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Mo Ti and the English Utilitarians

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

Philip L. Ralph
Philip L. Ralph
Affiliation:
Lake Erie College
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Extract

If the differences in the milieus which foster distinct philosophies are kept in mind, a comparison of ideas drawn from widely separated eras and environments can be profitable to the student of political thought and institutions. Social and environmental changes, and even technological revolutions, have altered but have not displaced the fundamental and still largely unsolved problems of human adjustment. Many formulas considered as peculiarly modern had their counterpart in antiquity, and concepts regarded as typical of Western culture have frequently been encompassed in the thought of Eastern peoples. A case in point is offered by the utilitarian political creed, which, while most famous and influential in England during the nineteenth century, was partially anticipated in one of the philosophical schools of ancient China. Utilitarianism was understandably a suitable vehicle for eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English reformers, but it seems remarkable to find the principle expounded in tradition-bound China of the later Chou dynasty, when, as afterward, appeal to authority and reverence for the past were strongly embedded. Not only was a utilitarian concept vigorously and logically developed by the philosoher Mo Ti (approximately 468-382 B.C.), but his disciples constituted a flourishing school for more than a century after his death and were formidable competitors of the Confucianists. Mencius, the greatest exponent of Confucianism at the opening of the third century B.C., denounced as the two most dangerous heresies the extreme individualism of Yang Chu (fourth-century hedonistic anarchist) and the indiscriminate altruism of Mo Ti, both of which doctrines he regarded as tending to undermine social decorum and a proper respect for authority. The rivalry between Confucianists and the champions of Mo Ti took on the nature of a partisan conflict. On many fundamentals the two schools were not so utterly irreconcilable as the heat of controversy made it appear. Both appealed to the example of ancient sage-kings for justification; both accepted as a political norm a benevolent, paternalistic system with power and initiative descending from above, although Mo's conceptions were more authoritarian and theocratic than those of the Confucians; both regarded politics and ethics as synonymous and believed that the creation of the good society would go hand in hand with the improvement of the individual's moral character. They shared the common ground of a logical, matter-of-fact approach to human problems, in contrast to the mysticism of the Taoists. Nevertheless, the Confucianists campaigned uncompromisingly against their rivals and finally won such a complete victory that Mo Ti's influence was extinguished and his teachings remained almost unknown for some 2,000 years.

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Articles
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The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , November 1949 , pp. 42 - 62
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1949

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References

1 See, for example, Williamson, H. R., Mo Ti, a Chinese heretic (Tsinan, 1927), especially 11–12;Google ScholarTomkinson, L., The social teachings of Meh Tse (Tokyo, 1927), 5;Google ScholarLong, W. H., Motze, China's ancient philosopher of universal love (Peiping, n.d.), 1, 5;Google ScholarHolth, S., Micius, a brief outline of his life and ideas (Shanghai, 1935).Google Scholar

2 David, A., Socialisme chinois, le philosophe Meh-Ti et Pidiée de Solidarité (London, 1907);Google ScholarMartiis, S.Cognetti de, Un socialista cinese del v secolo av. C., Mih-Teih (Rome, 1887);Google ScholarFaber, E., The principal thoughts of the ancient Chinese socialism, tr. from the German by Kupfer, C. F. (Shanghai, 1897).Google Scholar

3 Yi-pao, Mei, The ethical and political works of Motse (London, 1929);Google Scholar hereafter cited Mei. His translation is based on the text of Sun I-jang (1894).

4 “Identification with the superior,” Mei, 55–56.

5 ibid., 56.

6 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao reads the social contract into Mo Ti's description: “Motze founded his idea of society on the people's will.” “Motze teaches that the state owes its being to the common consent of the individual peoples” (History of Chinese political thought [London, 1930], 107). Lin Mousheng is even more emphatic: “Therefore, one bright day, men gather together and decide to elect the most virtuous and capable among them to be emperor. . . .The people elect ‘three ministers’ to assist him The people then elect governors of various territories, magistrates of districts, and heads of villages. . . .Thus, by a series of popular elections, the entire political hierarchy is created” (Lin Mousheng, Men and ideas [New York, 1942], 95–96). He admits, however, that there is controversy over the meaning of the term “election.”

7 He points out that in the Chinese text the subject of the sentence is omitted (Mei, 56, note), but he indicates that the last of the three parallel versions of this section (“Identification with the superior”) in the text leaves no doubt that Mo Ti assigned the initiative to heaven: “Heaven wished to unify the standards in the world. The virtuous was selected and made emperor.” “Hence, when Heaven established the empire and located the capital and commissioned the sovereign, kings, lords, and dukes, and appointed secretaries, scholars, professors, and elders. . .” (Mei, 71–72 and note on 71).

8 Mei, 56.

9 Those who see the social contract theory in Mo Ti are forced to admit the existence of a paradox. According to Lin Mousheng: “Here a great paradox appears. What is democratically created turns out to be a monstrous Leviathan that claims an absolute control over the soul and body of every citizen” (Men and ideas, 97). Actually, Mo Ti's ideal state is as far removed from Hobbes's Leviathan as it is from a political democracy.

10 “Exaltation of the virtuous,” Mei, 48; “Simplicity in funeral,” Mei, 123; “Anti-fatalism,” Mei, 182; and passim.

11 “Will of heaven,” Mei, 136.

12 “Indulgence in excess,” Mei, 22; also “Economy of expenditures,” 122.

13 Mei, 23.

14 “The seven causes of anxiety,” Mei, 21.

15 “The sole purpose of securing food is to increase energy, satisfy hunger, strengthen the body and appease the stomach” (Mei, 25). The ancient sage-kings had commanded: “Stop when hunger is satiated, breathing becomes strong, limbs are strengthened and ears and eyes become sharp” (Mei, 120).

16 Mei, 118.

17 ibid., 120.

18 “Lu's question,” Mei, 256.

19 “Simplicity in funeral,” Mei, 134; also “Economy of expenditures,” 122.

20 “Kung Meng,” Mei, 237.

21 “Condemnation of music,” Mei, 175–80.

22 “The seven causes of anxiety,” Mei, 19.

23 “Condemnation of offensive war,” Mei, 101–16.

24 ibid., 111–13.

25 “Lu's question,” Mei, 245.

26 Mei, 99.

27 “Will of heaven,” Mei, 159.

28 ibid., 139.

29 “Exaltation of the virtuous,” Mei, 37, and passim

30 “The emperor may not make the standard at will. There is Heaven to give him the standard” (“Will of heaven,” Mei, 137).

31 “Identification with the superior,” Mei, 57.

32 ibid., 56, 60, 73–76.

33 ibid., 67–68, 76–77.

34 “Exaltation of the virtuous,” Mei, 33.

35 ibid., 35, 36, 42, 47.

36 ibid., 49.

37 “Identification with the superior,” Mei, 77.

38 ibid., 66. “When the administration of the ruler answers to the desires of the people there will be order, otherwise there will be confusion. . . .When rewards and punishments do not answer to the desires of the people, the matter has to be carefully looked into” (ibid., 70).

39 “Universal love,” Mei, 89.

40 ibid., 78–80, 83; and Mo Ti's parable to one of his doubting disciples related in “Keng Chu,” Mei, 219–20.

41 Mei, 95.

42 “Principles of the civil code,” Works (Bowring ed., 1843), 1:302.

43 Ibid,, 1:301–03.

44 It should also restrict undue concentration of property by, for example, placing limitations and taxes upon inheritance (ibid., 1:303–13). The law's function was to “befriend” equality, but to “maintain” security (p. 302). Any direct attempt to establish equality would, Bentham said, endanger security (p. 303), and “when security and equality are in opposition, there should be no hesitation: equality should give way” (p. 311). He went so far as to assert that the first duty of the legislator was to maintain whatever property distribution he found already existing in the state, even if it embodied the institution of human slavery (which, of course, Bentham hoped to see gradually abolished). “The establishment of equality is a chimera: the only thing which can be done is to diminish inequality” (p. 511).

45 ibid., 1:301.

46 “Indulgence in excess,” “Economy of expenditures,” “Simplicity in funeral,” Mei, chs. 6,. 20–25.

47 “If capable, even a farmer or an artisan would be employed —commissioned with high rank, remunerated with liberal emoluments. . . .Ranks should be standardized according to virtue, tasks assigned according to office, and rewards given according to labour spent” (Mei, 32–33).

48 Principles of political economy (World's great classics ed., New York, 1899), 2:262.Google Scholar

49 ibid., 1:206.

50 He condemned the practice of rulers of keeping large numbers of women in their palaces, excessive taxation, late marriages, and the “loose” habits of people generally as factors tending to diminish the population (“Indulgence in excess,” Mei, 27; “Economy ofexpenditures,” 118–19).

51 Even J. S. Mill upheld the Malthusian theory of population growth in the main and argued that no real improvement in the condition of the laborers could be expected without a limitation of their numbers (Principles, 1:153–59, 188–90, 332–45; 2:261).

52 Here, again, J. S. Mill affords something of an exception. He refused to become alarmed over the prospect that capital and production might eventually reach a stationary level, and he saw in the “stationary state” possibilities for a better distribution of wealth, cultural improvement, and more leisure for cultivating “the Art of Living” (ibid., 2:259–65).

53 “Principles of morals and legislation,” Works, 1:2.

54 “Identification with the superior,” Mei, 77.

55 “Anti-fatalism,” Mei, chs. 35–37.

56 “The merchants go everywhere to do business and their gain is doubled and multiplied. They persist notwithstanding the difficulties. . .and the dangers. . . .Now the gentlemen can sit down and teach righteousness. . . .Their gain should be not only doubled and multiplied but become incalculable. Yet, they will not do it” (“Esteem for righteousness,” Mei, 228).

57 “Condemnation of music,” Mei, 178.

58 “Kung Meng,” Mei, 239–40.

59 “Esteem for righteousness,” Mei, 222.

61 “Keng Chu,” Mei, 214.

62 “Esteem for righteousness,” Mei, 224.

60 “Will of heaven,” Mei, 149–50.

63 Quoted by Tomkinson, The social teachings of Meh Tse, 5. The same contention is made by W. B. Pettus in his Introduction to Long's Motze, 1.

64 “On the necessity of standards,” Mei, 15–16; “Identification with the superior, ” 58, 62– 63; “Will of heaven, ” 139, 145.

65 “On ghosts,” Mei, 165.

66 “Bentham wrote: ”The will of God. . . as contained in the sacred writings. . . is a system which nobody ever thinks of recurring to at this time of day, for the details of political administration. . . .We may be perfectly sure, indeed, that whatever is right is conformable to the will of God: but.. .it is necessary to know first whether a thing is right, in order to know from thence whether it be conformable to the will of God” (“Principles of morals and legislation,” Works, 1:11).

67 The fact that his professed disciples remained organized in a closely knit, quasi-religious fellowship for a century or more after his death is beside the point.

68 “For what the ghosts and spirits desire of man is that when in high rank and receiving much emolument, he give up his position in favour of the virtuous; that when possessing much wealth he share it with the poor. How can the ghosts and spirits merely desire to snatch food and drink?” (“Lu's question,” Mei, 252).

69 “Will of heaven,” Mei, 145.

70 “On ghosts,” Mei, ch. 31. For example: “If it could be proclaimed to the whole country and to all the people [that ghosts and spirits reward virtue and punish vice] it would really be a source of orderliness in the country and blessing to the people” (p. 170).

71 ibid., 174.

72 Cited by Williamson, Mo Ti, 38.

73 “I do not recognize as either just or salutary, a state of society in which there is any ‘class’ which is not laboring; any human beings, exempt from bearing their share of the necessary labors of human life, except those unable to labor, or who have fairly earned rest by previous toil” (Principles, 2:265).

74 ibid., 1:200–08. He affirmed that if the only possible alternative choices were “between Communism with all its chances, and the present state of society with all its sufferings and injustices., .all the difficulties, great or small, of Communism would be but as dust in the balance” (1:204–05). Again: “We are too ignorant either of what individual agency in its best form, or Socialism in its best form, can accomplish, to be qualified to decide which of the two will be the ultimate form of human society” (1:206).

75 ibid., 2:445–46.

76 ibid., 2:268.

77 Histoire de la révolution de 1848 (Paris, 1870), 1:147–48Google Scholar (tr. from H. W. Laidler, Social-economic movements [New York, 1944], 62–63).

78 “Exaltation of the virtuous,” Mei, 52

79 Williamson, Mo Ti, 38.

80 Long, Motze, 5.