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Public Interest Environmental Groups in the United States and Britain

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

Timothy O'Riordan
Timothy O'Riordan
Affiliation:
Timothy O'Riordan is Reader in Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia, Norwich.He is indebted to Tom Burke, Brock Evans, Philip Lowe, and Robert Mitchell for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Extract

In a democratic political system policymaking takes place as a consequence of the clash of competing interests promoted in part by pressure groups. In the past many pressure groups operated in the shadows between the spotlight of intense publicity and the dark spaces where decision-takers and their advisers are to be found. More recently, especially in the case of the “ cause ” groups that form the subject of this analysis, pressure groups are working more consciously in the public arena both to arouse support and to widen the general understanding of the causes they espouse. Broadly speaking the political function of a pressure group is to recognize and publicize deficiencies in governmental activity; to try to influence in their favour governmental decisions; to provide information about events or problems that otherwise might not be available for decision-takers to consider; and, in some instances, to focus public attention on and increase public understanding of particular issues of wide social and moral significance.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of American Studies , Volume 13 , Issue 3 , December 1979 , pp. 409 - 438
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1979

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References

1 For a convenient summary of the role of pressure groups see Kimber, Richard and Richardson, Jeremy J.'s Introduction to their edited book Pressure Groups in Britain (London: J. M. Dent, 1974), pp. 1–22Google Scholar, and Paul, A. Pross's introduction in his edited volume Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics (Toronto: McGraw Hill, 1975), pp. 1–26Google Scholar. Numerous other references are cited in these useful introductions. For a general statement of policy-making see Schoettle, Enid B., “The State of the Art in Policy Studies,” in Bauer, Raymond A. and Gergen, Kenneth J. (eds.), The Study of Policy Formation (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 149–80Google Scholar.

2 This problem is neatly analysed in Allison, Lincoln's Environmental Planning (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975), pp. 109–15Google Scholar.

3 The amenity group literature is quite large, but for a comprehensive statement, see Lowe, Philip, “The Environmental Lobby,” Built Environment Quarterly, 06 1976, 73–76Google Scholar; Sept. 1976, 158–61; Dec. 1976, 235–38; Mar. 1977, 79–82; also Brooks, S. K. and Richardson, J. J., “The Environmental Lobby in Britain,” Parliamentary Affairs, 28 (1975), 312–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 There is an enormous literature on this topic, mostly repetitive and by no means internally consistent. For an American view, see Pirages, Denis C. and Ehrlich, Paul R., Ark II, Social Response to Environmental Imperatives (San Francisco: Freeman, 1974)Google Scholar. For an English equivalent, see Robertson, James, The Sane Alternative (James Robertson, London, 1978)Google Scholar.

5 For the sake of style, the phrase public-interest environmental group will be written in various ways including lobby, pressure group, environmental organization, etc. They all refer to the same collectivity as described in this introductory section.

6 See Olson, Mancur Jr, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (New York: Schocken Books, 2nd revised edn.)Google Scholar. Some of this section is also drawn from Mitchell, Robert, National Environmental Lobbies and the Logic of Collective Action: Toward a Theoretical Paradigm of Why People Contribute to the Production of Collective Goods (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future Discussion Paper D-35, 1978)Google Scholar.

7 For a detailed analysis of the environmental lobby in the US see Mitchell, Robert C. and Davis, J. Clarence III, The United States Environmental Movement and its Political Context: An Overview (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future Discussion Paper D-32, 1978)Google Scholar.

8 The Windscale issue has been widely debated. For a convenient summary, see Breach, Ian, Windscale Fallout (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1978)Google Scholar.

9 I am indebted to Robert Mitchell for allowing me to develop this point.

10 This “middle-class bias” is a well known feature of all political organizations. Milbrath, Lester W. and Goel, M. L., Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977)Google Scholar; also Mitchell and Davis.

11 Evans, Brock, Diary of the Boundary Waters Campaign (Washington: The Sierra Club, 1978), p. 46Google Scholar.

12 The best exposition of the activities of people during this period can be found in Kennett, Wayland, Preservation (London: Temple Smith, 1972), especially Chaps. 1 and 2Google Scholar.

13 See Lowe; Brooks and Richardson; also Park, Chris, History of the Conservation Movement in Britain (Chertsey, Surrey: The Conservation Society, 1977)Google Scholar.

14 This argument is well developed by Lowe, Philip, “Amenity and Equity: A Review of Local Environmental Pressure Groups in Britain,” Environment and Planning, 9 (1977), 35–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also The Civic Trust, The Local Amenity Movement (London: The Civic Trust, 1978)Google Scholar.

15 Dalyell, Tam, “Action on Seals,” New Scientist, 2 (11 1978), 379Google Scholar.

16 John Davoll, Director of the Conservation Society, in a speech to a conference on the Role of Environmental Impact Assessment in Policymaking, held at the Department of Transportation and Environmental Engineering, University of Birmingham, Oct. 1978.

17 See for example Hansard, Vol. 941, cols. 1537–1646 (22 March 1978), and Vol. 950, cols. III–182 (15 May 1978), when the two major Windscale debates were conducted in the Commons.

18 See Bugler, Jeremy, “Muddy Waters,” Vole, 9 (1978), 3–6Google Scholar, and his "Pollution Standards Plus, ibid., 12 (1978), 3–4. For an excellent discussion of how local pressure groups should act in this matter, see Macrory, Richard and Zaba, B., Polluters Pay: The Control of Pollution Act Explained (London: Friends of the Earth, 1978)Google Scholar.

19 See Hencke, David, “Civil Servants Back Big Lorries,” The Guardian, 30 10 1978, pp. 1, 24Google Scholar, plus the editorial, “Information: Why We Need a New Act,” ibid., p. 12.

20 For a useful summary of this arrangement and an argument that administrative discretion is somewhat restricted, see Jowell, Jeoffrey, “The Legal Control of Administrative Discretion,” Public Law, 5 (1973), 178–219Google Scholar.

21 Jackman, Brian in “Polishing Off the Hawksbill Turtle,” The Sunday Times, 29 10 1978, p. 9Google Scholar, provides a brief summary of this case.

22 See Tyme, John, Motorways versus Democracy (London: Macmillan, 1978)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a perspective on Tyme's activities see Sharman, Frank, “John Tyme and Highway Inquiries: An Interim Report,” Journal of Planning and Environment Law, 3 (1977), 293–98Google Scholar.

23 Tyme left his job at Sheffield Polytechnic and accepted a grant from the Rowntree Trust which gave him a three-year income at two-thirds of what he had been earning. Partly as a result of his activities, the Government set up a committee to look into the whole matter of motorway enquiries. This committee recommended that policy issues be aimed at such enquiries and that improvements be made in cost benefit analysis of new motorways. See Report of the Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment (London: HMSO, 1978)Google Scholar and the Government's reply, Report on the Review of Highway Inquiry Procedures (London: HMSO, 1978, Cmnd. 7133)Google Scholar.

24 This point is made by respondents to a Civic Trust survey of local amenity group officials most of whom feel that local planning officers are very sympathetic to their point of view and fully aware that most if not all planning applications are being regularly scrutinised. See Civic Trust, pp. 26–27.

25 For a comprehensive history of this issue, see Jones, Holway, John Muir and the Sierra Club: The Battle for Yosemite (San Francisco: The Sierra Club, 1965)Google Scholar.

26 The best historical account can be found in Hays, Samuel, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890–1920 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1959)Google Scholar.

27 Hays, p. 266.

28 As documented by Carson, Rachael, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962)Google Scholar.

29 For a somewhat biased account of this incident, see Carol, and Steinhart, John, Blowout: A Case Study of the Santa Barbara Oil Spill (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1972)Google Scholar. For a more balanced perspective, see Buesche, D. F., Herschner, C. H. and Milgram, J. H., Oil Spills and the Marine Environment (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1974)Google Scholar.

30 See Mitchell and Davis, The United States Environmental Movement.

31 For an excellent account of this arrangement see Wengert, Norman, Natural Resources and the Political Struggle (New York: Doubleday, 1954)Google Scholar, and, more recently, Berry, J. M., Lobbying for the People (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1978)Google Scholar, and Ornstein, Norman J. and Elder, Shirley, Interest Groups, Lobbying and Policymaking (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1978)Google Scholar.

32 For an excellent discussion of the moral aspects of environmental politics, see Ingram, Helen, “The Political Rationality of Innovation,” in Friedlander, A. E. (ed.), Approaches to Controlling Air Pollution (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press), pp. 12–57Google Scholar.

33 For a good review of this, see Hamby, James, “The Clean Air Act and Significant Deterioration of Air-quality: The Continuing Controversy,” Environmental Affairs, 5 (1978), 145–74Google Scholar.

34 The basis of the NRDC argument can be found in Perera, Frederica and Ahmed, Karim, Respirable Particles: The Impact of Airborne Fine Particles on Health and the Environment (Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources Defense Council, 1978)Google Scholar.

35 This is an enormously well-researched area nowadays. For a sense of the literature see Department of Energy, Energy Policy: A Consultative Document (London: HMSO, 1978, Cmnd. 7101)Google Scholar; Leach, Gerald, Lewis, Christopher and Romig, Fred, Low Energy Scenario for the United Kingdom, 1975–2025 (London: International Institute for Environment and Development, 1979)Google Scholar; and, The Energy Research Group, A Critique of the Electricity Industry (Milton Keynes: Open Univ. Press, 1976)Google Scholar.

36 Evans, , Diary, p. 1Google Scholar.

37 Ibid., pp. 5–6.

38 Ibid., p. 7.

39 This general point is made by Kimber, Richard and Richardson, Jeremy J. in Campaigning for the Environment (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 214–15Google Scholar.

40 For a general review of the standing issue, see O'Riordan, Timothy, Environmentalism (London: Pion Press, 1976), pp. 271–82Google Scholar.

41 A test case is presently before the British courts. Three children are suing four companies, including two oil giants, alleging that leaded petrol fumes are harmful to their health. They charge assault, negligence and nuisance. The defendants claim that the writs are not only vexatious, but are not legally appropriate. Obviously it is a test case, but it is unlikely that it will succeed. See Knewstub, Nikki, “Lead in Petrol Damaged Child's Health,” The Guardian, 23 09 1978, p. 22Google Scholar.

42 The classic case which provided this breakthrough was an action by a coalition of amenity organizations called the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference which contested a decision by the Federal Power Commission to grant a licence allowing Consolidated Edison and New York the right to dam part of the Hudson River for a nearby pump-storage hydroelectric power scheme. The Conference won legal standing on the grounds that its members gained psychic benefits from looking at the River unencumbered by dams and levees, and eventually won its case. A similar case, a challenge by the Sierra Club to stop the construction of a road through the Mineral King Wilderness Area in California to service a large ski resort complex adjacent to the Park, had a less successful ending from the environmentalists' point of view. The Supreme Court ruled that the Sierra Club did not have standing since none of the plaintiffs actually used the area in question. But the Court did uphold the principle that potential deprivation of psychic and aesthetic enjoyment constituted grounds for legal standing. See Sax, Joseph, “Standing to Sue – a Critical Review of the Mineral King Decision,” Natural Resources Journal, 13 (1973), 76–88Google Scholar and Lundmark, Thomas, “Mineral King Goes Downhill,” Ecology Law Quarterly, 5 (1976), 555–75Google Scholar.

43 The ruling can be found in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, Environmental Reporter Cases, 11 (1978), pp. 1439–54Google Scholar.

44 The effect of this legislation on both environmental policy and administrative action has been widely discussed. For a good review see Anderson, Frederic, NEPA and the Courts (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1973)Google Scholar and Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Impact Statements: An Analysis of Six Years' Experience by Seventy Federal Agencies (Washington, D.C., Council on Environmental Quality, 1976)Google Scholar.

45 For a good discussion of this issue see the Report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group, Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices (Cambridge Mass.: Ballinger, 1977), pp. 243–68Google Scholar.

46 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, p. 1454.

47 Personal communication, William Butler, General Counsel, Environmental Defense Fund, 28 Oct. 1978.

48 Personal communication, William Butler, General Counsel, Environmental Defense Fund, 23 Mar. 1978, p. 4. See also Dickson, David, “Inflation Forces new Tactics on U.S. Environmentalists,” Nature, 276 (28 12 1978), 747CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “Budget Problems Hit US Environment Policy,” New Scientist (8 03 1979), p. 748Google Scholar.

49 A good example is the recent agreement to streamline and shorten the environmental impact assessment procedures required under the Natural Environmental Policy Act. The new draft regulations published by the Council for Environmental Quality in the Federal Register of 8 June 1978 suggest that less paperwork be prepared and much greater precision displayed.

50 See Mitchell, Robert C., “The Public Speaks Again: A New Environmental Survey,” Resources, 69, 1–6 (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, Inc.)Google Scholar.

51 This is the argument of the new American Public Interest Group New Directions, founded in 1976. See Henderson, Hazel, Creating Alternative Futures: The End of Economics (New York: Bakeley Publishing Corporation, 1976)Google Scholar.

52 This matter is raised by Breach, Ian in Windscale Fallout, pp. 156–57Google Scholar, but remains a difficult issue to put into practice because of the needs for safeguards. In any case, governments are 10th to finance groups which are inherently critical. For a good discussion of why such groups should continue to exist and have more access to information see Ashby, Eric, “Protection of the Environment: The Human Dimension,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, 69 (1976), 721–30Google ScholarPubMed.

53 Breach, Ian argues this point well in his “Environmentalists After Windscale,” New Scientist (27 07 1978), pp. 258–60Google Scholar.

54 For example, a number of British environmental groups have joined forces to form “Green Alliance,” an informal coalition of talent. Hooper, John in his “A Common Cause with America that is Doomed to Fail,” The Guardian, 24 05 1979, p. 13Google Scholar, gives a fascinating account of the American and British citizen action groups and their influence on governmental activity.