Children in armed conflict are frequently deprived of basic needs, psychologically supportive environments, educational and vocational opportunities, and other resources that promote positive psychosocial development and mental health. This article describes the mental health challenges faced by conflict-affected children and youth, the interventions designed to prevent or ameliorate the psychosocial impact of conflict-related experiences, and a case example of the challenges and opportunities related to addressing the mental health needs of Rohingya children and youth.

This article by an Islamic scholar describes the principles governing international law and international relations from an Islamic viewpoint. After presenting the rules and principles governing international relations in the Islamic system, the author emphasizes the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and the aspiration of Islam to peace and harmony. He goes on to explain the relationship between Muslims and others in peacetime or in the event of war and the classical jurisprudential division of the world into the abode of Islam (dar al-islam) and that of war (dar al-harb). Lastly he outlines the restrictions imposed upon warfare by Islamic Shari'a law which have attained the status of legal rules.

Accounts narrating the history of the modern law of occupation display ambivalence to the 1863 Lieber Code. At times, they mark the humanity of its provisions on occupied territories; at others, they find its concept of humanity in occupation limited compared to subsequent developments. A broader reading of the Code against Lieber's published works, teaching, and correspondence reveals a unique – and disconcerting –sense of humanity pervading through its provisions. Lieber's different sense of humanity, not directed at individuals, throws light on the history of the law governing occupied territories today and paves the way for critical reflections on its conceptual bases.

This article describes the genesis of the humanitarian initiative and the political context in which it has developed in the course of the joint cross-regional statements and the three international conferences on this issue in Norway, Mexico and Austria. It examines the key substantive conclusions that have emerged as a result of this debate and assesses their relevance for the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. It concludes that these facts and findings warrant an urgent reassessment of the so-called security value of nuclear weapons and a nuclear deterrence-based notion of stability and security.

The 2003 occupation of Iraq ignited an important debate among scholars over the merits of transformative occupation. An occupier has traditionally been precluded from making substantial changes in the legal or political infrastructure of the state it controls. But the Iraq experience led some to claim that this ‘conservationist principle’ had been largely ignored in practice. Moreover, transformation was said to accord with a variety of important trends in contemporary international law, including the rebuilding of post-conflict states along liberal democratic lines, the extra-territorial application of human rights treaty obligations, and the decline of abstract conceptions of territorial sovereignty. This article argues that these claims are substantially overstated. The practice of Occupying Powers does not support the view that liberal democratic transformations are widespread. Human rights treaties have never been held to require states parties to legislate in the territories of other states. More importantly, the conservationist principle serves the critical function of limiting occupiers' unilateral appropriation of the subordinate state's legislative powers. Post-conflict transformation has indeed been a common feature of post-Cold War legal order, but it has been accomplished collectively, most often via Chapter VII of the UN Charter. To grant occupiers authority to reverse this trend by disclaiming any need for collective approval of ‘reforms’ in occupied states would be to validate an anachronistic unilateralism. It would run contrary to the multilateralization of all aspects of armed conflict, evident in areas well beyond post-conflict reconstruction.

Obtaining and maintaining humanitarian access to populations in need by humanitarian actors is a challenge. A wide range of constraints on humanitarian access exist, including ongoing hostilities or an otherwise insecure environment, destruction of infrastructure, often onerous bureaucratic requirements, and attempts by parties to armed conflict to block access intentionally. The difficulties that these constraints present to humanitarians are frequently compounded by a lack of familiarity – on the part of states, non-state armed groups, and humanitarian relief organizations – with the legal framework. The main purpose of this article is to lay out the existing international legal framework regulating humanitarian access in situations of armed conflict.

This article examines the applicability of international human rights law in situations of military occupation. Proceeding from the position that human rights obligations can exist in these circumstances, the article provides an analysis of the precise modalities of application. It examines the tests for the determination of human rights applicability, and how these are linked to the concept of occupation. Finally, it recognizes the practical and legal challenges to the implementation of human rights obligations, and argues for a contextual approach that provides for human rights protection while recognizing the realities of military occupation.

The ‘equal application’ principle is that in international armed conflicts, the laws of war apply equally to all who are entitled to participate directly in hostilities, irrespective of the justice of their causes. The principle, which depends on maintaining separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, faces serious challenges in contemporary armed conflicts and discourses. Some variations of the principle may be inevitable. However, it has a firm basis in treaties and in historical experience. It is the strongest practical basis that exists, or is likely to exist, for maintaining certain elements of moderation in war. The rival proposition – that the rights and obligations of combatants under the laws of war should apply in a fundamentally unequal manner, depending on which side is deemed to be the more justified – is unsound in conception, impossible to implement effectively and dangerous in its effects.

Les textes soumis à la Conférence diplomatique étaient done les suivants. Ils constituaient alors l'alinéa 4 de i'article 2 de chacun des quatre projets de Conventions votés à Stockholm:

Conventions « Blessés et malades » et « Maritime »:

« Dans tous les cas de conflit armé ne présentant pas un caractère international qui surgiraient sur le territoire d'une ou plusieurs des Hautes Parties contractantes, chacun des adversaires sera tenu d'appliquer les dispositions de la présente Convention. L'application, dans ces circonstances, de la Convention ne dépendra en aucune manière du statut juridique des Parties au conflit et n'aura pas d'effet sur ce statut. »

States party to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms that engage in military operations abroad face an increased risk to be held responsible for violations of the Convention, given the relatively recent case law adopted by the European Court of Human Rights. This article examines some of the issues raised by the concurrent applicability of international humanitarian law and European human rights law. It also seeks to identify ways to reconcile these two different, but not incompatible, branches of international law.

Families of the missing often have no facts to clarify whether their loved one is alive or dead, or if dead, where the remains are located. Such loss is called “ambiguous loss”, and those suffering from it will usually resist change and will continue to hope that the missing person will return. As this article will endeavour to explain, our goal as professionals working with the families of the missing is to help them shift to another way of thinking that allows them to live well despite ambiguous loss. To do this, we must acknowledge that the source of suffering – the ambiguity – lies outside the family. The article offers a psychosocial model with six guidelines focusing on meaning, mastery, identity, ambivalence, attachment, and finding new hope.

This article explores women's presence in military forces around the world, looking both at women's service as soldiers and at the gendered dimensions of their soldiering particularly, and soldiering generally. It uses the ‘beautiful soul’ narrative to describe women's relationship with war throughout its history, and explores how this image of women's innocence of and abstention from war has often contrasted with women's actual experiences as soldiers and fighters.

Genocide is a crime with a double mental element, i.e. a general intent as to the underlying acts, and an ulterior intent with regard to the ultimate aim of the destruction of the group. The prevailing view in the case-law interprets the respective ‘intent to destroy’ requirement as a special or specific intent (dolus specialis) stressing its volitional or purpose-based tendency. While this view has been followed for a long time in legal doctrine without further ado, it has recently been challenged by knowledge- and structure-based approaches, which have not received sufficient attention. A historical, literal, systematic and teleological interpretation of the ‘intent to destroy’ requirement, taking into account the particular structure of the genocide offence and the meaning of ‘intent’ in comparative law, reveals that the traditional view can no longer be maintained. It should be replaced by a combined structure- and knowledge-based approach that distinguishes according to the status and role of the (low-, mid- and top-level) perpetrators. Thus, the purpose-based intent should be upheld only with regard to the top- and mid-level perpetrators, whereas for the low-level perpetrators knowledge of the genocidal context should suffice. Lastly, this new approach requires a fresh look at the ‘intent to destroy’ requirement in cases of participation in genocide.

This article analyses the role and content of proportionality under contemporary international law governing the use of force, with a view to clarifying the legal framework governing the conduct of the parties to an armed conflict. In the system of jus ad bellum, protection is primarily granted to the interest of the attacked state in repelling the attack; the other competing interests are considered only to curtail the choice of the means to be employed in order to achieve that aim. Conversely, in the system of jus in bello there is by definition no prevailing interest, but instead a variety of interests and values which are entitled to equal protection of the law and must be balanced against each other. The existence of two distinct normative systems, with distinct standards of legality applicable to the same conduct, does not as a rule give rise to major problems. The legality of recourse to force is measured against the proportionality of self-defence, whereas individual actions would have to conform to the requirement of proportionality in jus in bello. However, beyond the large area in which these two standards overlap, there might be situations in which the strict application of the jus ad bellum standard makes it impossible to achieve the aims of jus in bello. In these cases, the proportionality test under jus in bello must be regarded as part of the proportionality test under jus ad bellum. States must thus take humanitarian implications into account in determining the level of security they may seek to obtain using military action.

Acts of humanitarianism are an essential element of religious practice for the Muslim. The Quranic and prophetic texts calling for humanitarian action, defining and ordering it are numerous. They are either of an obligatory or an inciting nature and do not exclude the non-Muslims from humanitarian aid. For the Muslim to undertake a humanitarian act is a way of receiving help from heaven, of erasing sins, and of meriting Paradise. The mechanisms established by the religion (e.g. zakat, waqf, kaffara) had an unprecedented impact on the lives of the population: the freeing of slaves, a significant support for the most vulnerable, and the expansion of the educational and health-care system. Nowadays faith based Muslim NGOs follow these texts to launch varied humanitarian programmes in different domains.

International humanitarian law (IHL) contains various provisions pertaining to the dead in armed conflicts and their burial places. This article provides an overview of the various substantive obligations with regard to persons having lost their lives in armed conflicts and their gravesites. The temporal scope of application of these provisions – namely whether they apply in times of peace – will also be analysed. Finally, the reasons why IHL as in force today is applicable to questions concerning the dead and their gravesites will be considered.

Since the 1967 War, in the course of which Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, the Supreme Court of Israel has considered thousands of petitions relating to acts of the military and other authorities in those territories (OT). This article reviews the contribution to the law of belligerent occupation of the Court's jurisprudence in these cases. After discussing issues of jurisdiction and the applicable norms, the article reviews the way in which the Court has interpreted military needs, the welfare of the local population, changes in the local law, and use of resources; the attitude of the Court to the long-term nature of the occupation and the existence of Israeli settlements, settlers, and commuters in the OT; the introduction of a three-pronged test of proportionality in assessing military necessity; and hostilities in occupied territories. In the final section, I draw some general conclusions on the Court's contribution to the law of occupation.