The theoretical separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provides important protection during armed conflict. It guarantees that jus in bello will apply regardless of the cause of a conflict. However, this distinction has been challenged by the view that in some cases a situation of self-defence may be so extreme, and the threat to the survival of the state so great, that violations of jus in bello may be warranted. The situation is compounded by the confusion of the principles of necessity and proportionality under jus ad bellum and jus in bello in both academic writing and the jurisprudence of international courts. The dangers of blurring the distinction will be elucidated by examining how jus ad bellum considerations have affected the application of jus in bello in armed conflicts between states and non-state actors.

While the Geneva Conventions contain gender-specific provisions, the reality of women's and men's experiences of armed conflict have highlighted gender limitations and conceptual constraints within international humanitarian law. Judgements at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) ad hoc tribunals have gone some way towards expanding the scope of definitions of sexual violence and rape in conflict. More recent developments in public international law, including the adoption of Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 focused on women, peace and security, have sought to increase the visibility of gender in situations of armed conflict. This paper highlights important developing norms on women, peace and security. Although these norms are significant, they may not be radical enough to expand constructions of gender within international humanitarian law. This leaves existing provisions open to continued scrutiny.

This article reconsiders the status and legality of both autonomous and remote weapons systems under international humanitarian law. Technologically advanced unmanned military systems are being introduced into the modern battlespace with insufficient recognition of their potential challenge to international humanitarian law. The article questions the understanding of both autonomous and remote weapons systems as ‘weapons’ and seeks to consider how their use may impact existing legal categories. Their use is then specifically situated to consider the legality of their deployment in certain contexts. Finally, the article raises the question of impunity for the use of both autonomous and remote weapons systems that arise from the inability to attribute responsibility for the harm they cause. It is imperative that law and policy are developed to govern the development and deployment of these advanced weapons systems to forestall these likely situations of impunity.

The following article focuses on the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Rules for the Mujahideen** to determine their conformity with the Islamic jus in bello. This code of conduct, or Layha, for Taliban fighters highlights limiting suicide attacks, avoiding civilian casualties, and winning the battle for the hearts and minds of the local civilian population. However, it has altered rules or created new ones for punishing captives that have not previously been used in Islamic military and legal history. Other rules disregard the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians and even allow perfidy, which is strictly prohibited in both Islamic law and international humanitarian law. The author argues that many of the Taliban rules have only a limited basis in, or are wrongly attributed to, Islamic law.

Organized crime and gang violence are global phenomena that often emerge in urban areas. Although they are not new, states only recently began to perceive them as serious threats to public security. Laws specifically designed to combat them have consequently been enacted. This article outlines the difficulties of dealing adequately in legal terms with these phenomena and analyses the different approaches adopted so far at the national and international level.

Does the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has the authority to apply international humanitarian law in a case before it? The author examines a recent decision where the Court concludes that it has no power to apply rules other than the American Convention on Human Rights and general international law (Las Palmeras case). This decision overturns the position taken by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights which concluded that international humanitarian law must be refered to insofar as human rights law does not satisfactorily answer the problem. The article examines the pros and cons of the question, with ample reference to the practice of the European Court of Human Rights.

This article identifies two countervailing sets of norms – one promoting humanitarian engagement with non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in armed conflict in order to protect populations in need, and the other prohibiting such engagement with listed ‘terrorist’ groups in order to protect security – and discusses how this conflict of norms might affect the capacity of humanitarian organizations to deliver life-saving assistance in areas under the control of one of these groups. Rooted in international humanitarian law (IHL), the first set of norms provides a basis for humanitarian engagement with NSAGs in non-international armed conflict for the purpose of assisting populations under their control and promoting compliance with the rules of IHL. The second set of rules attempts to curtail financial and other forms of material support, including technical training and co-ordination, to listed ‘terrorist’ organizations, some of which may qualify as NSAGs under IHL. The article highlights counter-terrorism regulations developed by the United States and the United Nations Security Council, though other states and multilateral bodies have similar regulations. The article concludes by sketching ways in which humanitarian organizations might respond to the identified tensions.

The Roots of Behaviour in War study sought to contribute to improvements in the communication policies and strategies of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) so as to make them more effective in preventing violations of international humanitarian law (IHL). The study addressed two main questions:

a) What are the key factors which influence the behaviour of bearers of weapons so that they respect or violate IHL in any given situation?

b) Do prevention strategies drawn up by the ICRC take due account of the answers given to the foregoing question?

Common Article 1 to the four Geneva Conventions lays down an obligation to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions in all circumstances. This paper focuses on the second part of this obligation, in particular on the responsibility of third States not involved in a given armed conflict to take action in order to safeguard compliance with the Geneva Conventions by the parties to the conflict. It concludes that third States have an international legal obligation not only to avoid encouraging international humanitarian law violations committed by others, but also to take measures to put an end to on-going violations and to actively prevent their occurrence.

The Iraqi High Criminal Court established to prosecute Saddam Hussein and other leading Ba'athists is one of the most visible of the current efforts to establish criminal accountability for violations of international norms. Juxtaposed against other tribunals, the High Criminal Court has provoked worldwide debate over its processes and its prospects for returning societal stability founded on respect for human rights and the rule of law to Iraq. This article explores in detail the legal basis for the formation of the High Criminal Court under the law of occupation. It addresses the relationship between the Iraqi model of prosecuting crimes in domestic fora incorporating international law and the alternative model of transferring jurisdiction to an international forum. The controversial aspects of the Iraqi model are considered, such as the legitimacy of its creation, the revocation of official immunity, the procedural fairness of the Statute in the light of international norms, and the substantive coverage of what some have termed an internationalized domestic process. The author concludes that accountability for international crimes is one of the unifying themes that should bind humanity in common purpose with the Iraqi jurists as they pursue justice in accordance with international norms.

The article outlines the legal framework that governs transfers of individuals, and in particular the international law principle of non-refoulement and other obstacles to transfers. The author addresses some of the new legal and practical challenges arising in detention and transfers in the context of multinational operations abroad and analyses the contemporary practice of transfer agreements.

The multifaceted nature of peace operations today and the increasingly violent environments in which their personnel operate increase the likelihood of their being called upon to use force. It thus becomes all the more important to understand when and how international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to their action. This article attempts to clarify the conditions for IHL applicability to multinational forces, the extent to which this body of law applies to peace operations, the determination of the parties to a conflict involving a multinational peace operation and the classification of such conflict. Finally, it tackles the important question of the personal, temporal and geographical scope of IHL in peace operations.

Present-day international humanitarian law has grown from two main sources: the Law of Geneva, i.e. a body of rules which protect victims of war, and the Law of The Hague, i.e. those provisions which affect the conduct of hostilities. The author examines the different policies which are behind these two branches of international humanitarian law and traces their history up to the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference which, by adopting Additional Protocol I, brought about their convergence. While the ICRC undoubtedly gave rise to the Law of Geneva, its contribution to the development and implementation of the Hague Law has been less explicit. The author argues that any involvement in humanitarian law today implies a concern for both domains, which now are inseparable parts of modem international humanitarian law.

Sexual violence is prevalent in contemporary armed conflicts. International humanitarian law and human rights law absolutely prohibit all forms of sexual violence at all times and against anyone; international criminal law moreover provides for the individual criminal responsibility of sexual crimes' perpetrators. These three bodies of law importantly reinforce each other in this field. The discrepancy between the facts on the ground and the law is a matter of concern that cannot be explained by potential legal gaps or uncertainties. What is needed is to find new ways of improving implementation for existing laws at the domestic and international levels.

This article looks at the tension between principles and politics in the response to the Afghan crisis, and more specifically at the extent to which humanitarian agencies have been able to protect themselves and their activities from overt instrumentalization by those pursuing partisan political agendas. After a short historical introduction, it focuses on the tensions around the issue of ‘coherence’ – the code word for the integration of humanitarian action into the wider political designs of the United Nations itself and of the UN-mandated military coalition that has been operating in Afghanistan since late 2001. The article ends with some more general conclusions on the humanitarian–political relationship and what Afghanistan ‘means’ for the future of humanitarian action.

In 2008, 260 humanitarian aid workers were killed or injured in violent attacks. Such attacks and other restrictions substantially limit the ability of humanitarian aid agencies to provide assistance to those in need, meaning that millions of people around the world are denied the basic food, water, shelter and sanitation necessary for survival. Using the humanitarian crises in Darfur and Somalia as examples, this paper considers the legal obligation of state and non-state actors to consent to and facilitate humanitarian assistance. It is shown that the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, as well as customary international law, require that states consent to and facilitate humanitarian assistance which is impartial in character and conducted without adverse distinction, where failure to do so may lead to starvation or otherwise threaten the survival of a civilian population. This paper considers whether this obligation has been further expanded by the development of customary international law in recent years, as well as by international human rights law, to the point that states now have an obligation to accept and to facilitate humanitarian assistance in both international and non-international armed conflicts, even where the denial of such assistance does not necessarily threaten the survival of a civilian population.

In view of the challenges frequently encountered in providing assistance to civilians in opposition-held territories, consideration is sometimes given to cross-border relief operations. Such operations raise numerous legal questions, including whose consent is required; what constitutes arbitrary withholding of consent; what the consequences of withholding of consent are, both for those wishing to provide assistance and for the parties withholding consent; and what alternatives exist for providing assistance in such circumstances.