Chinaeconomic historyglobal history
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Chinese History 中國歷史學刊 , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , January 2020 , pp. 1 - 29
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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