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The distribution of evolutionarily stable strategies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2016

John Haigh*
Affiliation:
University of Sussex
*
Postal address: School of Mathematics and Physical Sciences, The University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9QH, UK.

Abstract

Suppose the n × n matrix A gives the payoffs for some evolutionary game, and its entries are the values of independent, identically distributed, continuous random variables. The distribution of the pattern of evolutionarily stable strategies for A will depend, if n ≧ 3, on this underlying distribution. A fairly complete picture for n = 3 is found, and some results are obtained for n ≧ 4.

Type
Research Papers
Copyright
Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 1988 

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