A central controversy in the economic history of Iran revolves around the nature of the changes that occurred in the nineteenth century: was there an economic “decline” or, on the other hand, can one see the “beginnings of modernization” in the long reign of the Qajar dynasty from 1800 to 1925? Did living standards rise or fall? Did the level and type of consumption improve or deteriorate for the majority of the population? And were the dominant trends positive or negative within the subsectors of peasant agriculture, tribal pastoralism and urban production and trade? The Qajar period has found a number of good historians but has been plagued by problems of conceptualization and interpretation. Two very different judgments have arisen: on one side, Nowshirvani, Gilbar and Nashat have advanced analyses highlighting progress, in terms of “commercialization of agriculture,” “modernization of institutions,” “rise in per capita incomes,” and so forth. On the other, Issawi, Bharier and Keddie have painted more sober portraits emphasizing “relative economic stagnation and very slow development,” especially compared with Egypt and the Ottoman empire.

Ever since Minorsky published his introduction and commentary on the Safavid manual of administration Tadhkirat al-Mulūk, which has become a classic in the field, scholars have come to agree on the tribal character of the state that was founded by Shah Esma`il. In fact, it is through the military force of the Turkmen tribes, the Qezelbash, that Shah Esma`il was able to accede to the throne, thus inaugurating a period of relative stability for Iran that lasted more than two centuries. Iran owed its ability to resist the recurring and alternating attacks by the Ottoman Empire and the Uzbegs to Qezelbash power as well.

Initially mobilized by religious fanaticism, the military strength of the Qezelbash became a double-edged sword for the Safavid rulers with the waning of unconditional Qezelbash devotion to the shah. Though they were indispensable to the defense of the empire's frontiers, the Qezelbash amirs, with their unbridled despotism and the resulting turmoil, never ceased to be a prime source of concern for the rulers.

To some, it might seem frivolous to speak of village games when issues such as freedom and democracy, factions and socio-political configurations of a larger order loom in Iran. However, this paper hopes to demonstrate that these games, by their very frivolity, reveal and help resolve tensions not only in the village, but ones that lie at the very core of society. The village might have been where they were observed, but such events can become a window to basic questions such as how society continues in spite of tension and conflict.

The games were observed over Nawruz, the Persian new year which coincides with the vernal equinox, during fieldwork conducted between 1976 and 1979 on the mystical roots of the modernization of the Isma'ilis of Iran. The data, in the form of films of the games and notes from observations and interviews, was collected in villages north of the town of Birjand, southern Khurasan.

During the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century in Tabriz, the political and cultural capital of medieval Persia, a remarkable congregation of Sufi poets assembled whose society, fellowship, and fraternity in Sufism, made them all members of one literary movement in Persian poetry, known as the ‘School of Tabriz’. In presenting the literary accomplishments and the mystical outlook of this School to a wider audience, the present article attempts to introduce the least known member of this school, namely, the Sufi gnostic poet, ‘Abd al-Rahim Khalvatī (Mashreqī), whose poetic oeuvre and biography has, to date, been completely neglected by Persian literary historians, both east and west.