More than one third of Asia is dry. From the Red Sea almost to the Pacific are a series of deserts and semideserts, the product of continentality, mountain patterns, and atmospheric circulation. Two areas of extreme aridity are present in die Rub al Khali of southern Arabia and the Takla Makan of western China, both essentially rainless and lifeless. Elsewhere, aridity fades off into subhumid lands with marginal potentials for settlement.

The growth of China's population and die veracity of the figures that purport to measure it are both puzzles. Critical in die solutions to both puzzles are die records of an alien dynasty that ruled China from 1644 to 1911. All reconstructions of the growth of the population in recent centuries trace to one or the other of die two Ch'ing series—die local reports ordered by the emperor Ch'ien-lung in 1741, or the survey that began in 1909 and ended with the revolution in 1911. The results of the registration of 1953–1954 are consistent with the first Ch'ing activity. The statistics of the Republic of China had lineal descent from both series, but at a level of total population consistent with the limited results of the 1909–1911 survey.

The British administrative frontier in India had widely differing effects on the political and social structures of the regions into which it moved from the middle of the eighteenth century until the middle of the nineteenth century. It is impossible to generalize on the impact of the administration, because the regions into which it moved differed in their political and social structures, and because British administration and ideas about administration, both in India and in Great Britain, changed markedly throughout this hundred year period.

The Meiji Restoration of 1868, unquestionably the most important event in modern Japanese history, brought in its wake social and economic changes of a revolutionary nature. With the overthrow of the Tokugawa bakufu, the subsequent abolition of the han system, the equalization of classes, and the establishment of a conscript army, the need for a hereditary military class ceased to exist. Certainly, the presence of a samurai class, numbering approximately 1,800,000, or 400,000 families, stranded in a society in process of divesting itself of all feudal fetters, constituted an acute problem. The continued existence of this vast army of unemployed retainers could have easily hamstrung all efforts to modernize. And it is hardly surprising that the new Meiji leaders realized at the inception of the new regime that if the work of the Restoration was to be completed successfully, it was necessary to work out a satisfactory settlement for the samurai class.