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New Trends Among the Hazaras: From “The Amity of Wolves” to “The Practice of Brotherhood”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Robert L. Canfield
Robert L. Canfield*
Affiliation:
Anthropology at Washington University in St. Louis
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Iranian Studies , Volume 37 , Issue 2: Special Issue on Afghanistan , June 2004 , pp. 241 - 262
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 The International Society for Iranian Studies

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References

1 I have not been in the Hazarajat for many years. What I have to say about the Hazaras here is mainly based on the research and publication of other scholars, notably Harpviken. In a few cases I quote individuals who remain unnamed in the interest of protecting them.

2 From the Wahdat website, http://www.geocities.com/wahdat_magazine, February 2, 2002.

3 Wahdat website, February 2, 2002.

4 Mousavi, S. A., The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study (Surrey, 1988), 179Google Scholar.

5 Ferrier, J. P., Caravan Journeys and Wanderings in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkistan and Beloochistan; with Historical Notices of the Countries Lying between Russia and India, translated from the original unpublished manuscript by Capt. William Jesse (London, 1857), 222Google Scholar.

6 Quoted in Schurmann, H. F., The Mongols of Afghanistan (Leiden, 1962), 117Google Scholar.

7 Elphinstone, M., An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul. (London, 1819), 485Google Scholar.

8 Ferrier, Caravan Journeys, 219–221.

9 Mousavi, Hazaras, 177, 180, 183, 186.

10 David Filipov, “Hazaras hold key role after Taliban destruction,” Boston Globe, 14 February 2002.

11 Masson, Charles, Narrative of Various Journeys in Beloochistan, Afghanistan, and the Panjab, Including a Residence in Those Countries from 1826 to 1836, vol 2 (London, 1842)Google Scholar.

12 Kakar, M. H., Afghanistan: A Study in Internal Political Developments 1880–1896 (Kabul, 1971), 176–7Google Scholar.

13 Burnes, Alexander, Cabool: A Personal Narrative of a Journey to, and Residence in, That City, in the Years 1836, 7, and 8 (London, 1961[1842]), 114Google Scholar.

14 Quoted in Caroe, Olaf, The Pathans: Five Hundred B.C. to A.D. Nineteen Hundred Fifty-Seven (London, 1965), 306Google Scholar.

15 Bradsher, Henry S., Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham, 1983), 49Google Scholar.

16 Mousavi, Hazaras, 219, note 1.

17 Actually, there was a dispute among the Doshi Isma‘ilis over whether Sayyed Mansur Nadiri (or his older brother) should head the Isma‘ilis. Most Isma`ilis presumed Nasir Nadiri to be the mukki and Mansur Nadiri his deputy. But a story was going around that no one had yet been appointed mukki. It was said that when Nasir Nadiri went to see the Agha Khan in Paris the Agha Khan refused to see him because he had agreed to support the government. It was said that Isma‘ili authorities in Karachi affirmed that no one had been designated mukki yet. In 1990 at the Isma‘ili Center in London Sayyid Nasir Nadiri was being referred to as Mukki Nasir. I was unable to reach him personally.

Also there were tensions between the Doshi Isma‘ilis and the Shughnani Isma‘ilis (Emadi, Hafizullah, “The End of Taqiyya: Reaffirming the Religious Identity of Ismailis in Shughnan, Badakhshan – Political Implications for Afghanistan,” Middle Eastern Studies 34, [1998]: 103–120CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

18 Sayyid Mansur was accused of playing a double game in the war. One person (in 1996) expressed the belief to me that Mansur passed information to Mas‘ud, the anti-communist commander of Panjsher. Mousavi (Hazaras, 187) says “the Isma‘ili Hazaras … supported both the government and the resistance.” But a person who worked closely with Mansur assured me (in 1996) that Mansur's commitment to the Parchami regime was genuine. He accepted his position with the government (I was told) because his people were vulnerable. As the government, for its part, lacked support in most of the rural areas and, as Sayyid Mansur's strength lay in the rural area to the north, both sides had an interest in alliance. Throughout most of the 1980s Sayyid Mansur's forces were relatively unengaged but they did come under attack from the Shi‘a organization Harakat-i Islami, and at least once the Isma‘ili forces fought the (Sunni) Jam‘iyat-i Islami.

19 Harpviken, >Kristian Berg, Political Mobilization among the Hazara of Afghanistan: 1978–1992 (Oslo, 1986), 81Google Scholar.

20 Harpviken, 96.

21 Harpviken, 83.

22 Cordovez, Diego and Harrison, Selig S., Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal (Oxford, 1995)Google Scholar.

23 Harpviken, Political Mobilization, 94 ff.

24 Harpviken, 104–5.

25 Mousavi, Hazaras, 187.

26 Edwards, David Busby, “The Evolution of Shi'i Political Dissent in Afghanistan,” Shi‘ism and Social Protest, ed. Cole, J. R. I. and Keddi, N. R. (New Haven, 1986), 223Google Scholar.

27 Emadi, Hafizullah, “The Hazaras and their Role in the Process of Political Transformation in Afghanistan,” Central Asian Survey 16 (1997): 376CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 Harpviken, Political Mobilization, 75.

29 Harpviken, 77.

30 Roy, Olivier, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge, 1990 [1986]), 142CrossRefGoogle Scholar, says there were nine wulayats.

31 Personal interview in Dari (Afghan Farsi). My translation.

32 Roy, 142–43.

33 Emadi, “Hazaras and their Role,” 376.

34 Behishti like Muhsini had studied in Iraq with Ayatullah Sayyed Abul Qasim-i Khu'i, with whom he also retained ties. Loyalty to Khu'i may have been a way the Afghanistan Shi‘a expressed their independence from Iranian Shi‘ism. I once asked a Hazara in Quetta, who had some knowledge of the organization, if adherence to Khu'i meant opposition to Khomeini. He insisted that the party was merely separate; they did not approve or disapprove of Khomeini.

35 An Afghan from Hazarajat said to me, “Iran sent people into Afghanistan to take it for Iran. In 1361 they started fighting, and two years later the Shura was very weak” (my translation). An attempt at reapprochement with Iran in 1989 by a prominent figure in the Shura organization was repudiated by other members.

36 Personal interview in Dari. My translation.

37 Edwards, Evolution, 226.

38 Harpviken, Political Mobilization, 88.

39 Emadi, “Hazaras and Their Role,” 377.

40 Edwards, “Evolution,” 226–7.

41 Personal interview in Dari. My translation.

42 Harpviken, Political Mobilization, 74 ff. On conflicts between Quetta-based secular groups and Islamistic groups in 1980–81 see Bindemann, Rolf, Religion und Politik bei den schiitischen Hazara in Afghanistan, Iran und Pakistan (Berlin, 1987), 62–64Google Scholar.

43 Edwards, “Evolution,” 227; see also, Emadi, “Hazaras and Their Role,” 377.

44 Name of source withheld. My translation.

45 Neyru was considered “very successful” by N. Haqshinas, Russia's Intrigues and Crimes in Afghanistan [in Dari] (Tehran, 1985), 36.

46 Edwards, “Evolution,” 225.

47 Harpviken, Political Mobilization, 79–80.

48 Harpviken, Political Mobilization, 86 ff.; Roy, Olivier, L'Afghanistan d'est en oust: Compte rendu de voyage 1982. Les Nouvelles of'Afghanistan, 12–13 (Paris, 1983), 49–51Google Scholar.

49 Harpviken, Political Mobilization, 84 ff. This section of my paper, as well as much of the rest, is indebted to Harpviken for providing a valuable report on the period of confusion in Kabul in 1991–1992.

50 Harpviken, 85 ff.

51 Harpviken, 88.

52 Harpviken, 95.

53 Harpviken, 95.

54 Harpviken, 94.

55 Harpviken, 97.

56 Harpviken, 94.

57 Harpviken, 104.

58 Harpviken, 94 ff.; 100 ff.

59 Harpviken, 102–3.

60 Harpviken, 103.

61 Harpviken, 104 ff.

62 Harpviken, 108.

63 Mousavi, Hazaras, 192–194.

64 Mousavi, 195.

65 Harpviken, Political Mobilization, 115.

66 Rubin, Barnett R., The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (New Haven, 1995), 152Google Scholar.

67 Harpviken, Political Mobilization, 110.

68 Emadi, Hafizullah, “Minority Group Politics: The Role of Isma‘ilis in Afghanistan's Politcs,” Central Asian Survey 12 (1993): 379–392CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Emadi, “Taqiyya”; Rubin, Fragmentation, 270.

69 Sliwinski, Marek, Afghanistan 1978–87, War, Demography and Society, Central Asian Survey, Incidental Paper Series, 6 (1988), 18Google Scholar; Mousavi, Hazaras, 196; Harpviken, Political Mobilization, 110 ff.

70 Harpviken, Political Movements, 109.

71 It seems to be generally supposed that if the Americans had not ceased their involvement in Afghanistan in the early 1990s the country would not have descended into such anarchy. That is not quite the way I see it. What I remember is that the U.S. was allowing the Pakistani ISI to run the war against the Soviets, which meant that the U.S. was effectively behind Pakistan's policy. It was Pakistan's policy to support G. Hikmatyar, and it was Pakistan's policy to encourage the battle for Kabul that pitted Hikmatyar's forces against the Hazaras and the Tajiks. In addition, the U.S. was allowing the Saudis to support Sayyaf's party, which also brutally attacked the Hazaras in Kabul. If the Americans had been involved, it is possible that they would have been implicated in the slaughter of the people of Kabul. What is new now is that the United States is not relying on Pakistan to run the war against the Taliban, and it has forced Pakistan to backtrack on its support for the Taliban. For a different view, see Yousaf, Mohammad and Adkin, Mark, Afghanistan: The Bear Trap (Havertown, PA, 1992)Google Scholar.

72 Harpviken, Political Mobilization, 113.

73 Harpviken, 110.

74 Mousavi, Hazaras, 196–198.

75 Filipov, “Hazaras”; see also the Hazara websites www.hazaraunity.com; www.shia-network.com, www/hazara.net.

76 Mousavi, Hazaras, 196.

77 mazari.cjb.net, website of the Martyr Abdul Ali Mazari Cultural Centre.

78 www.geocities.com/mohaqiq; www.hazara.net

79 Benard, Cheryl, Veiled Courage: Inside the Afghan Women's Resistance (New York, 2002)Google Scholar.

80 One feature of the Hazara community that augurs well for their future is their avowed emphasis on education. As an educated Hazara wrote me in 2001, “This is probably where Hazaras are currently distinguishing themselves. There are more schools probably in the mountains today than ever, and if what we hear is correct it may be the only place technically under Taliban control that still has girls going to school. Beginning under the communists, Hazaras in particular saw education as the way off the bottom rung of the social ladder, and their pursuit of it … has become only stronger in recent years. Resources are meager, but funds are raised both locally and internationally … . These are mostly more independent type schools, though Iran is weighing in a lot, as well. Curriculum is not like the Sunni Madrassahs, but much wider-a point even the Iranian schools pride themselves on-including English and computers.” According to another educated Hazara, “Even before the Taliban appeared a university had begun [via some] relationship with the university of Balkh in Mazar-i Sharif. Those involved were Hazaras from Kabul who had fled to Mazar … . [Also] in the mountains schools have actually multiplied and may have been the only place where girls were attending classes. All are locally supported.”