The ICRC Study on Operational and Commercial and Other Non-operational Issues Involving the Use of the Emblems (‘the Emblem Study’) is an efficient and user-friendly tool to tackle issues regarding the use of the emblems of the red cross, red crescent, and red crystal. This article presents the Emblem Study's origin and objectives, and explains the structure and the methodology followed in its preparation. Recurrent questions regarding joint use of emblems and other signs are also examined, in order to demonstrate the Emblem Study's potential as an analytical and practical tool. Particular emphasis is placed on the need to avoid diluting the protective value of the emblems by maintaining a distinction between those entitled to use the emblems, their partners, and other players in the humanitarian field.

This article provides an overview of internal displacement and the internally displaced person (IDP) assistance system in Colombia. It analyses the humanitarian consequences faced by IDPs when they move to an urban environment, and examines the impact of the influx of IDPs into cities on the different actors involved, such as the government, national and international organizations and host communities.

States across the globe are increasingly involved in violent conflicts with non-state groups both within and across borders. This new situation challenges the classic distinction in international humanitarian law between international and non-international armed conflicts. However, the changing face of warfare does not diminish the importance of IHL. The essence of this body of law – to protect civilians and persons hors de combat and to lessen unnecessary harm during armed conflict – remains the same. The applicability of IHL must therefore be determined according to objective criteria and must not be left to the discretion of the warring parties. This article seeks to conceptualize the notion of armed conflict and examines the extent to which the existing body of humanitarian law applies to the new asymmetrical conflicts. It finds that the definition given by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in its Tadić Decision on Jurisdiction, which was taken up by Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute, is a useful starting point for an analysis of the ‘triggering mechanism’ of international humanitarian law in asymmetrical conflicts.

The risks of the use of nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical (NRBC) weapons are heterogeneous. Each risk has its own implications for developing and deploying any capacity to assist victims of an NRBC event and, in parallel, for the health and security of the people bringing this assistance. At an international level, there are no plans for assisting the victims of an NRBC event which are both adequate and safe. Recognizing the realities of the contexts associated with each risk throws up numerous challenges; such recognition is also a prerequisite for addressing these challenges. The realities that have to be considered relate to:

1. 1. developing, acquiring, training for and planning an NRBC response capacity;

2. 2. deploying a response capacity in an NRBC event;

3. 3. the mandates and policies of international organizations pertaining to NRBC events.

The challenges that will pose the greatest difficulty for a humanitarian organization are those for which the solutions are ‘non-buyable’ and which involve making extremely difficult decisions. Attempting to assist victims of an NRBC event without a reality-based approach might generate ineffective and unacceptably dangerous situations for those involved.

In this article, the moral values underlying humanitarian principles are analysed. What were these original moral values? Have they changed? To what extent are they in danger today? Has humanity itself become an instrumental value? To answer these questions, the author examines the humanitarian discourse: firstly, how these values have been described by humanitarians themselves, and secondly, how they are used by humanitarians in specific contexts.

At first glance, merely the ‘ordering’ of displacement seems to be prohibited in non-international armed conflict. However, after interpreting Article 17(1) AP II and Rule 129(B) of the ICRC Customary Law Study with particular regard to State practice and opinio juris, the author concludes that these norms prohibit forced displacement regardless of whether it is ordered or not. On the other hand, the ICC Elements of Crimes for the crime of forced displacement under Article 8(2)(e)(viii) ICC Statute require an order. It remains to be seen whether the ICC adopts that interpretation in its jurisprudence.

International humanitarian law (IHL) contains various provisions pertaining to the dead in armed conflicts and their burial places. This article provides an overview of the various substantive obligations with regard to persons having lost their lives in armed conflicts and their gravesites. The temporal scope of application of these provisions – namely whether they apply in times of peace – will also be analysed. Finally, the reasons why IHL as in force today is applicable to questions concerning the dead and their gravesites will be considered.

The gradual process of state failure is commonly accompanied by armed violence. Apart from occasional outbreaks, armed violence in fragile states tends to smoulder with relatively low intensity, often over an extended period of time. The actual level of violence may oscillate around the level of violence that is commonly accepted as triggering the application of international humanitarian law (IHL). In addition, because of the specific objectives typically – though not necessarily always – pursued by armed groups in failed state conflict scenarios, cross-border spillover effects are fairly frequent. The qualification of armed violence in such scenarios according to the conflict categories laid down in IHL thus raises some rather specific issues. Moreover, weak states, failing states, and ultimately failed states are increasingly perceived as a key threat to international security. States seem increasingly inclined to assume sporadic order maintenance functions in the place of disabled governments so as to maintain the perceived security threat at a tolerable level. Current efforts to repress acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia are an evident case in point. Since the Security Council, in Resolution 1851, at least implied the possibility of applying IHL in that specific context, the application of this legal regime to sporadic law enforcement operations by third parties also demands further scrutiny.

Humanitarian organizations dealing with migrants have long prioritized such people according to legal and institutional categories, therefore focusing on those fleeing conflict, violence or persecution. In a departure from this tradition, it was recommended at the 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent that the Movement should take an inclusive approach towards addressing the humanitarian dimension of migration, irrespective of the status of the migrants of concern. This article discusses the shift towards such an approach, and how it has been implemented in the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' migration policy.

In 2008, 260 humanitarian aid workers were killed or injured in violent attacks. Such attacks and other restrictions substantially limit the ability of humanitarian aid agencies to provide assistance to those in need, meaning that millions of people around the world are denied the basic food, water, shelter and sanitation necessary for survival. Using the humanitarian crises in Darfur and Somalia as examples, this paper considers the legal obligation of state and non-state actors to consent to and facilitate humanitarian assistance. It is shown that the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, as well as customary international law, require that states consent to and facilitate humanitarian assistance which is impartial in character and conducted without adverse distinction, where failure to do so may lead to starvation or otherwise threaten the survival of a civilian population. This paper considers whether this obligation has been further expanded by the development of customary international law in recent years, as well as by international human rights law, to the point that states now have an obligation to accept and to facilitate humanitarian assistance in both international and non-international armed conflicts, even where the denial of such assistance does not necessarily threaten the survival of a civilian population.

Modern armed forces are employed in a wide array of operations that range from peacetime riot control to outright international armed conflict. Classifying these various scenarios to determine the applicable international law is rendered difficult by both the lack of clarity inherent in the law and the political factors that tend to enter the decision-making process. The author describes the major challenges of legal classification facing the military leadership, and proposes a solution to ensure that the intended beneficiaries of the law – from soldiers to civilians – do indeed receive its protection.

The Responsibility to Protect is being touted as a new approach to protecting populations from mass atrocities. Certainly it would be encouraging to believe that an end to genocides, large scale ethnic cleansing and large scale loss of life were within humanity's reach. However, whilst the holistic approach of the doctrine is to be commended, the legality of the proposal requires further analysis. This paper specifically addresses the evolution of the legality of humanitarian intervention and looks at whether the Responsibility to Protect doctrine advances the legality of the use of force for humanitarian ends.

This article compares the concepts, scopes of application and procedural regimes of war crimes and grave breaches, while considering what role remains for the latter in international criminal law. In addition to their original conception as international obligations to enact and enforce domestic crimes, grave breaches have taken on a new meaning as international crimes, similar to war crimes. Only in few regards does the scope of application of these new grave breaches surpass that of war crimes. The procedural regime of grave breaches differs in theory significantly from that of war crimes, though less so in practice. Although it is too early to discount grave breaches, they are likely to become confined to history.

Effective control of cross-border activities is nearly impossible in market-economy regimes which, in order to remain viable, have to keep their borders open to goods, capital and services. This article exposes the tensions between a legal system predicated on openness and a groundswell of security-driven rhetoric justifying coercive and ostracizing practices against foreigners.

Genocide is a crime with a double mental element, i.e. a general intent as to the underlying acts, and an ulterior intent with regard to the ultimate aim of the destruction of the group. The prevailing view in the case-law interprets the respective ‘intent to destroy’ requirement as a special or specific intent (dolus specialis) stressing its volitional or purpose-based tendency. While this view has been followed for a long time in legal doctrine without further ado, it has recently been challenged by knowledge- and structure-based approaches, which have not received sufficient attention. A historical, literal, systematic and teleological interpretation of the ‘intent to destroy’ requirement, taking into account the particular structure of the genocide offence and the meaning of ‘intent’ in comparative law, reveals that the traditional view can no longer be maintained. It should be replaced by a combined structure- and knowledge-based approach that distinguishes according to the status and role of the (low-, mid- and top-level) perpetrators. Thus, the purpose-based intent should be upheld only with regard to the top- and mid-level perpetrators, whereas for the low-level perpetrators knowledge of the genocidal context should suffice. Lastly, this new approach requires a fresh look at the ‘intent to destroy’ requirement in cases of participation in genocide.