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The rational enforcement of international law: solving the sanctioners’ dilemma

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2009

Alexander Thompson
Alexander Thompson*
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
*
E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

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Type
Symposium on Andrew Guzman's How International Law Works
Information
International Theory , Volume 1 , Issue 2 , July 2009 , pp. 307 - 321
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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