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Gentry Power and the Changsha Rice Riot of 1910

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

Arthur L. Rosenbaum
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The Changsha rice riot of April 12–16, 1910 was one of the series of popular revolts that racked the Ch'ing dynasty in its closing years.1 Triggered by serious crop failures and peasant demand for relief, it involved over twenty thousand participants and the occupation of a heavily garrisoned provincial capital. Rioters put the torch to the governor's yamen, foreign property and government offices and looted over one hundred rice shops. In outlying districts secret societies made spasmodic attempts to incite a general uprising against the dynasty.

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The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 34 , Issue 3 , May 1975 , pp. 689 - 715
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Copyright © The Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1975

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References

1 For the purposes of this paper, I have accepted Hsiao Kung-ch'uan's terminology. A riot is defined as an uprising of local inhabitants against local officials. It is distinguished from rebellion by the fact that the rioters wish only to remove specific grievances whereas a rebellion seeks to overthrow the existing government. See Kung-ch'uan, Hsiao, Rural China. Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960), pp. 433–44.Google Scholar

In addition to the insights it offers into Hunanese local politics, the riot is of interest to the historian because it was the first political event that is known to have attracted the attention of Mao Tse-tung. In an interview with Edgar Snow, Mao claimed: “This incident was discussed in my school for many days. It made a deep impression on me. Most of the other students sympathized with the ‘insurrectionists,’ but only from an observer's point of view. They did not understand that it had any relation to their own lives.,They were merely interested in it as an exciting incident. I never forgot it. I felt the rebels were ordinary people like my own family and I deeply resented the injustice of the treatment given to them.” Snow, Edgar, Red Star Over China (New York: Modern Library, 1944), pp. 129–30.Google Scholar

2 Ichiko, Chuzo, “The Role of the Gentry, An Hypothesis,” in Wright, Mary C., ed., China in Revolution, The First Phase, 1900–1913 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 298.Google Scholar

3 As Jonathan Spcncc has suggested, the Chinese gentry did not of themselves compose a class, but were a stratum within the Chinese upper class. Spcncc follows Richard Centers in insisting classes arc psychosocial groupings that are “essentially subjective in character, dependent on class consciousness,” while a stratum is defined by such characteristics as education, occupation, power, function, etc. See Spence, Jonathan, “On the Chinese Upper Classes in Early Ch'ing,” Ch'ing-shifi wen-t'i (May, 1965), Issue 1, No. 1, p. 13.Google Scholar

4 In 1904 Japanese observers identified eleven individuals as the established leaders of the gentry community in Changsha: T'an Chung-lin, Wang Hsien-ch'icn, T'ang Pin-chen, Chang Tsu-t'ung, Lung Chan-lin, Yeh Te-hui, Ch'en Ch'i-t'ai, Liu Fcng-pao, K'ung Hsicn-chiao, Wang Kai and Tu Pen-t'ang. Three of these men—Yeh Te-hui, Wang Hsicn-ch'icn and K'ung Hsien-ch'ien—were implicated in the riots. Relatives of three other men were among the most prominent members of the progressive group: Tan Yen-k'ai, son of T'an Chung-lin, Lung Chang, son of Lung Chan-lin and Chen Wcn-wei, brother 0f Ch'en Ch'i-t'ai. For list of the leading gentry in Changsha see Shiraiwa, cited in Lewis, Charlton, “The Opening of Hunan: Reform and Revolution in a Chinese Province, 1895–1907” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1965), pp. 110–170.Google Scholar

5 Tung-fang tsa-chih (Eastern Miscellany), Vol. 7, No. 5 (1910), p. 68, memorial by Jui-cheng, undated.Google Scholar

6 Wehrle, Edmund, Britain, China, and the Anti-missionary Riots, 1891–1900 (Minneapolis: University oi Minnesota Press, 1966), pp. 19–28.Google Scholar

7 Wingate, A. S., A Short Report of the Province of Hunan (Calcutta, 1900), p. I.Google Scholar

8 Lewis, Charlton, “The Hunanese Elite and the Reform Movement,” Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 29, No. 1 (November, 1969), pp. 35–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The term “conservative” is used by Lewis to define the activities of Wang and Yeh in 1898. Wang Hsien-ch'ien (T. I-wu, 1842–1918), was a prominent scholar, educator and official. He received his chin-shih in 1866 and later served as President of the Imperial Academy and provincial director of education in Kiangsu. He was driven from office in 1888 after attacking Ts'u-hsi and Li Licn-ying. As a retired official, he led the opposition to the Hundred Days Reform in Hunan. He is best known for his work in editing the Tung-hua hsu-lu and compiling the Han-shu pu-chu. See Howard Boor-man, Biographical Dictionary of Republican China (N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1970), Vol. 3, pp. 379–80.Google ScholarCh'ing shih pien-tsuan wei-yuan-hui (Committee for the compilation of the Ch'ing History), Ch'ing Shih (An official history of the Ch'ing dynasty), (Taipei: Kuo-fang yen-chiu-yuan, 1963) Vol. 7, pp. 5217–18.Google Scholar

9 Hu-nan sheng-chih pien-hui wei-yuan-hu: (Committee for the compilation of the Hunan provincial gazetcer), Hu-nan chin-pai-nien ta-shih chi-shu (Narrative of the major events in Hunan in the past Hundred years), (Tokyo: Daian reprint, 1966), pp. 189–303 for derails on the activities of the revolutionary movement in Hunan.

10 Nakamura Tadashi, “Shingai kakumei no shozentei—tokuni Konanshō o chūshin toshit” Rekishigaku kenkyū (Studies in History), No. 188 (Oct. 1955), pp. 1–12.

11 Charlton Lewis, “The Opening of Hunan: Reform and Revolution in a Chinese Province, 1895–1907,” pp. 110–170.

12 Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 245–47.

13 Hu-nan ehin-pai-nien, pp. 207–12: Sun, E-tu Zen, Chinese Railways and British Interests, 1898–1911, (N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. 76–78, 94–96. Hunan was the first province to request cancellation of the railway loan. Although Chang Chih-tung and other officials played a significant role in the early stages of the movement, the rights recovery movement had strong backing from students and gentry. To pay for the railway, Hunan issued special railway shares and shifted contributions intended for relief rice to the railway fund.Google Scholar

14 Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 242–45, 276–78. The company was headed by Yü Shao-k'ang, Yuan Shu-hsun, Chang Tsu-t'ung and Hsi Hui-hsiang.

15 Ibid. This episode is one of the few indications of merchant dissatisfaction with the gentry. Merchants in Hunan generally deferred to the gentry who had close connections with officials. Moreover, the Merchant Guild itself included gentry directors—Ch'en Wen-wei, brother of Ch'en Ch'i-t'ai, and U Ta-chang, an ex-local magistrate—who had become industrial capitalists.

16 Ibid. For a study of central government policy see Rosenbaum, Arthur, “Chinese Railway Policy and the Response to Imperialism: The Peking-Mukden Railway, 1895–1911,” Ch'ing-Shih wen-t'i, Vol. 2, No. 1 (October 1969).Google Scholar

17 Ibid. p. 243. The governor agreed to levy taxes on rents, income, houses, and government salaries. By 1910, Hunan had raised Tls. 5,000,000, approximately one-fourth of the necessary capital.

18 Tan Ycn-k'ai (1874–Sept. 22, 1930) was the son of Tan Chan-lin. He passed the chin-shih examination in 1904, entered the HanJin Academy and later returned to Hunan where he served as director of several modern schools in Changsha. Active in local politics and the reformist movement, he was selected head of the pronvincial assembly in October 1909 and served as Hunan's delegate to the National Assembly. Returning to Hunan, he led the constitutional reformers and masterminded the coup that ousted the T'ung-Meng-hui leaders from power in Hunan after the 1911 Revolution. In 1913 he was forced out of power by Yuan Shih-k'ai, but briefly served as governor of Hunan in 1917 and 1920, He later joined the Kuomingtang and eventually sided with Wang Ching-wei and the Wuhan wing. See Howard Boorman, Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, Vol. 3, pp. 220–22. For details on the provincial assembly FO 405/199 Enc 1 in No. 11, Report by Cambell, Oct. 1909; Enc 1 in No. 31. Also Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 252–54.

19 Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 221 for statistics. Modern nationalism allowed Chinese to accept Western knowledge while resisting foreign domination. Despite the thirst for Western knowledge, missionaries reported that the Hunanesc were highly selective in their utilization of foreign personnel. The government was reluctant to hire foreign teachers and refused to give foreigners control of the school. Yale-in-China archives (Yale Divinity School, New Haven), Report of Inspector of Yale Mission, May 1907; Gage to Reed, January 2, 1906; Beach to Reed, May 9, 1904.

20 Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 221–225.

21 Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao (Materials on the History of Hunan), Vol. 3 (1958), pp. 130–32. K'ung was an expectant taotai (fen-sheng pu-yung tao) and a former member of the Hanlin Academy. Although government sources portray K'ung as an individual of low repute with a reputation for fabricating rumours and turning right and wrong upside down, he was one of the leading Changsha gentry.

22 As Professor Ichiko and others have pointed out, the constitutional reforms and the establishment of local self-government afforded the gentry another chance to reconsolidate their control. Local gentry frequently assumed control of the schools, railways, elections etc. However, there can be little doubt that by 1909 the Ministry of Posts and Communications was in the process of reasserting its control over railways and that the long term implications of a national police and judicial system were not favorable to local gentry power. See Ichiko, “The Role of the Gentry,” pp. 299–300.

23 Yeh Te-hui (1964–April II, 1927) received his sheng-yuan degree and went into business before succeeding in the ehin-sfuh examination of 1892. A rabid conservative known for his opinionated views, he found official office distasteful and returned to Hunan after a brief stint as an assistant secretary in a board. In 1897. together with Wang Hsien-ch'ien, he led the conservative opposition to the Hundred Days Reform in Hunan. He was cashiered for his role in the rice riot and later opposed the Revolution of 1911. In 1927 he was executed by the Chinese communists. Boorman, Biographical Dictionary, Vol. 4, pp. 35–37.

Yang Kung had been cashiered from his post as magistrate of P'ei-chou in Szcchwan, He was in charge of public construction in Changsha, a position which enabled him to exert considerable influence over the masons. Tung-fang tsa-chih (Eastern Miscellany), “Hu-nan sheng-ch'eng luan-shih yü-chi,” Vol. 7, No. 5 (May, 1910), pp. 23–24.Google Scholar

24 Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 242–43.

25 Ibid. pp. 253–58 for a list of members of the assembly. It should be noted that the children of several of the established gentry leaders were members of the assembly or active in the constitutional movement, (i.e. T'an Yen-k'ai and Lung Chan).

26 Ts'en Ch un-ming was the fifth son of the famous Ts'cn Yü-ming( former governor-general of Yunnan-Kweichow and the man responsible for suppressing the southern Muslim rebellion under Ma Ju-lung in the 1860's. Three of his brothers served as Ch'ing officials including Ts'cn Ch'un-hsuan, a leading foe of Yuan Shih-k'ai who had risen to become governor-general of Kwangtung and Szechwan.

27 North China Herald, August 5, 1910, pp. 317–18 (hereafter cited as NCH). Also Ta-Ch'ing Hsüan-t'ung cheng-chi shih-lu (Veritable Records of political events in the Hsuan-t'ung reign of the Ch'ing dynasty), (Tokyo: Okura Shuppan, 1937–38), ch. 27/8a for the rumors (hereafter cited as SL).

28 FO 405/199, No. 163, Muller to Grey, March 21, 1910.

29 NCH, August 5, 1910, pp. 317–18; Jan. 7, 1910, p. 20.

30 NCH, July 1, 1910, pp. 23–24.

31 Great Britain, Original Manuscripts of Foreign Office Documents of Public Records Office, London. Hereafter cited as FO, with additional annotations referring to scries and volume. FO 405/199, Enc. 1 in No. 11, Report of Cam bell; Enc. 1 in No. 31. Ch'en Wcn-wei was director of the Chamber of Commerce, director of the Electric Lighting Company, a leading investor in the provincial railway and brother of Ch'en Chi-t'ar. According to Cam-bell, T'an was responsible for political decisions while Ch'en was in charge of all commercial issues coming before the provincial assembly. However, Cambcll is in error when he implies that Ch'en actually served in the assembly. For the membership of the assembly, see Hu-nan chin-pal-nien, pp. 252–54.

32 Ibid., The provincial assembly also demanded that “in all cases where the government proposes to contract an agreement with any foreign nation involving the interests of Hunan, or in case of the issue of rules and regulations of provincial or local interest, they shall first form the subject of debate on the part of the provincial assembly.” Quoted in FO 405/199 Enc. 1 in No. 31. Ts'en's contention that the assembly had encroached on the prerogatives of the central government by interfering with foreign policy was upheld by the central government.

33 Ibid. Also U. S. Department of State, Records of Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1910–1927, microfilm, Roll J, Vol. 1, No. 250. Baugh to Assist. Sec. of State, Jan. 25, 1910.

34 Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, p. 126 for one of many examples of gentry access to the governor.

35 Chung-kuo shih-hsueh hui (Chinese Historical Association), Hsin-hai ko-ming (The Revolution of 1911), (Shanghai: Jen-min, 1957), Vol. 3, p. 509 for an example of conservative attempts to take advantage of popular dislike of modernization. Hereafter cited as HHKM.Google Scholar

36 Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, p. 131.

37 FO 405/199, Enc. 1 in No. 137, Hewlett to Muller, April 28, 1910.

38 Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, p. 131.

39 The question of changing patterns of tenancy and their effect on the well-being of the peasantry is beyond the scope of this paper. Tenancy rose from 50–60 per cent in the eighteenth century to 70–80 per cent in the early twentieth century. As Evelyn Rawski has demonstrated, rising rents and higher rates of tenancy do not automatically produce a decline in the standard of living. Her study indicates that for the eighteenth century rising rice prices enabled tenants in Hunan to enjoy a higher standard of living. However, the trend was reversed in the nineteenth century. According to one set of fragmentary figures, in the nineteenth century the price of land tripled whereas the price of rice increased by only 80 per cent. Although Rawski feels these figures arc too incomplete to provide an accurate and representative picture, they are not out of line with the data collected by Marxist writers. Rawski, Evelyn, Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy of South China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 120–121 and p. 224. Also Li Shih-yuch, Hsin-hai, pp. 33–36. A contemporary account of the plight of the Hunan peasant is reproduced in Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao (Materials on the history of Hunan), Vol. 3, (1958), pp. 115–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

40 Memorial by Yang Wen-ring cited in Hu-nan sheng-cfiih pien-hui wen-yttan-hui (Committee for :he compilation of the Hunan provincial gazetteer), Hu-nan chin-pai-nien ta-shih chi-shu (Narrative of he major events in Hunan in the past hundred years) (Tokyo: Daian reprint, 1966), pp. 265–66.

41 Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, p. 266. The Shanghai Shih-pao, a newspaper of moderate reformist persuasion, claimed that Hunanese officials were raising taxes in an irresponsible fashion. All that the government had accomplished with its program for “new government” (hsin-cheng), it editorialized, was to line the pockets of officials. Cited in Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao. pp. 117–18.

42 Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 243–44. These surcharges and others on house and store rents and the salaries of government employees were levied by the provincial assembly in late 1909 and early 1910.

43 For an excellent analysis of traditional riots and the rioters' general acceptance of the Confucian framework sec, Hsiao, Rural China, pp. 433–53.

44 FO 405/199, No. 11, End. 11, Report of Cambell, October 1909, pp. 21–22. Cam bell's statement brings into question die current assumption that local gentry, including the more conservative elements, were able to extend their power and enlarge their wealth by managing self-government agencies. At least in Hunan there were locjal gentry who did not trust modernization or constitutional government, even if directed by a provincial assembly. For interpretations of the gentry's role in self-government see Lust, John, “Secret Societies, Popular Movements, and the 1911 Revolution,” in Chesneaux, Jean, Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China, 1840–1950 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 166–67.Google Scholar

45 Smh-yuch, Li, Hsin-hai ko-ming shih-ch'i liang-Hu ti-ch'ü ti ko-ming yun-lung (The revolutionary movement in Hunan and Hupei during the period of 1911 Revolution) (Peking: San-lien, 1957) p. 41;Google ScholarHu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 203–06, 224–40, 266–74, 288–98. Also Lust, “Secret Societies,” pp. 179–180, and Lewis, Charlton, “Notes on the Ko-lao Hui in Late Ch'ing China,” in Chcsneaux, Popular Movements, pp. 110–112.Google Scholar

46 Ibid.

47 The customs agents at Changsha estimated that “given ordinary crops, there will remain a surplus of 3 to 5 million bags (of 150 catties) for export,” which at the normal rate of 100 catties per picul converts into 4.5 million piculs as the minimum export. If this is correct, it means that most of the export rice bypassed the customs houses at Yochow and Changsha. In 1908, Yochow and Changsha customs recorded a total of 1,700,000 piculs of rice being exported, the highest figure of the decade. Japanese authorities placed the domestic consumption of rice in Hunan at 43 million piculs. Thus, five to ten per cent of Hunan's rice crop was intended for export. China, The Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1902–1911. Vol. I, p. 312;Google ScholarChina, The Maritime Customs, Returns of Trade, 1908–1911;Google ScholarDōbunkai, Tōa, Shina shobetsu zenshi (Comprehensive gazetteer of the various provinces of China), Vol. 10, Konan [Hunan]), pp. 504–05.Google Scholar

48 Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, pp. 121–23, memorial by Ch'un-ming, Ts'en, undated; NCH, June 10, 1910, pp. 615–16.Google Scholar

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid. For confirmation of diversion of relict funds to the railways see Yang Wen-ting's report on Hunanese finances in Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 265–66. In Hupei, where funds earmarked for relief had been diverted to railways, the Ministry of Posts and Communications blocked provincial efforts to use the money to help finance relief measures. See SL, Ch. 23/42–43a edict, Nov. 23, 1909; Ch. 24/80–98, edict, Dec. 4, 1909.

51 Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, p. 126. Government and newspaper accounts do not specify whether all segments of the gentry engaged in rice hoarding. Moreover, the charges leveled against Wang and Ych are not linked to the activities of the assembly which demanded a ban on rice exports. This may indicate that conservatives and moderates were more directly involved in these “traditional” forms of “cntreprencurship” than the progressive constitutionalists. However, Nakamura Tadashi has argued that usury and pawnshops were the main source of economic power in Hunan. Profits from these activities—and probably from rice speculation—sustained gentry investment in land, commerce and foreign trade. Although Nakamura lacks the data to link specific individuals with investment in pawnshops, his thesis suggests that even the gentry progressives who can be termed “industrial capitalists” may have been involved in rice hoarding. I am inclined to believe that the government's failure to indict more gentry for hoarding—including some constitutionalists—was dictated by political expediency. Conservative gentry speculation was more common, but some gentry from all three groupings were involved in rice speculation and the assembly's call for a ban to rice exports was self-serving. However, public opinion demanded the imposition of a ban and individual members of the assembly not involved in speculation would have supported a move to keep rice in Hunan. Moreover, Nakamura is incorrect in assuming that the riots were led by the Ko-Iao-hui and directed against the gentry. He also underestimates the hostility between Ts'cn and the gentry. See Nakamura Tadashi, “Shingai kakumci no shozentei,” pp. 1-12.

52 SL, Ch. 20/20a, edict dates October 1, 1909. Also NCH, June 10, 1910, pp. 615–16.

53 NCH, June 10, 1910, pp. 615–16.

54 FO 405/199, Enc. in No. 144, “Memorandum by Phillip on the Prohibition of Rice” NCH, June 10, 1910, pp. 215–16.

55 Ibid.Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, pp. 126–67,Google Scholar gives the figures of one million piculs. The veracity ot this and all other statistics dealing with rice exports is subject to question. The quarterly returns for Changsha, published by The Maritime Customs, show abnormally high exports in the second quarterly of 1909 and then a rapid decline in rice exports:

If one assumes thai most rice shipped by foreign firms passed through customs, certain conclusions may be drawn. First, the absence of a ban permitted sizable exports during the fourth quarter, equal to one half of total shipped during the bumper harvest of 1908, but less than was commonly believed by the public. Second, there is no indication that foreign firms were responsible for the massive outflow of the first quarter of 1910. The outflow cither was exaggerated or was the result of the activities of Chinese merchants and gentry. See China, The Maritime Customs, Quarterly Reports, 1908–1911.

56 FO 405/200, Enc. in No. 7, Fraser to Muller, April 13, 1910.

57 Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, pp. 127–28; HHKM, Vol. 3, p. 501.Google ScholarTing, , “I-chiu-i-ling,” p. 207; Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, p. 133, memorial by cheng, Jui-.Google Scholar

58 Ibid., For Ts'en's assurances see FO 405/199, No. 12, Müller to Grey, April 14, 1910.

59 Hu-nan chin-pai-lien, pp. 257–58. According to one version, a waterseller named Huang sought to purchase a pint of rice, priced at 80 cash. He was refused the rice because his money was of unacceptable quality. Later that evening Huang returned with the 80 cash in acceptable specie only to find that the price had risen. Driven beyond endurance, he threw himself into the river. His distraught wife and children, now without any means of support, committed suicide shortly thereafter.Google Scholar

60 TFTC, Vol. 7, No. 5 (May, 1910), “Hu-nan sheng-ch'eng luan-shih yu-chi,” p. 16. The basic facts about the riot are to be found in this account and in Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, pp. 128–33.Google Scholar

61 Ibid. During the later stages of the rioting, the masons and carpenters were acting under orders from Yang Kung and K'ung Hsien-chiao, two members of the conservative wing of the gentry class. It is possible that the masons may have gone to Ao-shan*tiao to cause trouble.

62 Ibid. According to most accounts, the magistrates were annoyed that Lung had arrested a man for such a trivial matter and ordered him to return to Changsha and release Liu. This order, as well as others issued by them, were never executed. When Lai arrived at Ao-shan-tiao, Yü and Kung vainly sought to calm him down, apparently aware of the crowd's mood and the unpopularity of policemen. After Lai was beaten, he found temporary refuge in a nunnery. He had two soldiers disguised as peasants take him on their backs, shouting to the crowd that they were taking him to Changsha to be punished by the governor. In the confusion of entering the city, Lai finally managed to escape from the crowd. Communist writers, perhaps embarrassed by the popularity of Yü and Kuo, accuse them of deliberately deceiving the people and making false promises they never intended to keep.

63 Ibid., pp. 23–24.

64 Ibid. Ts'en's reluctance to employ force to disperse the crowd is puzzling, especially when contrasted to his aggressive response to the Ao-shan-tiao incident. He had at his disposal six thousand soldiers of the new standing army stationed outside the city as well as local police and yamen guards. Perhaps he was motivated by a reluctance to fire on innocent people, but I am inclined to believe that he lost his nerve. Aware of gentry hostility towards him and lacking the loyalty and guidance of his subordinates, he was incapable of taking decisive action.

65 TFTC, Vol. 7, No. 5 (May, 1910), pp. 71–72, memorial by Jui-cheng: HHKM, Vol. 4, p. 509.

66 Ibid. Ting Yüan-ying disputes this version. In his account, Ts'en announced the reduction in the price of rice only after the yamen guards proved unable to break up the crowds by force. Ts'en's conciliatory gestures are seen as a desperate measure to buy time until the standing army could arrive on the scene. He also claims that the guards killed three and wounded ten others while clearing the courtyard and the army, when it arrived, shot and bayonetted “several tens.” Ting, “I-chiu-i-ling,” p. 203. Casualties were inflicted by the army and guards, but Chinese and Western contemporary accounts indicate that the soldiers were remarkably restrained considering the verbal and physical abuse directed against them. In fact, the general passivity of the troops led to rumors that large numbers of soldiers had defected to the side of the rioters. FO 405/199, Enc. in 171, Müller to Grey, June 1, 1910.

67 Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, pp. 130–32.

68 HHKM, Vol. 3, pp. 509–10.

69 Tan's role in the affair is not clear. Li Shih-yueh alleges that T'an used the opportunity to press for Ts'en's outster and the appointment of Chuang Keng-liang as the new governor. If so, he remained behind the scenes and is not mentioned in any other account. Li Shih-yueh, Hsin-hai, p. 49.

70 Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, pp. 130–32. Seven people signed the telegram including Lung Chang, a leader in the rights recovery movement and the provincial railway company. Wang never admitted that he had signed the telegram, claiming that his name had been forged. He spent the rest of his life trying to clear himself.

71 FO 387, Enc. 1, in No. 863. Hewlett to Muller, April 28, 1910. According to Hewlett, the troops sustained 120 casualties before they took action. Later, when two soldiers fired on their own initiative, they were executed on the spot. Estimates of the number killed by the soldiers range from two to ten.

72 HHKM, Vol. 3, p. 509.

73 Ibid., p. 510.

74 FO 405/199, No. Müller to Grey, May 21, 1910.

75 HHKM, Vol. 3, p. 510. One reason for the failure of the fire brigades to respond to call for assistance is that each organization had four masons and carpenters as members.

76 NCH, May 13, 1910, pp. 377.

77 Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, pp. 132–33.

78 TFTC, Vol. 7, No, 4 (April, 1910), pp. 52–54.

79 Yale-in-China, Hail, “Changsha after the riot,” file of 1910–11. Many foreigners claimed that they escaped because of the warnings provided by the British Consul, Hewlett. The Chinese government, on the other hand, insisted that it offered adequate protection to foreign lives although the limited resources at the disposal of the government did not permit protection of private property. A careful reading of missionary letters published in the North China Herald indicates that the Chinese government offered some assistance, but that many had to make their own way to safety. The single most important factor in preventing foreign deaths appears to have been the mood of the mobs. A number of missionaries escaped out the back door as the rioters entered through the front door. Rarely, if ever, was there any attempt at pursuit.

80 Ibid. Also Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, pp. 139–42.

81 Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, pp. 135–36. NCH, April, 29, 1910 and May 6, 1910, pp. 312–13.

82 Ibid.

83 NCH, June, 1910, p. 679. At Hua-shih, twenty miles south of Siangtan, rebels wore yellow head-dress and carried yellow flags.

84 Ibid.

85 NCH, May 20, 1910, pp. 456–57.

86 NCH, May 27, 1910, p. 494; April 29, 1910, pp. 264–65.

87 K'uei-ying, Ch'cn, “Ts'ung Ch'ing chün-chi-chu tang-an k'an Hsin-hai ko-ming-ch'ien ch'un-chung ti fan-k'ang tou-cheng” (Mass struggle of resistance prior to 19x1 as seen in the archives of the Grand Council), Hsin-hai ko-ming wu-shih chou-nien chi-nien lun-wen-chi (Collection of essays in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution of 1911), (Peking; Hsin-hua, 1961), Vol. 1, p. 209.Google Scholar

88 SL, Ch. 33/4b–5a, edict dated April 16, 1910; Ch. I4a–b, edict dated April 17.

89 SL, Ch. 33/15b–16a, April 17.

90 Yale-in-China, Hail, “Changsha after.”

91 Hu-nan li-shih tzu-liao, pp. 128–131. Ironically, the government took a much harsher interpretation of the gentry's refusal to allow the use of force against the rioters.

92 Ibid., pp. 132–33.

93 NCH, July i, 19x0, pp. 23–24.

94 Ibid.

95 Yale-in-China, Hail, “Changsha after.”

96 Ibid.

97 Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 265–67.

98 Ibid.Also HHKM, Vol. 4. PP. 523–53.

99 HHKM, Vol. 3, pp. 365–536, Jean Chesneaux, Peasant Revolts in China, 1840–1949, (London: W. W. Norton, 1973), p. 56.Google Scholar

100 For two examples of this type of interpretation, see Shih-yueh, Li, Hsin-hai ko-ming shih-ch'i liang-Hu ti-ch'ü ti ko-ming yun-tung (The revolutionary movement in Hunan and Hupei during the period of the 1911 Revolution), (Peking: San-lien, 1957), pp. 4–16Google Scholar and Yuan-ying, Ting, “I-chiu-i-ling Ch'ang-sha ch'ün-chung ti 'Ch‘iang-mi’ feng-ch'ao” (The 1910 mass rice riot in Changsha), Chung-kuo k'o-hsueh-yuan li-shih yen-chiu li-san-so cht-k'an (Serial publication for the Institute of History of the Academia Sinica), (Peking, 1954), Vol. 1, pp. 201–207.Google Scholar

101 NCH, July 1, 1910, p. 24. According to the correspondent, Chuang Kcng-Iiang was “the most beloved of all officials.” Kuo Chung-kuang also received the accolades of the crowds as he left. It is ironic that Chuang, the agent of gentry power, remained a popular figure in the public imagination. In his account of the riots, Mao remembered, “the Commissioner of Internal Affairs, a man named Chang (sic.), came out on his horse and told the people that the Government would take measures to help them. Chang was evidently sincere in his promise, but the Emperor disliked him and accused him of having intimate connections with ‘the mob.’ He was removed.” See Snow, Red Star, p. 129.

102 Chuzo Ichiko, “The Role of the Gentry,” pp. 302–303. Whether the Changsha riot was typical of other riots of this period can not be answered in this paper. An impressionistic reading of the accounts of late Ch'ing riots printed in the North China Herald and the collection Hsin-hai ko-ming suggests that conservative gentry led riots against manifestations of centralizing power were not uncommon.

103 NCH, July 1, 1910, p. 24.

104 Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 271–74.

105 Ch'u-heng, P'eng, “Hu-nan kuang-fu yun-tung shih-mo chi,” (An account of the restoration movement in Hunan), in Chung-hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo wu-shih nien wen-hsien (Documents on the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China), (Taipei, 1961), Series 2, No. 3, p. 46.Google Scholar

106 Hu-nan chin-pai-nien, pp. 262–63. During the frantic days of April 1910 Ch'en Tso-hsin considered having the new army join the rioters in order to incite a general uprising against the Ch'ing. He broached the idea to his superior who advised him that the time was not ripe.

107 Ibid., p. 288.

108 Ibid.