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Province and Nation: The Chekiang Provincial Autonomy Movement, 1917–1927

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

R. Keith Schoppa
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Humiliated and shaken by the depredations of the imperialist nations, early twentieth-century Chinese leaders sought the establishment of a strong nation-state. Bitter struggles over the means to reach that goal—primarily over the distribution of political power—ended in the demise of the Ch'ing, the defeat of Yuan Shih-k'ai, and the turmoil of the “warlord” period. After Yuan's death in 1916, the dispute over distribution of power thrust into serious consideration the model of a federation for building a nation out of China's disparate regions and interests. Some felt that a federation was perhaps a more effective integrating form than the centralized bureaucratic model the late Ch'ing and Yuan Shih-k'ai had supported. The debate was not new in China. However, during the empire, proponents of centralization (chün-hsien) and decentralization (feng-chien) had been concerned with finding the form that would produce the greatest stability and administrative efficiency; now the Chinese were obsessed with the issue for life-and-death reasons. 2 Rapid national integration seemed imperative for China's survival. In 1901, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao had discussed the possibilities of a Chinese federation; 3 but, until 1916, federalism was effectively submerged by the centralizers. Amid increasing turmoil after Yuan's death, federalism seemed to provide an answer to chaotic instability.

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Articles
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The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 36 , Issue 4 , August 1977 , pp. 661 - 674
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Copyright © Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1977

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References

1 For an excellent account of Yuan Shih-k'ai's bureaucratic centralization, see Young, Ernest P.,The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1977), pp. 105–06 and 148–68.Google Scholar

2 For an account of this debate between proponents of the chün-hsien and feng-chien systems, see Lien-sheng, Yang, “Ming Local Administration” in Hucker, Charles (ed.), Chinese Government in Ming Times (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1969), pp. 1–21Google Scholar.

3 See Young (n. 1 above), p. 22.

4 Ch'i-yün, Chang, Che-chiang sheng shih-ti chi-yao (Shanghai: Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, 1925), p. 60.Google Scholar

5 “The Province, the Nation, and the World” in Feuerwerker, A., Murphey, R., and Wright, M. (eds.), Approaches to Modern Chinese History (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1967), p. 270.Google Scholar

6 These ideas are inherent in the school of historians who trace strong regionalist or provincialist developments from the period of the Taiping rebellion when provincial officials gained significant power. For example, see Michael, Franz, “Introduction” to Stanley Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1964)Google Scholar. Levenson's article (n. 5 above) also is filled with a sense of the pejorative nature of provincialism. This idea is also implied in such writing as Chüzö, Ichiko, “The Role of the Gentry: An Hypothesis” in Wright, Mary (ed.), China in Revolution (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1968), p. 300Google Scholar: gentry “were more deeply concerned with provincial matters and their own businesses than with national interests.”

7 For the intermediate stage, see John Fincher, “Political Provincialism and National Revolution” (p. 220) and Yoshihiro Hatano, “The New Armies” (p. 302) in Wright (n. 6 above). For the “tactical retreat” idea in the federalist movement, see Jean Chesneaux, “The Federalist Movement in China, 1920–3” in Gray, Jack (ed.), Modern China's Search for a Political Form (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969), p. 104Google Scholar; it is stated somewhat differently in Diana Lary, Region and Nation (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1974), p. 8.

8 In my discussion of integration, I am generally following Jacob, Philip E. and Teune, Henry, “The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community” in Jacob, and Toscano, James V. (eds.), The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964), pp. 1–45Google Scholar. They describe ten integrative factors cited by social scientists: geographic proximity, homogeneity, interactions among persons or groups, knowledge of each other, shared functional interests, the “motive” pattern of a group, the structural frame or system of power and decision-making, the sovereignty-dependence status of the community, governmental effectiveness, and previous integrative experiences. See also Frey, Frederick W., “Communications and Development” in Pool, Ithiel de Sola and Schramm, Wilbur (eds.), Handbook of Communication (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1973), p. 382.Google Scholar

9 For a discussion of these possibilities, see Verba, Sidney, “Comparative Political Culture” in Verba, and Pye, Lucian W. (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965), pp. 529–37Google Scholar. An intriguing account suggesting that lower group loyalties and nationalism are compatible is found in Liddle, R. William, Ethnicity, Party, and National Integration (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1970)Google Scholar. For stimulating theoretical presentations of the method by which higher-level developmental units exist discretely, apart from lower levels of integration, see Teune, H., “Development and Territorial Political Systems, ” International Review of Community Development, 33–34 (1975), pp. 159–74Google Scholar; also Teune, and Mlinar, Zdravko, “Development and Participation” in Bruhns, G., Wiatr, J., and Cazzola, F. (eds.), Development, Participation and Local Politics (Pittsburgh: Center for International Studies, 1974), pp. 11436Google Scholar.

10 The civilian administrative leadership would usually be included among the elite; but because of their relative unimportance in these issues, I exclude them.

11 See, for example, Shih, Fei, “Che-feng p'ien,” Che-chiang cb'ao, IV (Apr 1903), pp. 1–12Google Scholar.

12 For accounts of the railroad movement, see Chiang-Che t'ieh-lu feng-ch'ao (reprint, Taipei: Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chung-yang wei-yuan- hui tang-shih shih-liao pien-tsuan wei-yuan hui, 1968; Chin-yü, Chao, “Su-Hang-Yung t'ieh-lu chieh-k'uan ho Chiang-Che jen-min ti chü-k'uan yün-tung,” Li-shih yen-chiu, IX (1959)Google Scholar; Masao, Fujii, “Shinmatsu Kōsetsu ni okeru tetsudo mondai to burujawa seiryoku no ichi sokumen,” Rekishigaku Kenkyū, CLXXXIII (1955)Google Scholar. In Eng- lish, see Sun, E-tu Zen, “The Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway Loan of 1908,” Far Eastern Quarterly, X (Feb 1951), pp. 136–50Google Scholar; also Chi, Madeleine, “Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway Loan: A Case Study of the Rights Recovery Movement,”Modern Asian Studies, VII (Jan 1973), pp. 85–106.Google Scholar

13 For claims against foreigners involving commercial rights in the province, and claims against missionaries at the Mokan Hills retreat, see Shih Pao [hereafter S], HT 1/11/9 and 1/12/25. [Dates of the S until 1 Jan 1912 are given according to reign title and year (Hsuan-t'ung = HT 1), followed by lunar month and day.] See also North China Herald [hereafter NCH], 1911/4/22, p. 220 and 1911/5/6, p. 346;Returns of trade and Trade Reports [hereafter TK] (Shanghai: Inspectorate General of the Maritime Customs, 1899), p. 391; and the summation by Shanghai Consul-General Cunningham to Dept. of State, 30 Sept 1925, National Archives [hereafter NA] 893.00/6767, pp. 9–10.

14 The phrase is Ernest Young's (n. 1 above), p. 261, n. 29; he propounds this point of view most persuasively. In my unpublished dissertation, “Politics and Society in Chekiang, 1907–1927: Elite Power, Social Control, and the Making of a Province” [hereafter “P ”] (Univ. of Michigan, 1975), I have argued essentially the same point of view, at least for the situation until 1913.

15 A provisional assembly of thirty-eight met from Dec 1911 to Feb 1913, when the first regularly elected assembly met. The latter was abolished by Yuan in Feb 1914. NCH, 1912/7/20, p. 240.

16 S, 1912/8/15, 17, and 25.

17 S, 1912/4/16.

18 See statements in S, 1912/10/30, 1913/1/15, 1913/3/1; also Min-li Pao [hereafter MLP], 1912/11/12.

19 For example, Chu acred the sycophant before Yuan's conferral upon him of title of marquis (hou); see Tao-ch'ing, Ssu, “Che-chün shih-pa nien ti hui-i-lu” in Chin-tat shih tzu-liao, 2 (1957), p. 84Google Scholar and S, 1915/12/25.

20 S, 1915/8/6. See, as indications of this feeling from 1913, MLP, 1913/8/27; S, 1913/9/14, 18 and 10/20.

21 For the story of the railroad nationalization and subsequent financial disputes, see S, 1914/5/2, 3, 5, 8, 15, 19. Also NCH: 1914/3/7, p. 704; 3/28, p. 969; 4/4, p. 52; 4/18, p. 230; 5/9, pp. 485–86.

22 Chu's ouster stemmed from provincial anger at his policies and at his obsequious support for Yuan. Lü Kung-wang, the head of one faction and a staunch nationalist, became military and civil governor in May 1916. During his tenure of office, he attempted to fill important positions with men of his own clique, hoping to destroy the opposition. Such action in Dec 1916 brought on the crisis.

23 For the telegrams and accounts of the meetings, see S, 1917/1/5, 1/7, 1/11.

24 S, 1917/1/10, 11; NCH, 1917/1/6, p. 11.

25 See S, passim; for a few specific examples, see 1912/9/15; 1913/3/1, 9, 27; 1924/3/22; 1926/12/ 21.

26 Chiang was joined by Chekiangese military leaders Chou Feng-ch'i and Ku Nai-pin.

27 For the account of the coup and its results, see TR, 1917, pp. 951, 973, 998. Chung-hua hsin-pao, 1917/11/27–30; 12/3, 22. S, 1917/11/28–30; 12/1–5, 15. NCH, 1917/12/1, pp. 513–14 and 8, pp. 577, 587–88; 1918/1/5, p. 18 and 12, p. 59.

28 For Yü's role, see S, 1917/12/14. The Chekiang rebel leaders were treated leniently. Chou Feng-ch'i fled, but through the pressure of Chekiang military men, he was allowed to return to the province by mid-1920; see S, 1920/8/9. Ku Nai-pin retired from the military, became head of the Hang district assembly of the 1920s, and was one of the respected “elder-statesmen” of the province.

29 For a discussion of autonomy and its relationship to integration, see Jacob and Teune (n. 8 above), pp. 38–42.

30 For a detailed study of Chekiang's developing integration, see especially the Introduction and Chap. 7 of “P ” The mail statistics are found in Decennial Reports, 1912–1921 (Shanghai: Inspectorate General of the Maritime Customs, 1921), p. 76Google Scholar. My argument relies heavily upon the ideas of Karl Deutsch. See his presentations “Communication Theory and Political Integration” and “Transaction Flows as Indicators of Political Cohesion” in Jacob and Toscano (n. 8 above). See also Frey (n. 8 above), pp. 377–89.

31 Juan Hsing-ts'un, a leading provincial lawyer, has been given credit for making the proposal in the Provincial Assembly on 8 Dec 1920. See Juan I-ch'eng (ed.), Hsien-chün Hsün-po kung nien-p'u [hereafter HCHP] in Juan Hsün-po hsien-sheng i-chi, vol. I (Taipei: Wen-hai ch'u-pan she, 1970), p. 27.Google Scholar

32 For an insightful view of the inherent clash between the goal of nation-building based upon wealth and power and the values of liberalism, see Schwartz, Benjamin, In Search of Wealth and Power (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 237–47.Google Scholar

33 See the account of liberalism in Bluhm, William T., Ideologies and Attitudes: Modern Political Culture (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Co., 1974), pp. 50–65Google Scholar. For the best statement of the meaning of liberalism in the early Republican context, see Grieder, Jerome B., Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1970), p. 344.Google Scholar

34 Shun-t'ien shih-pao [hereafter ST], 1921/6/7, 8, 9, 13, 21; 7/2. Lu also conceived of autonomy as a way to appeal for provincial support. His proposal followed that of militarists from Hunan, Szechwan, and Kwangtung. For an account of the federalist movement in other provinces, see Chesneaux (n. 7 above). This article must be used with care, however; not only is his interpretation of the movement in Chekiang misleading, but his single page on Chekiang has two factual errors: he writes that Chekiang had 30 districts (it has 75) and he calls Lu Jung-t'ing (rather than Lu Yung-hsiang) the military governor of Chekiang.

35 Social chaos had erupted in Chekiang in the aftermath of the 1911 revolt, and on a large scale following the 1913 revolt; see “P ” chaps. 1 and 3.

36 ST, 1921/6/26.

37 Neither the Shih Pao nor Shen Pao are available for 1921–1922; compilation and analysis of constitutional participants are not possible from available material. The convention was composed of 207 men and women: 55 chosen by the Provin- cial Assembly; 75 chosen by the seventy-five districts; and 77 representatives of commercial, educational, and legal organizations as well as of the provincial women's organization (fu-nu t'uan).

38 HCHP, p. 30; ST, 1921/7/7.

39 ST, 1921/8/6, 11, 12; 9/11, 14; 12/19.

40 HCHP, p. 43.

41 ST, 1922/12/21. Lu stipulated that two conditions had to be met before the constitution could be adopted: a statement inserted into the draft positively forswearing interference with the military and a requirement that autonomy (tzu-chih) at the town and township levels must precede the adoption of the constitution.

42 Tung, William L., The Political Institutions of Modern China (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), fn. on pp. 84–85. The list of commission members is found in ST, 1922/9/29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

43 Shen Pao [hereafter SP], 1923/1/27; and Chang Ch'i-yün (n. 4 above), pp. 61, 64. The red specified a commission of deputies; the yellow, an appointed cabinet system; and the white, a commission under a civil governor. The last two called for an elected civil governor.

44 Chang Ch'i-yün (n. 4 above), p. 133; and Tung (n. 42 above), p. 85, fn.

45 S: 1923/7/1, 8, 12, 16, 17, 19, 31; 8/7, 8; 10/ 12, 18, 24, 26, 29; 11/5, 15, 19; 12/3.

46 S, 1923/8/9.

47 See Chap. 5 of “P ”

48 The quote is from the translated 9/9 constitution, p. 118. See Yui, Stewart and Quigley, Harold S. (trans.), “The Provincial Constitution of Chekiang,” The Chinese Social and Political Science Review, VI (1921–1923), pp. 114–42Google Scholar. Because a complete draft of the three-color “constitution” is not available, a complete comparison with the 9/9 is difficult. Chang Ch'i-yun has given a sketch of its outstanding points in his Historical Geography of the Province of Chekiang (Che-chiang sheng shih-ti chi-yao) (Shanghai: Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, 1925), pp. 62–66Google Scholar. In Chang's description, there is no mention of powers retained by Peking, and the most detailed portion is entitled “provincial powers.”

49 See the passages from the first issue (Feb 1921) of New Chekiang (Hsin Che-chiang) in Wu- ssu shih-chi chi-k'an chieh-shao, vol. III (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1959), p. 424Google Scholar. In addition, see the statement at the opening of the 9/9 constitutional convention, ST, 1921/6/13.

50 Only a few provincial assemblymen scoffed at the idea of yet another convention when the drafts of the earlier assemblies had not been adopted. S, 1923/12/20.

51 Although there is no complete listing of those who served in the 1924 constitutional convention, I can identify 132 of the participants. Of these, 76 represented district assemblies (which had been elected in 1921) and district professional organizations; 9 had served in the Ch'ing assembly; 7 had been national assemblymen in 1913; 32 had served in one of the four Republican provincial assemblies; 8 had been Chekiang officials, and at least 2 were powerful informal advisory elite at Hang-chow, often involved in provincial decision-making.

The list of participants is obtained from S, 1924/8/7–10, 12, 19–20. The specific numbers of each group do not add up to 132 because there is overlapping in categories. The total number of convention participants is not given in any available source. The 9/9 convention had 207 delegates, and it is logical to assume (since delegates were elected in the same manner) that the 1924 convention also had that number. I cannot, however, verify that assumption.

52 For the debate, see S, 1924/8/18 and 21.

53 S, 1924/8/2.

54 S, 1924/9/23.

55 S, 1924/10/1.

56 See Tung (n. 42 above), pp. 70–72, 341.

57 For the third Chekiang constitution, promulgated on 1 Jan 1926, see Tung-fang tsa-chih, XXII, 2 (25 Jan 1926), pp. 129–38. A convention telegram to all provinces in Dec 1924 (after Ts'ao's overthrow) made clear the new position that a federation was the only method for China's salvation. S, 1924/12/9.Google Scholar

Sun Ch'uan-fang and his military ambitions were responsible for killing any possibility of putting the constitution into effect. See SP: 1925/ 10/23; 12/11; 12/30; 1926/1/3, 5.

58 For the story of this attempted coup, see NCH: 1924/9/27, PP- 489–99 passim; 10/11, p. 50; 10/18, pp. 91, 107; 10/25, pp. 134, 136; S: 1924/9/29; 10/4, 5, 11, 16, 18, 20–22; Kung-chih, Wen, Tsui-chin san-shih nien Chung-kuo chün-shih-shih, vol. I (Taipei: Wen-hsing shu-tien, 1962), pp. 197–98Google Scholar; Cunningham to Secretary of State, 11 Oct 1924, NA 893.00/5720, pp. 3–4, and North China Daily News clipping of interview between Cunningham and Sun, 20 Oct 1924, NA 893.00/5757.

After a confusing beginning, when some of the initial leaders (for still unknown reasons) fled, former Military Governors Chiang Tsun-kuei and Lü Kung-wang emerged as the movement's leaders. The Chekiangese commander dispatched by Sun, Chou Feng-ch'i, followed Sun's bidding because he felt that fighting Sun was futile. Later military clashes at Ningpo between Chou's forces and forces loyal to Sun support this interpretation. S: 1924/11/16,17; 12/7.

59 S, 1924/10/22.

60 The following account is based on S, 1926/12/13–24, and C. E. Gauss's reports to Peking and the Dept. of State in Dec 1926 and Jan 1927 (numbered NA 893.00/7990, 8036, 8037, 8108, 8109, I 8265).

61 S, 1926/12/21. The elite probably did not mean the call for a people's autonomous government (jen-min tzu-chih cheng-fu) as an expression of democratic thought; rather, “people” (jen-min) in the phrase was simply being contrasted to the “warlord” (chun-fa) autonomy proposed in 1921 by Lu Yung-hsiang.

62 Only three of the chosen deputies were associated in any way with Chekiangese provincialism: Ch'en I (who had already scoffed at autonomy), Chou Feng-ch'i (already fighting for the KMT), and Chang Tsai-yang (who showed no interest in a provincial regime). Among the remaining was Ch'u Fu-ch'eng, who had supported the federation. Others were military men Chou Ch'eng-t'an and Huang Fu, educator Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, and banker Ch'en Ch'i-ts'ai.

63 A U.S. State Department report noted numerous “longings expressed for the good old days of Sun Ch'uan-fang.” See Report of Consul-General of Shanghai Consular region, Apr 1929, NA 893.00 Political Reports.

64 See especially Chesneaux (n. 7 above) and Lary (n. 7 above).

65 Lary's contention (n. 7 above), p. 9, that proponents of “regionalist attachments” were “seldom members of the elite” and that they were “unsophisticated, incoherent, and unsystematic” is a misreading of history, at least as seen in Chekiang.