This essay discusses some of the recent trends in the scholarship on Islam and Africa that contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the historical relationship between African Muslims and the global ecumene of believers. Rather than looking at the faith as an insular African phenomenon, this piece examines the links between Africans and the wider community of believers across space and time. Such an approach has important ramifications for our understanding of the dynamics of Islam. However, it also challenges many of the assumptions underpinning the geographic area studies paradigm that has dominated the academy since the Second World War. This essay suggests the adoption of a more fluid approach to scholarly inquiry that reimagines our largely continental attachment to regions in favor of a more intellectually agile methodology where the scope of inquiry is determined less by geographic boundaries and more by the questions we seek to answer.

This article documents a landmark dispute between British Petroleum (BP) and the Nigerian tax authorities that occurred over a N130 million (£100 million) capital gains tax assessment arising from an intra BP Group transfer of its 50 per cent shareholding in Shell/BP Nigeria. This was necessitated by a BP transaction in Abu Dhabi. This tax assessment, which was more than twice the yearly cash flow of BP's Nigerian operations at the time, ignited a chain of events and schemes that saw the British government covertly and overtly providing support to BP, with the primary goal of influencing the outcome of the dispute in order to protect the interests of both the British government and BP. Evidence in this article highlights the complexities of postcolonial relationships between centre countries and African ex-colonies.

African Oral traditions differ critically from recorded history in their treatment of time. Time is relative and ‘Historical time’ is replaced by ‘structural time’. Eastern Nigerian traditions have a beginning, the ‘remote past’, and an end, ‘the recent past’ and episodes which should belong to a middle period between these extremes are pushed either into the ‘remote’ or the ‘recent past’ or are forgotten altogether. This can be seen as soon as Eastern Delta traditions are compared with the relevant European historical records.

Scholarly and popular histories of Kenya largely agree that African Second World War veterans played a central role in the Kenya Land Freedom Army. Former African members of the colonial security forces have reinforced these assumptions by claiming to have been covert Mau Mau supporters, either after their discharge, or as serving soldiers. In reality, few Mau Mau generals had actual combat experience. Those who served in the colonial military usually did so in labor units or support arms. It therefore warrants asking why so many Kenyans accept that combat veterans played such a central role in the KLFA and in Kenyan history. Understanding how veterans of the colonial army have become national heroes, both for their wartime service and their supposed leadership of Mau Mau, reveals the capacity of popular history to create more useful and inclusive forms of African nationalism.

One of the major developments in West Africa since the later seventeenth century has been the emergence of the powerful inland Empire of Ashanti and its gradual expansion towards the coast. This process ultimately brought the Ashantis into contact with the Fantes, the conquest of whom was necessary if the Empire was to extend to the sea. Their relationship, therefore, forms a central theme in the history of the Gold Coast in modern times. But problems were created by it which extended far outside the bounds of native politics. The existence on the coast of European trading settlements in close rivalry with each other meant that any serious local upheaval was bound to have wide repercussions. For economic reasons, Europeans could not remain indifferent to changes in the balance of power which would affect trade routes from the interior to the forts and, in particular, the future of the Fante states whose people, by the eighteenth century, had long acted as middlemen in the slave trade.

The suggestions put forward in this paper may be summarized as follows. The linguistic, cultural and to some extent physical ancestors of the modern Bantu people south of the Zambezi, including the Shona, arrived in Rhodesia in the early part of the first millennium a.d. The B1 culture was not introduced by Shona migrants arriving in the eleventh century, but was a local development of the already existing Shona Iron Age A, attributable perhaps to prosperity gained from the gold trade. The B1 culture should not in fact be regarded as a separate culture from the A, that later fused with it, but as a variant of it, which because of the power and influence of those who developed and practised it eventually spread over a large area and became a common factor in the various local Shona cultures that had diverged, and continued to diverge, in the course of time.

Weyane was a spontaneous, localized peasant uprising with limited objectives. It occurred in 1943 because several disaffected social groups in the eastern part of Tigrai believed that they could defeat or at least extract substantial concessions from a weak transitional government. The multiplicity of objectives roughly correspond to the divergent interests of the participants: the sectarian nobility wanted a greater share in the regional reallocation of power, the semi-pastoral communities of the lowlands were interested in pre-empting feudal incorporation, and the highland cultivators wanted to terminate the excessive demands of officialdom and militia. The convergence of these forces made Weyane possible; the disorganization of the ruling strata and the subsequent defection of a segment of the territorial nobility enormously enhanced the peasants' capacity for collective action. But this very heterogeneity comprised the peasants' objectives. The revolt lacked a coherent set of goals, nor did it have a specific program for social action. The rebels attacked neither the legitimacy of the monarchy nor the ideological basis of the Ethiopian aristocracy. In the end, Weyane buttressed the feudal order, and was probably instrumental in strengthening Ethiopia's neo-colonial link with the West. In the aftermath of rebellion, the Tigrai nobility did get its rights and prerogatives recognized, to the same extent that the nobility in the other northern provinces did. The government undercut the nobility's political autonomy, but paid the price of reinforcing their social position. On the other hand, in reaction to Weyane, the state destroyed the social basis of clan authority and autonomy, and reduced the Raya and Azebo to landless peasants. Weyane marked the end of conflict between centrifugal and centralizing forces, but did not eliminate the social roots of popular protest.

The Yoruba toll system has not been studied, in spite of its important place in Yoruba economy and politics. This essay fills the gap by examining toll collection among the Yoruba-speaking states of south-western Nigeria. It is divided into two parts, the first on the practice of toll collection during the pre-colonial era and the second on the changes introduced by the colonial administration. For the pre-colonial, it emphasizes the dominant aspects of the system, most notably the significance of toll revenue in relation to other sources of income; the control of toll gates by chiefs in order to appropriate the revenues; the character and privileges of collectors; and the features of collection at the toll gates, especially the duties imposed and their implications for trade.

The second part explains the steps taken by the new colonial administration to regulate toll collection after 1893, notably by the reduction of customs houses and the printing of tariffs. These reforms failed to solve the problems of corruption by toll clerks and evasions and smuggling by traders, or allay the fear that the imposition of tolls constituted an obstacle to modern commerce. Consequently, the colonial administration decided to abolish the system, and was able to achieve this between 1904 and 1908. Both reforms and abolition were possible because of the gradual approach adopted, the administrative and military power available to the administration, and its ability to generate alternative sources of revenue to maintain itself and pay the chiefs. There can be no doubt that abolition was a major step towards the constitution of the colonial economy.

It has usually been supposed that World War I was ‘an injury to the Christian cause’ because of the disruption of missionary work when mission personnel were called up, interned or not replaced. This view is questioned. Evidence is adduced from the history of the church in East Africa to show that African Christians responded to the situation by shouldering responsibilities in a way which surprised the missionaries on their return. The churches best placed to survive were those in which a beginning had been made to train African clergy. Only the Anglicans and Catholics had made any progress in training indigenous leadership by 1914. But even where this had not been done, leaders emerged, and some churches even grew considerably in numbers without any loss of quality. One example of this is drawn from the Usambara–Digo synod of the Lutheran Church in Tanzania. The missionaries' attitudes and actions on their eventual return are surveyed. Often they were surprised to find that in their absence the Christian communities had not disintegrated as they had feared. But almost always their concern was to ‘discipline’ the church, and return to the ways of doing things at the outbreak of war, instead of building on the developments which had occurred in the meantime. This sometimes had disastrous consequences as natural leadership became frustrated. The greatest ‘injury to the Christian cause’ may have been the missions' failure to see that a new method of working was now required of them rather than a return to the old.

This article examines the migration trajectories of individuals of slave descent and ‘mixed descent’ (children of slave concubines) in a royal family network from the Haayre region of central Mali. Focusing on the twentieth century, it considers the extent to which social status has defined options for mobility within this network. Its argument is twofold. First, it shows that attention should be paid not only to the slave/free divide but also to subtler hierarchical nuances such as mixed descent and royal slavery. Rather than social status per se, it is internal hierarchies within social status groups which defined a person's options for movement. Second, the mobile trajectories of people with royal slave status tended to be intertwined with and depend on the movements of their patrons. Although these dependent forms of migration hardly ever changed their social status, they improved their economic condition considerably.

The Portuguese historian of Mozambique, Alexandre Lobato, has referred to the ‘arms and powder, which guaranteed an overwhelming military superiority’ in the Zambezi hinterland, but a rapid survey of the evidence most easily available would suggest that, until the introduction of the maxim gun, the use of firearms seldom, if ever, constituted a decisive military advantage in Central Africa. Guns might sometimes decide the fate of battles, but by themselves they were insufficient to win a campaign. Yet cannon and muskets were undoubtedly the most valuable, and probably the most envied, commodity possessed by the Portuguese on the Zambezi, and the political and commercial role of firearms may well have been quite considerable.

This paper examines the role of the imperial and colonial governments in the formulation of policy towards the Nigerian palm oil export industry between 1939 and 1949. It argues that for most of the war years colonial officials in Nigeria accepted that metropolitan needs and conditions should dictate policy in the oil palm produce industry. However, towards the end of the war, they began to question whether policies centred around the requirements of the metropole would preserve the future competitiveness of the industry. Thereafter, they pressed for measures which gave priority to the problems and necessities of the local industry and the colonial economy. While colonial policy was sensitive to the concerns of imperial and local government officials, for most of the period under review it was reluctant, and on occasions, unable to accommodate the measures necessary to harmonize imperial and colonial goals. Consequently, the anticipated expansion in palm oil exports failed to materialize and the future competitiveness of the industry remained in doubt.

This article fills an important void in the current literature on the Nigerian palm oil export industry. To date insufficient attention has been paid to the thinking within imperial and colonial government circles which underpinned the policies adopted in the industry during World War II and the early post-war years, and which led to the failure of policy makers to achieve their objectives. Moreover, the current literature ignores the vigorous debate between the Colonial Office and the Nigerian colonial government, and among colonial government officials, over the best means by which the needs of the local palm oil industry could be reconciled with the demands of the metropole, especially between 1942 and 1949.

This article traces chronologically the rise and fall of the office of the kpojito, the female reign-mate to the kings of Dahomey. The women who became kpojito in the eighteenth century were central to the efforts of the kings to establish legitimacy and assert control over the kingdom's expanding territory. The office reached its zenith in mid-century when Kpojito Hwanjile and King Tegbesu gained office and effectively ruled in tandem, thereby solidifying an ideological model that persisted to the end of the kingdom. The model posited a balance of power between male and female, royal and commoner. Subsequently, powerful women of the king's household worked with ambitious princes to build coalitions to seize power at times of royal succession. When their efforts succeeded, the prince was installed as king and the woman as kpojito. By the nineteenth century, princes began to find alternative sources of support in their struggles for the kingship and alternative sources of guidance once enthroned. The royal family became more central in the state as princes and princesses replaced commoners in high offices. Even though alliances between princes and their fathers' wives continued, non-royal women within the palace were more constrained in their ability to wield power and the influence of the kpojito fell into steep decline.

The institutional history of the kpojito is discerned through an analysis of religious change in Dahomey. Because the hierarchy of the gods was manipulated by the monarchy to reflect its changing conceptions of the nature of power, the history of religion represents an intellectual history of the ruling class. Central among the religious changes and cultural influences that had a probable impact on the office of the kpojito, and more broadly on the ability of women to exercise power in the state, were contacts with Europe and with Yoruba-speaking peoples. Those influences were associated with cultural and religious visions that promoted the individual, the male, and the royal.

The problem of akori beads consists above all in the question of their [organic or inorganic] composition. If, according to the ‘water theory’, akori were some kind of corals, then how to explain their findings in old graves, where they remained in good state of preservation after the human bones decayed? In the present stage of research the following explanation might be offered: the term of ‘akori’ served for the designation of cylindrical and oval beads of varying composition and colour, made maybe of some now unknown kind of coral, but certainly also of stone or glass; perhaps the akori recovered from the sea-shores and rivers were not really corals but worked jewels from the corpses of those buried in the water or offerings to the sea-deity Olokun. The discovery in Ife of large production of glass beads seems to support this.

Several recent studies have examined the impact of the First World War on the people, and rulers – alien and indigenous - of West Africa. Diverse societies responded in a variety of ways to a situation in which extraordinary demands from the colonial rulers - of which direct military recruitment was only one - were often accompanied by administrative and military contraction at the local level.

This paper examines the way in which wartime conditions in the Zouaragu (Zuarungu) and Bawku districts of what is now upper Ghana exposed the weakness of the indigenous administrative structure recently constructed by the British. Here, in many instances, chiefs had been imposed, or at least had had their powers qualitatively changed and substantially increased, in societies that were traditionally organized on a kinship basis. The War seemed to provide an opportunity for an overthrow of this structure, which had enabled many of the chiefs to establish harshly exploitative relations with their subjects. An upsurge of disobedience to chiefly orders was followed in the Bongo area by a land dispute which flared into disturbances in which a constable was killed. These disturbances and an incident in the neighbouring Bawku District were taken as a sign of revolt and ruthlessly crushed by a local administration intent on teaching an unforgettable lesson.

Governor Clifford in Accra anatomized the inadequacies of administrative control and condemned his officers' brutal response to the disturbances, but offered little in the way of suggestions for the reform of the chieftaincy system despite clear indications that local hostility was directed more against it than against colonial rule per se. Neither were reform proposals forthcoming from the Northern Territories administration. Thus the severity of the British response to popular opposition to chiefly power was a factor in enabling some chiefs to continue as ‘spoilers’ rather than ‘fathers’ of their people even after the introduction of formal Indirect Rule in the 1930s had nominally broadened popular participation in local administration.

The purpose of this article is to examine the ideas of Mary Kingsley, not merely in abstract, but as the political theory of certain groups active in Late Victorian colonial affairs. A ‘surgical’ approach of this kind is almost certain to reduce concepts which at first sight seem brilliant and original to more mundane proportions, so perhaps at the outset this woman's outstanding achievements should be emphasized. Among contemporaries of her sex few achieved more; at a time when women were struggling to create merely the elementary conditions in which to express themselves, Mary Kingsley overshadowed the male competitors in her chosen field, sometimes in physical and almost always in intellectual achievement.

The pervasive importance of gold mining in modern South Africa has become embedded in South African historiography. Despite this, little research has been done to ascertain its impact on the other major sector of the economy, agriculture.

The gold mines had a profound effect upon one particular branch of agriculture – beef farming. The mines purchased large amounts of beef and were able to use their buying power to confront beef farmers in the marketplace. In the recession following the First World War, the mines were caught in a profitability crisis that was to lead to the Rand Revolt in 1922. One of the ways in which mining attempted to ease its position was by cutting back on the cost of the meat it supplied to its African labour force. This initially involved co-operation with a powerful cold-storage company, big ranchers and a number of smaller farmers to form a Meat Producers Exchange. This fragile alliance fell apart when farmers, themselves on the verge of bankruptcy, attempted to take control of the Exchange and raise beef prices. The farmers failed and in 1923 the exchange collapsed.

The victory of the mining and cold-storage companies rested on a number of factors. Farmers were unable to organize effectively because of the defection of ranchers to the mines. Changing economic conditions in 1922 and 1923 permitted the mines to terminate their co-operation with beef farmers. Finally the mines were able to call upon the state for support. The state ensured the demise of the Exchange and the defeat of the beef farmers. In the process it showed itself capable of intervening decisively to protect the interests of certain sections of capital.

The relationship of trade to politics has long been a central theme in African history. This paper analyses this relationship in the context of Barotseland during the period of Kololo hegemony (c. 1840–64). The development of long-distance trade in Barotseland is first related, and then followed by a discussion of the impact which trade had upon the politics of the area. The conclusion suggests that the relationship of trade to politics was not only important, but complex as well. Politics affected trade as much as trade affected politics.

Based on interviews with participants and witnesses, together with some documentation, the article describes the means and conditions by which Kimbanguist doctrines were introduced to Kisangani (Stanleyville) between 1945 and 1959, before the foundation of the Church of Christ on the Earth by the Prophet Simon Kimbangu as a national and international church. The special place in the covert theology of the Church of certain events in 1952, at the camp for Kimbanguist exiles in Lowa, is described. Discussion of ethnic rivalries during and after the foundation of the Church is related to the content of the oral traditions, which represent several political tendencies. The conclusion is that Kimbanguism in Upper Zaire differs from that of its place of origin in Lower Zaire in lacking roots in local culture and politics, and in having been primarily a product of nationalist sentiment after World War II.

The responsibility for the retention of the British Protectorates during the period leading up to Union lay more with Lord Selborne than with the British government as a whole. Governemental dealings (both Conservative and Liberal) with the Protectorates up to the era of Lord Selborne had been consistently heedless of the interests of the Africans involved.

The key to the change in policy seems to have been Selborne's dealings with the Basutos. The High Commissioner, from the time of his first exposure to them until years after his departure, continually evidenced the highest regard for the Basutos' intellect, accomplishments and military prowess. Through the vehicle of the National Council, he had a real chance to learn what the nation was thinking, wishing or fearing. Through correspondence with local traders and missionaries (notably the Rev. Jacottet), Selborne had become convinced, by the eve of the National Convention, that the Protectorates, whatever the outcome of the native franchise question, must be withheld from the Union if the current African restlessness, especially in Basutoland, were not to be transformed into outright rebellion. The virtual denial of native representation by the Convention provided Selborne with a plausible and strong reason for doing so. In the face of determined opposition by the Convention, Selborne stood firm, and was backed up by the Colonial office for fear, among other reasons, that he would resign if it did not.