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Voter Demands, Access to Resources, and Party Switching: Evidence from the South Korean National Assembly, 1988–2008

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 October 2013

JAE HYEOK SHIN
JAE HYEOK SHIN*
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Korea [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper investigates why some legislators tend to switch parties frequently – which is believed to undermine effective representation of citizen interests in democracies – while others tend to stay put. On the assumption that the ultimate goal of legislators is to be reelected, I argue that voters' demands for local/individual benefits, or pork, and legislators' lack of access to resources for such benefits are likely to lead the legislators to switch parties in order to improve their electoral chances in the subsequent election. By analyzing party switches by legislators from 1988 to 2008 in South Korea, where the president controls access to the pork pipeline, I find that the president's party members are less likely and independents are more likely to change party affiliations, irrespective of voter demands for pork or national public policies. However, I also find that opposition party legislators who are elected from less-developed districts, where voters tend to desire pork over policy, are more likely to switch parties than those elected from more-developed districts. These findings suggest that interaction between voter demands and party access to resources influences politicians’ party loyalty: voter demands for pork (or policy) tend to lead politicians to be less (or more) loyal to their current parties. Voter demands, however, have little impact on the party loyalty of those who are already in parties with access to the pork pipeline.

Type
Research Article
Information
Japanese Journal of Political Science , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , December 2013 , pp. 453 - 472
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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