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The Irish Government and the Sunningdale Council of Ireland: a vehicle for unity?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2015

Shaun McDaid
Shaun McDaid*
Affiliation:
Institute for Research in Citizenship and Applied Human Sciences, University of Huddersfield
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Extract

In December 1973, the British and Irish governments and the Northern Ireland Executive designate agreed to the formal establishment of a ‘Council of Ireland’ as part of the historic Sunningdale Agreement. This council was to have executive functions and co-ordinate the provision of certain services on both sides of the border; it would have ‘executive and harmonising functions and a consultative role, and a consultative assembly with advisory and review functions’. The Council of Ireland proposal was the British government's formal recognition of the ‘Irish dimension’ which it had accepted in the March 1973 White Paper, the Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals. The proposed council was one of the most divisive issues in Northern Ireland politics during the 1972–4 period, and was strongly resisted by a majority of unionists. The council issue led to the collapse of the power-sharing Executive which had taken office in January 1974. Loyalist opponents of Sunningdale argued that the Council of Ireland, if allowed to operate, would be a stepping-stone to a united Ireland. Recently, some scholars have retrospectively endorsed this interpretation of the council, arguing that the Irish government, in concert with the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (S.D.L.P.), sought a particularly strong institution – with the goal of Irish reunification. But was the proposed Council of Ireland really intended as a vehicle for future Irish unity?

Type
Research Article
Information
Irish Historical Studies , Volume 38 , Issue 150 , November 2012 , pp. 283 - 303
Copyright
Copyright © Irish Historical Studies Publications Ltd 2012

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References

1 For memoir accounts of the Sunningdale negotiations, see for example Faulkner, Brian Memoirs of a statesman (London, 1978), pp 202–25;Google Scholar Currie, Austin All hell will break loose (Dublin, 2004), pp 211–25Google Scholar and McIvor, Basil Hope deferred: experiences of an Irish unionist (Belfast, 1998), pp 95–8.Google Scholar

2 The Sunningdale Agreement, University of Ulster, Conflict Archive on the Internet (C.A.I.N.) website (http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/sunningdale/agreement.htm) (21 July 2010).

3 Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals (London, 1973).

4 See Farrington, Christopher ‘Reconciliation or irredentism: the Irish government and the Sunningdale communiqué 1973’ in Contemporary European History, 16, no. 1 (Feb. 2007), pp 89–107 CrossRefGoogle Scholar and McGrattan, Cillian ‘Dublin, the S.D.L.P. and the Sunningdale agreement: maximalist nationalism and path dependency’ in Contemporary British History, 23, no. 1 (Mar. 2009), pp 61–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Farrington, ‘Reconciliation or irredentism?’, p.106.Google Scholar

6 Ibid., p. 98.

7 McGrattan, ‘Dublin, the S.D.L.P. and the Sunningdale agreement’, p. 61.Google Scholar

8 Ibid., p. 69.

9 Bew, Paul Ireland: the politics of enmity, 1789–2006 (Oxford, 2007), pp 395–6.Google Scholar

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13 See for example Kennedy, Michael Division and consensus: the politics of cross-border relations in Ireland, 1925–1969 (Dublin, 2000)Google Scholar and Tannam, Etain Cross-border cooperation in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (Basingstoke, 1998).Google Scholar For the history of North-South tourism co-operation, Zeulow, Eric GE. ‘“Ingredients for cooperation”: Irish Tourism in North-South Relations, 1924–1998’ in New Hibernia Review/Iris Éireannach Nua, 10, no. 1 (spring 2006), pp 17–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For an investigation of more recent developments, Coakley, John and O’Dowd, Liam (eds), Crossing the border: new relationships between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (Dublin, 2007).Google Scholar

14 Irish Independent, 19 Feb. 1965. In the 1950s, there was existing co-operation regarding fisheries, electricity and drainage. See Ferriter, Diarmaid The transformation of Ireland 1900–2000 (London, 2004), p. 461.Google Scholar

15 Minister plenipotentiary at the Irish embassy, London.

16 Memorandum by Kevin Rush, 7 Oct. 1969 (N.A.I., Department of Foreign Affairs (D.F.A.) 2000/14/444).

17 This was deemed preferable to an extradition treaty by the U.U.P. See U.U.P., Towards the future: a Unionist blueprint (Belfast, 1972).

18 S.D.L.P., Towards a new Ireland (Belfast, 1972).

19 The V.U.P.P. was formed in March 1973. It originated as a pressure group within the U.U.P. It left when the latter refused to reject the Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals outright.

20 Vanguard, Ulster Government without right (Belfast, 1973);Google Scholar D.U.P., 1973 Assembly election manifesto: Ulster Democratic Unionist Party (Belfast, 1973).

21 Ibid.

22 The future of Northern Ireland: a paper for discussion (London, 1972).

23 SirPeck, J. to U.K. representative, Belfast, 4 Jan. 1973 Google Scholar (T.N.A., P.R.O., Northern Ireland Office, (CJ4) /390).

24 Meeting between Mr Lenihan and Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 15 Jan. 1973 (T.N.A., P.R.O., CJ4/391).

25 For more on Fianna Fáil and Northern Ireland see, Mair, Peter The changing Irish party system: organisation, ideology and electoral competition (London, 1987), pp 12–61 Google Scholar and O’Donnell, Catherine Fianna Fáil, Irish republicanism and the Northern Ireland troubles, 1968–2005 (Dublin, 2007).Google Scholar

26 Note of a meeting held at Government Buildings, 22 Dec. 1972 (N.A.I., Department Department of the Taoiseach (D.T.), 2004/21/2).

27 ‘Council of Ireland’: second meeting with Irish government representatives, 23 Jan. 1973 (T.N.A., P.R.O., CJ4/391).

28 Sir John Peck to Kelvin White, 5 Feb. 1973 (T.N.A., P.R.O., Foreign and Commonwealth Office (F.C.O.) 87/228).

29 Council of Ireland: preliminary discussions with the Irish Government, 14 Feb. 1973 (T.N.A., P.R.O., CJ4/391).

30 Preliminary consultations with Departments, Agriculture, Fisheries and Lands, 15 June 1973 (N.A.I. , D.T. 2004/1/240).

31 Preliminary consultations with Departments, Social Welfare, Labour and Health, 11 June 1973 (N.A.I., D.T. 2004/1/240).

32 Preliminary consultations with Departments of Transport and Power, 8 June 1973 (N.A.I., D.T. 2005/7/653).

33 Preliminary consultations with Departments of Defence and Justice, 18 June 1973 (N.A.I., Department of Justice (JUS) 2005/24/8).

34 Memorandum for the government, Department of Foreign Affairs, report by Minister for Foreign Affairs [Garret FitzGerald] on the possible structures and functions of a Council of Ireland, 30 July 1973 (N.A.I., JUS 2005/24/8).

35 FitzGerald, Garret All in a life: an autobiography (Dublin, 1991), p. 203.Google Scholar

36 Memorandum for the government, Department of Foreign Affairs, report by Minister for Foreign Affairs on the possible structures and functions of a Council of Ireland, 30 July 1973 (N.A.I., JUS 2005/24/8).

37 Note for the record, 2 July 1973 (T.N.A., P.R.O., CJ4/391).

38 The Sunningdale Agreement, C.A.I.N. website (http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/ sunningdale/agreement.htm) (21 July 2010). The value of this declaration was lessened when veteran republican Kevin Boland challenged the Irish government in the Supreme Court, arguing that it violated articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution.

39 The U.U.C. was the U.U.P.’s governing body, comprised not just of party members but also members of the Orange institutions.

40 Executive minutes, 8 Jan. 1974 (P.R.O.N.I., Office of the Executive, O.E./2/1A).

41 Minute by Muiris MacConghail, 5 Jan. 1974 (N.A.I., D.T. 2005/7/651).

42 Faulkner to Cosgrave, 6 Feb. 1974 (P.R.O.N.I., O.E./1/35).

43 Lee, J.J. Ireland 1912–1985: politics and society (Cambridge, 1989), p. 444.Google Scholar

44 Executive minutes, 28 Jan. 1974 (P.R.O.N.I., O.E./2/6).

45 Annex - Sunningdale - outline scheme, Executive minutes, 13 May 1974 (P.R.O.N.I., O.E./2/21).

46 Executive minutes, 22 May 1974 (P.R.O.N.I., O.E/2/26).

47 Jackson, Home Rule, p. 278.Google Scholar

48 For detailed accounts see Anderson, Don Fourteen May days: the inside story of the loyalist strike of 1974 (Dublin, 1994);Google Scholar Bruce, Steve The red hand: Protestant paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Oxford, 1992), pp 78–109;Google Scholar Fisk, Robert The point of no return: the strike which broke the British in Ulster (London, 1975);Google Scholar Gillespie, Gordon ‘Loyalist politics and the Ulster Workers’ Council strike of 1974’ (Ph.D. thesis, Queen’s University Belfast, 1994).Google Scholar

49 Jackson, Home Rule, pp 272–3.Google Scholar

50 Bourke, Peace in Ireland, p. 213.Google Scholar

51 Kerr, Michael Imposing power-sharing: conflict and coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon (Dublin, 2005), p. 64.Google Scholar Kerr is correct that the Council of Ireland could not have become the vehicle for a united Ireland. However, this was not solely due to the unionist veto. The evidence suggests that unionists would not have had to veto any such development, since the Irish government did not intend to use the council to achieve Irish unity.

52 McLoughlin, P.J. ‘“Dublin is just a Sunningdale away?” The S.D.L.P. and the failure of Northern Ireland’s Sunningdale experiment’ in Twentieth Century British History, 20, no. 1 (2009), p. 87.Google Scholar

53 Executive memorandum (EXMEMO) 13/74. Council of Ireland: Memorandum by the Secretary to the Executive, 28 Jan, 1974. Executive minutes, 28 Jan. 1974 (P.R.O.N.I., O.E/2/6).

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid. Emphasis in original.

56 As shown above, officials from the Republic admitted that standards in the Republic lagged behind Northern Ireland.

57 Executive memorandum (EXMEMO) 13/74. Council of Ireland: memorandum by the Secretary to the Executive, 28 Jan. 1974. Executive minutes, 28 January 1974 (P.R.O.N.I., O.E/2/6).

58 Holden was head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service, Schmield one of his senior officials.

59 Memo by K. P. Bloomfield, D.C.B. Holden and K.R. Schmield. Executive minutes, 7 May 1974 (P.R.O.N.I., O.E/2/19).

60 Ibid.

61 EXMEMO 77/74. The Sunningdale agreement by A. B. D. Faulkner, 8 Mar. 1974 (P.R.O.N.I., O.E/2/9).

62 Council of Ireland memorandum, 16 Apr. 1973 (N.A.I., D.T. 2004/21/2).

63 Ibid. Emphasis in original.

64 Ibid. Emphasis in original.

65 Proposals for Northern Ireland settlement. Transfer of functions to the proposed Council of Ireland, [Feb. 1974] (N.A.I., D.T. 2005/7/665).

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Discussions between officials of the Government of the Republic of Ireland and officials of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 18 Dec. 1973 (N.A.I., D.T. 2005/7/665).

69 Proposals for Northern Ireland settlement. Transfer of functions to the proposed Council of Ireland, [Feb. 1974] (N.A.I., D.T. 2005/7/665).

70 It was believed that the establishment of a strong council with the requisite human and financial resources would cost in the region of £25 million per annum ‘exclusive of overheads and pensions liability’. This comment appeared in a section of the report entitled ‘Implications of transferring the executive functions identified as seen by departments’. Ibid.

71 Meeting between Garret FitzGerald and William Whitelaw at the N.I.O. [Northern Ireland Office], London, 8 Nov. 1973 (N.A.I., JUS 2005/24/8).

72 Farrington, ‘Reconciliation or irredentism’, pp 89–107.Google Scholar

73 Memorandum for the government, Department of Foreign Affairs, report by Minister for Foreign Affairs on the possible structures and functions of a Council of Ireland, 30 July 1973 (N.A.I., JUS 2005/24/8).

74 Blaney, along with co-accused Charles Haughey, was sacked by Lynch in May 1970 over his alleged role in a plot to import arms using government funds for distribution to Northern Ireland nationalists. The charges against Blaney were later dropped; Haughey was acquitted. Boland resigned in protest at Lynch’s decision to sack the men. Blaney continued in national politics as an independent T.D. until his death in 1995. Boland formed his own party, Aontacht Éireann, but was never again elected to Dáil Éireann after leaving Fianna Fáil. See O’Brien, Justin The arms trial (Dublin, 2000).Google Scholar

75 In the Dáil, George Colley stated that the Council’s unionist veto would ‘ensure that if there were any progress towards a united Ireland it would be by consent. We are not asking Loyalists to forego anything’, Dáil Éireann deb., cclxxv, 1657 (26 Jan. 1974). Jack Lynch had also stated that he did not wish the Council of Ireland to be seen as a ‘“half-way house” to a united Ireland’, Irish Times, 10 Feb. 1973.

76 Ibid.

77 McGrattan, ‘Dublin, the S.D.L.P. and the Sunningdale agreement’, pp 61–78.Google Scholar

78 Even officials from the D.F.A. had accepted that a body along the lines of the S.D.L.P.’s national senate was not feasible. Noel Dorr commented ‘Realistically … we must assume that it is simply “not on” at the present time’, Dorr, N. ‘Council of Ireland’, 16 Apr. 1973 Google Scholar (N.A.I., D.T. 2004/21/2).

79 Neither the accounts of Farrington or McGrattan have analysed either the June 1973 discussions between the I.D.U. on Northern Ireland and the various government departments or the February 1974 report on the transfer of functions to the Council of Ireland.