Article contents
Pressure, Persuasion, Decision: Factors in the Partition of the Punjab, August 1947
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2011
Extract
A sense of grievance over a “lost territory” may come to dominate the internal and external politics of a country. France's mourning over Alsace-Lorraine from 1870 to 1918, West German sensitiveness over the Oder-Neisser line in the 1950s and 60s, the Arab obsession with Israel—all are examples of states and peoples who will not forget the lands that have been torn from them. Pakistan is unique as a country with a sense of bitterness and grievance for territories that have never formed part of its polity. The concern with Kashmir needs no discussion here; it is not difficult to understand why Pakistanis believe they have been wronged. But this major, this massive, grievance leads to the perpetuation of a legend of injustice regarding the frontier line in the Punjab. Pakistanis believe that the Indian occupation of Kashmir was made possible by the allocation of Gurdaspur District to India, which afforded access to the state. Inasmuch as Gurdaspur appeared in the Second Schedule of the Indian Independence Act as part of the territories of the new West Punjab (Pakistan), being a district with a majority—even if a small majority—of Muslim inhabitants, there appears to be no good reason why it should have been given to India under the decision of Sir Cyril Radcliffe.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1977
References
1 Created Lord Radcliffe of Werneth in 1949. He died in March 1977, while this article was awaiting publication.
2 There seem to be two theories, both given credence in The Emergence of Pakistan by Ali, Chaudhril Muhammad (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1967)Google Scholar. 1. The boundary was fixed in advance by agreement with the Congress, and Radcliffe was brought out to conduct a “cover” operation (pp. 208 and 216); 2. Radcliffe's award was altered at the very last moment, being reversed under pressure—direct or indirect—from the Viceroy (pp. 218–19).
3 The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1967), pp. 162–94Google Scholar.
4 Master Tara Singh, the leader of the militant Sikhs, was a Hindu convert.
5 In many ways, a comparison suggests itself between Sikhs and Jews. The Sikhs have employed much the same techniques to win their own Punjabi Suba as the Jews did to gain Israel. But whereas as the great majority of Jews in Israel have discarded the outward signs of their group identity—distinctive headgear and hairstyle—the Sikhs, as they have consolidated their own polity, have given these greater emphasis.
6 Clauses 3 (3) and 4 (2); italics added.
7 Gazette of India Extraordinary, New Delhi, Sunday 17 August 1947, The Reports of the Bengal Boundary Commission and of the Punjab Boundary Commission.
8 Minute to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs by R. H. A. C[arter] April 1948: “Jenkins, the Governor of the Punjab, after consulting Mudie and Trivedi [his successors as Governors of West and East Punjab], … advised against such a step. Somewhat curiously, Lord Mountbatten in the covering letter of 2 March [1948] with which he sent the brief, says that the decision to take no action was against his own advice. Even if this is true, he cannot avoid responsibility for the decision…. It is easy to be wise after the event. Nevertheless, it does seem to me that in a matter of this importance Lord Mountbatten ought to have let Jinnah know of the change of policy.”
9 Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad, The Emergence of Pakistan (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1967), pp. 218–19Google Scholar. In March 1948, while Mountbatten was still Governor-General, it seemed probable that the Pakistan government might question the boundary on the basis of the letter and map of 8 August, which had come into their possession. Lord Ismay was asked by Lord Mountbatten to obtain a statement from Sir Evan Jenkins on the circumstances under which the letter had been written. Ismay telegraphed this communication to Mountbatten in New Delhi. He did not mention the meeting of 9 August between himself and Muhammad Ali, though the latter was at that time Secretary-General, head of the civil service of Pakistan.
10 From October 1946, the Chaudhri had committed himself “to work as unofficial adviser to the Muslim League bloc in the cabinet. This was nothing unusual, since many of the senior Hindu officials were acting in a similar capacity for the Congress bloc” (ibid., p. 84).
11 Cable from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 22.15 hours, 14 Aug 1947.
12 Cable from Ismay to Mountbatten, 7 Apr 1948, quoting communication from Jenkins.
13 Viceroy's Personal Report to the King and the British Government, no. 17, dated 16 Aug 1947, para. 12.
14 Annexure to ibid.
15 Viceroy's Personal Report, no. 17, para 15.
16 Indian Constituent Assembly, Debates, vol. V, n. 2, p. 16.
17 Minutes of Meeting at Government House, New Delhi, 5 p.m. Saturday 16th August [1947].
18 Viceroy's Personal Report, no. 17, para. 78.
19 Memorandum by Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations to India-Burma Committee of Cabinet, 20 August [1947].
20 UK High Commissioner, Karachi to Commonwealth Relations Office, telegram, 20 Aug 1947.
21 Lord Radcliffe to Aloys Michel, cited in The Indus Rivers (n. 3 above), p. 194.
22 Sir R. H. A. Carter to Sir Cyril Radcliffe, 9 April 1948; enclosure.
23 Sir Cyril Radcliffe to Sir R. H. A. Carter, 13 April 1948.
24 Commonwealth Relations Office to UK High Commissioner, Pakistan, telegram, 22 April 1948.
- 7
- Cited by