The story of freedom fighter Jean Djonteu provides a new approach to the history of Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC) nationalism in the Grassfields and Mungo regions of Cameroon. Within the context of Baham, his village of origin, Djonteu's actions and tracts reveal his politico-spiritual reasons for joining the UPC militia in its revolutionary fight against Franco-Cameroonian state administration. UPC nationalism and village political culture formed a hybrid of political ideologies, or a ‘village nationalism’ articulating UPC anti-colonialism with Grassfields political concepts of nation and sovereignty that pre-dated European occupation. As this articulation disintegrated, Grassfields populations disengaged from state politics and turned inwards towards village political culture and spirituality rekindled by popular involvement in the UPC nationalist movement.

The Kingdom of Dahomey has played a central role in our understanding of political organization in West Africa in the era of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Research has focused on two major questions: whether or not Dahomey possessed revolutionary qualities that allowed it to maintain order in this turbulent era, and the role of militarism in fostering stability. Mounting archaeological evidence from the Republic of Bénin can contribute to our understanding of Dahomean political dynamics over time. Spatial patterns in royal palace construction, materialized regionally and architecturally, are examined in this essay. These data suggest that Dahomey achieved real administrative advances in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including the expansion of regional control and the successful integration of a complex administrative hierarchy.1

Malaria was a major health problem in Swaziland during the colonial period. Prior to the commencement of vector control measures in the late 19405 annual outbreaks of malaria occurred during the summer and autumn months from December to May. These seasonal epidemics incapacitated large numbers of Swazis as well as a few Europeans. During most years the epidemic was limited to the lower regions of the country and was marked by relatively few deaths. In other years, however, the annual epidemic spread throughout the country and was accompanied by a high rate of mortality especially among young children. Colonial medical opinion ascribed these major epidemics to abnormally heavy rainfall and increased vector breeding. Yet they were also a product of long-term trends in the Swaziland political economy – the semi-proletarianization of Swazi herdsmen/cultivators and the subordination of Swazi economic interests to those of South African and local European capital - which produced a state of nutritional vulnerability among many Swazi families. This, vulnerability in combination with short-term economic crises, such as the worldwide depression of the early 19305, and drought, gave rise to famine conditions which greatly increased the severity of subsequent outbreaks of malaria, as seen in the histories of the major epidemics of 1932 and 1946.

Based on a broad assessment of the scholarship on North-Western Africa, this article examines Saharan historiography with a particular view towards understanding how and why historians have long represented the continent as being composed of two ‘Africas’. Starting with the earliest Arabic writings, and, much later, French colonial renderings, it traces the epistemological creation of a racial and geographic divide. Then, the article considers the field of African studies in North African universities and ends with a review of recent multidisciplinary research that embraces a trans-Saharan approach.

The mechanics of food production by peasant cultivators have received relatively little attention from historians of colonial Africa, and yet a knowledge of food production systems and the labour they require is crucial to any understanding of rural change and stratification in the colonial period. On the Shire Highlands of Southern Malawi, ecological disturbance and the alienation of land in the early years of the twentieth century meant that an intensification of labour on food production was needed if hunger was to be avoided. The differential success of various groups in holding on to their family labour was a major factor making for economic differentiation in this period. Full-scale famine was avoided by the ability of some groups to adopt new cropping patterns, intensify labour, and thus continue to produce a food surplus. A degree of land shortage could be accommodated as long as labour could be intensified on the available land. In the Upper Shire valley at the same time, there was little shortage of land, but the concern for food security there was important in determining the outcome of the introduction of cotton as a cash-crop. The attainment of food security in this area, which was prone to drought, involved the deployment of family labour on food production over much of the year, including the planting of second crops and back-up crops in the dry season. The introduction of cotton was largely a failure because the returns did not compensate for the loss of labour on food production.

Considering the scale of violence that has accompanied the crisis in eastern Congo, the avalanche of academic writings on the subject is hardly surprising. Whether it helps us better understand the region's tortured history is a matter of opinion. This critical article grapples with the contributions of the recent literature on what has been described as the deadliest conflict since the Second World War. The aim, in brief, is to reflect on the historical context of the crisis, examine its relation to the politics of neighboring states, identify and assess the theoretical vantage points from which it has been approached, and, in conclusion, sketch out promising new directions for further research by social scientists. A unifying question that runs throughout the recent literature on the eastern Congo is how might a functioning state be restored or how might civil society organizations serve as alternatives to such a state – but there is little unanimity in the answers.

The unrestricted trade in arms and ammunition in East Africa in the late nineteenth century was one of the most important problems facing European administrators, missionaries, and traders.

The generic term Takarīr (also Takarna) is a popular Middle Eastern concept applied to all West African Muslims. The progenitor of the name, to which the attribution Takarīr is made, is the ancient state of Takrūr, which existed briefly on the Senegal basin from ca. a.d. 1OOO and which was the first West African chieftaincy to accept Islam. This paper suggests that probably the earliest West African Muslims to be seen in the Middle East in recognizable numbers may have come from that state. Because the milieu of the Hijaz and the diversity of races frequenting the annual pilgrimage ceremonies encouraged generalizations, the name Takarīr was conveniently applied to West Africans. The ambiguity of the term may thus be seen to have progressively increased with the expansion of Islam in West Africa, while the name itself became sufficiently entrenched in popular usage for it to survive the fame of great West African empires like Mali and Songhay. The term ‘Bilad al-Takrūr’ is essentially the extension of the Middle Eastern concept of Takrūr and has therefore received various territorial definitions.

This article examines the dimensions of indigenous political structures that sustained local governance in colonial Yorubaland. Legitimated by reconstructed traditional political authorities and modern concepts of development, Yoruba indigenous political structures were distorted by the system of indirect rule. Conversely, obas (Yoruba monarchs), baales (head chiefs), chiefs, Western-educated Christian elites and Muslim merchants embraced contending interpretations of traditional authorities to reinforce and expand their power in a rapidly shifting colonial context. With a strong emphasis on development and governance, collective political action also entailed the struggle over the distributive resources of the colonial state. Traditional and modern political leaders deployed strong communal ideologies and traditional themes that defined competing Yoruba communities as natives and outsiders.

The monarchies and other polities of precolonial Madagascar exerted a strong influence on each other. For this reason, in recent years it has become more interesting to trace their inter-relationship than to emphasize their autonomy. The Betsimisaraka kingdom, which flourished on Madagascar's east coast in the early eighteenth century, has generally been regarded as a polity standing rather outside the mainstream of state formation in Madagascar, not least because of the identity of its founder, the son of an English pirate. Research in European and South African archives demonstrates the close connection between the Betsimisaraka kingdom and the Sakalava kingdom of Boina.

The sources for pre-Arab trans-Saharan contacts are poor, but at least for the central Sahara a picture can be made out. The alignment of rock paintings and engravings of chariots along two trans-Saharari routes has been supposed to prove regular traffic across the desert. The inference is unjustified, but literary and archaeological sources indicate that the conclusion is correct. Herodotus attests the use of a route running west from Egypt to the Fezzan, then apparently south-west via Tassili and Hoggar to the Niger. This corresponds with the central Saharan ‘chariot-route’.

There was also a route to the Garamantes of the Fezzan from the Punic settlements on the coast of Tripolitania. Carthage imported from the Garamantes the precious stones known as ‘carbuncles’, which were apparently brought to the Fezzan from the south-west. Other possible imports are slaves and gold. Carthage imported gold from West Africa by sea, and it seems likely that her explorations down the coast were inspired by an overland trade in gold. But there is no direct evidence for such a trade.

In the second century B.C. Rome replaced Carthage in control of the coast of Tripolitania. Between 20 B.C. and A.D. 86 she fought a series of wars with the Garamantes. Later friendly relations were established, but further trouble led to the organization of the ‘limes Tripolitanus’ after A.D. 201. Trade is attested by imported Roman material in tombs of the Fezzan dating from the late first to the fourth centuries. There is evidence that the Romans imported ivory from the Garamantes, and slaves are now attested directly.

The commodities exported north by the Garamantes came not from the Fezzan, but from farther south. Literary sources refer to hunting expeditions and raids to the south, and finds of Roman material have been made along the ‘chariot-route’ south-west of the Fezzan as far as Ti-m-Missao.

Trade ended with the collapse of Roman rule in North Africa. It was revived with the Byzantine reconquest after A.D. 533, and Christianity penetrated to the Fezzan. In 666 the Arabs overran the Fezzan.

Le territoire de la République Islamique de Mauritanie compte bon nombre de sites archéologiques: le plus connu et le seul fouillé avant 1960 est celui de Koumbi Saleh; mais il faut signaler ceux d'Azougui, Chinguetti, Ouadane, Tichitt, Oualata, Rachid, Ksar-el-Barka qui, non travaillés jusqu'à ce jour, ont en commun la particularité d'avoir été, à des époques différentes certes, étapes au long d's;une piste commerciale reliant à travers le Sahara occidental, selon un parcours qui a varié au cours des siècles, les pays maghrébins au Bilad-el-Sudan, le Pays des Noirs. Parmi ces sites, les ruines de Tegdaoust, signalées depuis plusieurs dizaines d'années, ont été à plusieurs reprises identifiées à celles de la ville médiévale d'Awdaghost que citent souvent les récits de voyage et les descriptions géographiques rédigés par des auteurs arabes dès la fin de la conquête de l'Afrique du Nord par les Musulmans.

This article examines the unique role played by fishing, hunting and gathering groups in the survival strategy of the pastoralist societies in whose midst they live. During periods of extreme adversity, these groups acted as a refuge for destitute herdsmen and their households by absorbing population in periods of hardship and releasing individuals back into pastoralism when conditions once again allowed the accumulation of stock. Extensive quotations from the historical traditions of the peoples of the Lake Turkana region of northern Kenya are used to detail the recent history of two such fishing communities, the Elmolo and the Dies, the latter being a fishing group within Dasenech society. The epizootics that decimated the cattle herds of East Africa at the end of the nineteenth century are background for examining the interactions of the Elmolo and Dies with their pastoralist neighbours, the Samburu and Rendille, and the cultural changes initiated during this period. The subsequent changes inaugurated by the imposition of colonial rule are documented and the Elmolo are shown to be a ‘dying tribe’ in the sense that the traditional cultural features of their society are giving way to a more pastoral existence based on that of their herding neighbours.

Poverty has a long history in Africa. Yet, the most conventional and influential history of African poverty is a very short one. As told by the World Bank, the history of poverty starts in the 1980s with the first Living Standard Measurement Study. This history of poverty by numbers is also a very narrow one. There is a disconnect between the theoretical and historical underpinnings of how academics understand and define poverty in Africa, and how it has been quantified in practice. While it is generally agreed that poverty is multidimensional and has certain time- and location-specific aspects, the shorthand definition for poverty is the dollar-per-day metric. This article reveals how particular types of knowledge about poverty have gained prominence and thus shaped the dominant interpretation of poverty in Africa. It argues that, based on other numerical evidence, the history of poverty in Africa could be radically different from the dominant interpretation today.

Two necessary conditions for the existence of New World slavery and the slave trade are an acute labour shortage and an elastic supply of coerced labour. Though the former condition has been the mainstay of hypotheses on slavery where high land/labour ratios were viewed as causal determinants, less attention has been given to the role of labour supply responses. This paper joins these conditions in a model which postulates that labour demand stemming from open resource pressures induced a politico–economic supply response in West Africa. The model shows a derived demand for labour evolving over time into a specific demand for slaves as entrepreneurs sought the lowest cost method of expanding the production of agricultural staples. Free and indentured labour were both characterized by inelastic supply, but the supply of slaves was elastic due to factors discussed within a vent for surplus framework. African governments and private traders responded to the new effective demand from the Americas with improved organization which widened the pre-existing market for slaves. The desire for imported goods, with firearms especially significant, plus various technical changes in transport, money, and credit all combined to ensure the further development of the slave trade and the continued maintenance of a longrun elastic supply pattern

In the first two decades of the twentieth century the affairs of northern Somalia were dominated by the politico-religious movement led by Muhammad Abdullah Hassan. The ‘Mad Mullah’, as he was styled by the British, proved to be an elusive adversary and at one time forced the British to evacuate their Somaliland Protectorate. The Italians too were concerned about the Mullah's dervishes, who disturbed the peace of Italy's two nominal protectorates, the sultanates of Obbia and the Mijertein, and of their colony in southern Somalia. At one time the Italians found a temporary solution to the problem by granting the Mullah the Nogal Territory in northern Italian Somaliland. For the Ethiopians the Mullah's movement posed a threat to their Empire's expansion eastward to the Indian Ocean because of its appeal for support from among the Ogaden Somalis. Although the Mullah's recruits were mostly Darod Somalis, for Somalis of other tribes he was not only the agent of a not always acceptable religious movement, but also the symbol of political revolt against foreign domination of any kind. Today the Mullah is regarded as a forerunner of contemporary Somali nationalism.

One of the crucial reasons for the failure of British policy in South Africa during the Reconstruction period was an acute shortage of African labour for the mines, which were therefore unable to support a large English-speaking immigrant community. According to the prevailing economic beliefs, there was a fairly rigid ratio between the numbers of unskilled coloured workers and of skilled white workers which the mines could employ, so that the scarcity of African labour did inhibit the mines from expanding their white labour force.

The reasons for this scarcity include the deplorable physical conditions in which labourers lived and worked, and the unusually large demands for African labour in other sectors of the economy. British policy also, inadvertently, put less pressure on Transvaal Africans to take industrial or agricultural employment. However, the scarcity of labour was noticeable not only within British South Africa, but more especially outside its borders, where Africans seem to have been more reluctant than usual to take employment in the mines. It is possible to argue that the shortage was caused partly by the disillusionment of the workers as a result of their experience of British administration, and partly by a fairly extensive determination to withhold labour until conditions were improved. Such an interpretation is compatible with the facts of the case, though impossible at this stage to prove.

Whatever the reasons for the scarcity, the result was the importation of Chinese labour to supplement the existing unskilled labour force. The well-documented complaints of the Chinese labour throw some light on the treatment of African labour. The Chinese also undercut the wages paid to Africans, who lost their commanding position as unconscious arbiters of the success of mining. Further, the Chinese were employed in terms of a very restrictive contract, whose terms were later extended to cover African labour as well, with the result that the industrial colour-bar was solidified at a time when white labour was in control of an unusually large area of employment.

This article surveys research into the business history of Africa completed during the past decade, taking as a point of departure the author's previous essays, ‘Imperial business in Africa’, in this Journal (XVII, (1976), 29–48 and 291–305), and using as a point of reference the published proceedings of two conferences held in Paris and London in 1981 and 1983. It is apparent that knowledge of indigenous and expatriate business in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has expanded considerably during the past ten years, and also that the studies produced by specialists on Africa have particular strengths: they remain integrated with other branches of history; they have illuminated the relationship between business enterprise and official policy; and they have been concerned to explore the wider social consequences of business activities and to relate historical research to current development issues. The literature reveals some characteristic weaknesses too, quite apart from limitations of source materials: the market for knowledge remains imperfect, and specialists often fail to incorporate work which is available; and their analysis is frequently limited by a reluctance to make use of theories of the firm and of accounting techniques. An explanation of these characteristics is offered, and it is concluded that once the present deficiencies have been recognized they can be overcome, and that the quality of research will improve still further as the subject continues to grow during the next decade.

Nuer–Dinka relations are usually described as being based on constant mutual hostility. An examination of Nuer–Dinka relations along the Sobat and Zaraf valleys since the beginning of Nuer eastward expansion in the nineteenth century reveals a different pattern. Conflict during the immediate Nuer conquest of Dinka territory was followed by assimilation of individual Dinka into the Nuer social and political system. Through kinship ties connecting both communities a number of Nuer segments began to have closer relations with various Dinka groups than they had with related but more distant Nuer segments. Such relations inhibited the expansion of hostilities, and Nuer raids against the Dinka became increasingly selective. By the end of the nineteenth century a number of religious leaders deliberately fostered the growth of a Nuer–Dinka community. With the arrival of the Anglo-Egyptian administration an attempt was made to separate the Nuer and Dinka into discrete political units, and this policy exacerbated tensions between some of the neighbouring Nuer and Dinka settlements. The policy of separation ultimately failed due to the strength of the ties linking the two peoples. The model of structural opposition between Nuer and Dinka which Evans-Pritchard presented is based on data gathered during the early 1930s when separation was in force. It must now be modified by an examination of evidence covering a longer historical period.

In the late nineteenth century the West African palm oil trade entered a period of difficulties, characterized mainly by a fall in prices from the early 1860s. Part of the reason for this lay in the introduction of regular steamship services between Britain and West Africa from 1852. As steam came to replace sail so the palm oil trade underwent major changes. These changes can be quantified fairly precisely. One effect of the introduction of steamers was the concentration of the British side of the oil trade once again on Liverpool, its original centre. Another effect was the increase in the number of West African ports involved in the trade. The most important impact was the increase in numbers of traders in oil trade from around 25 to some 150. The resulting increased competition in the trade led to amal-gamations becoming increasingly common – a process that culminated in the formation of the African Association Ltd in 1889. It was also to provide the context for the pressure exerted by some traders for an increased colonial presence in the 1880s and 1890s.