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Documenting violations of international humanitarian law from space: a critical review of geospatial analysis of satellite imagery during armed conflicts in Gaza (2009), Georgia (2008), and Sri Lanka (2009)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 June 2013

Joshua Lyons
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Abstract

Since the launch of the first commercial very high resolution satellite sensor in 1999 there has been a growing awareness and application of space technology for the remote identification of potential violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. As examined in the three cases of armed conflict in Gaza, Georgia, and Sri Lanka, analysis of satellite imagery was able to provide investigators with independent, verifiable, and compelling evidence of serious violations of international humanitarian law. Also examined are the important limitations to such imagery-based analysis, including the larger technical, analytical, and political challenges facing the humanitarian and human rights community for conducting satellite-based analysis in the future.

Keywords

satellite imageryarmed conflictinternational humanitarian lawIHLGazaGeorgiaSri Lankaspace technologyhuman rightsgeospatialGEOINThuman rights WatchHRWRichard GoldstoneUNOSATSouth Ossetiadamage assessmentTamil TigersLTTEGoldstone ReportIsraelIDFUnited NationsUNUNITARIMINT
Type
Ethics, Civil Society and New Technologies
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 94 , Issue 886: New Technologies and Warfare , June 2012 , pp. 739 - 763
Copyright
Copyright © International Committee of the Red Cross 2013 

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References

1 Yahya A. Dehqanzada and Ann M. Florini, ‘Secrets for sale – how commercial satellite imagery will change the world’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2000, available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2000/03/01/secrets-for-sale-how-commercial-satellite-imagery-will-change-world/4jgy (last visited 25 March 2012). See also Lt Col. Peter L. Hays, ‘Transparency, stability, and deception: military implications of commercial high-resolution imaging satellites in theory and practice’, presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Chicago, 21–24 February 2001, available at: http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/archive/hays.html (last visited 25 March 2012).

2 Imagery courtesy of GeoEye 2012. The UN characterized Grozny in 2003 as ‘the most destroyed city on earth’. See ‘Scars remain amid Chechen revival’, in BBC News, 3 March 2007, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/6414603.stm (last visited 25 March 2012).

3 The Ikonos satellite based on declassified US military technology. VHR imagery is generally defined by a spatial resolution (the minimum image pixel size) of one metre or less in diameter, a threshold that enables the visual identification of many terrestrial objects, including small passenger vehicles, makeshift refugee shelters, and building damages.

4 Dual-use satellite systems are jointly developed, financed, and controlled through bilateral agreements between private companies and national intelligence agencies or military agencies.

5 Covered in Articles 51, 53, 56, and 57 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Articles 11, 15 and 16 of Additional Protocol II, and relevant customary IHL rules.

6 ‘Russian jets attack Georgian town’, in BBC News, 9 August 2008, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7550804.stm (last visited 15 April 2012).

7 Satellite imagery assessment done by UNITAR – operational satellite applications programme (UNOSAT). Overview map available at: www.unitar.org/unosat/node/44/1262 (last visited 25 April 2012).

8 Based on author's unpublished correspondence and notes. See ‘Satellite damage assessment for cultural heritage monuments, South Ossetia, Georgia’, UNITAR, available at: http://www.unitar.org/unosat/node/44/1265 (last visited 25 April 2012).

9 See products available at: http://www.unitar.org/unosat/maps/PSE (last visited 25 April 2012).

10 ‘Satellite-based Gaza damage assessment overview’, UNOSAT, available at: http://unosat-maps.web.cern.ch/unosat-maps/PS/Crisis2008/UNOSAT_GazaStrip_Damage_Review_19Feb09_v3_Lowres.pdf (last visited 25 April 2012).

11 Ibid., attribution to the different Israeli military branches was possible to an uneven extent, depending on the relative complexity of the environment and level of damages detected.

12 UN GA Res. 60/251, 3 April 2009.

13 ‘Satellite image analysis in support to the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’, UNITAR/UNOSAT, 31 July 2009, available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/docs/UNITAR_UNOSAT_FFMGC_31July2009.pdf (last visited 25 April 2012).

14 Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, 25 September 2009, available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/factfindingmission.htm (last visited 25 April 2012).

15 ‘Goldstone transcript: righteous in our generation’, Rabbibrian's Blog, available at: http://rabbibrian.wordpress.com/2009/10/23/goldstone-transcript-righteous-in-our-generation/ (last visited 25 April 2012).

16 UN Fact Finding Mission Report, above note 14, para. 1006.

17 Ibid., pp. 160 and 174.

18 Ibid., pp. 205–208, and pp. 214–217.

19 Ibid., para 1021.

20 Satellite image analysis in support to the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, UNITAR/UNOSAT, 27 April 2009, pp. 6–13.

21 Ibid., pp. 14–22.

22 UN Fact Finding Mission Report, above note 14, paras. 53 and 1006.

23 Project work conducted by UNITAR/UNOSAT 2008.

24 Example of arson overview product available at: http://www.unitar.org/unosat/node/44/1035 (last visited 29 April 2012).

25 Fire data obtained from two NASA satellites MODIS Aqua and Terra, which together provided data on probable active fires within an approximate area of one square kilometre upwards of two to four times daily.

26 Based on internal UN correspondence. See also ‘Georgia: satellite images show destruction, ethnic attacks’, in Human Rights Watch, 28 August 2008, available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/08/27/georgia-satellite-images-show-destruction-ethnic-attacks (last visited 25 April 2012).

27 ‘Village damage summary: Kekhvi to Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, Georgia’, UNITAR, 28 August 2008, available at: http://www.unitar.org/unosat/node/44/1258 (last visited 29 April 2012). Figures for building damages were all based on final post-conflict images recorded on 19 August 2008. Based on the fact that continued active fires in the villages were detected on 22 August 2008, it is likely that there were more than 300 damaged buildings in the four ethnic Georgian villages to the east of Tskhinvali (from Pirsi to Eerie).

28 Report of Independent International Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG), Council of the European Union, 2009, paras. 19–28, available at: http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_I.pdf (last visited June 2012).

29 Based on the imagery recorded on 19 August, multiple concentrations of Russian main battle tanks and assorted heavy transport vehicles were identified in villages north of Tskhinvali at the time arson attacks were occurring, strongly suggesting that Russian forces had passively supported the Ossetian campaign of looting and destruction against ethnic Georgian villages and property.

30 Damage figures from initial UNOSAT assessment completed on 22 August 2008.

31 See field report of Jewish Quarter destruction in Catherine Belton, ‘Tskhinvali bears scars of military maelstrom’, in The Financial Times, 18 August 2008, available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/06946f30-6cbb-11dd-96dc-0000779fd18c.html#axzz1tedp35Eb (last visited 10 April 2012).

32 Based on author's internal UN correspondence.

33 Internal field validation commissioned by UNITAR/UNOSAT in southern and eastern areas of Lebanon following the conflict with Israel, September–October 2006.

34 Available at: http://www.caucasica.org/analytics/detail.php?ID=1387 (last visited 29 April 2012).

35 Ibid.

36 Project work conducted by UNITAR/UNOSAT in 2009.

37 The leak of one report by a foreign Embassy to the UK media and the subsequent accidental release of a second report, both in April 2009, provoked a small diplomatic crisis provoking the Sri Lankan government to accuse the UN of ‘spying’. See interpretation from US Embassy cable, available at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09COLOMBO484.html# (last visited 4 May 2012).

38 Report of the Secretary-General's Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, UN Doc. 31 March 2011, para. 127, available at: http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf (last visited June 2012).

39 ‘Geospatial Analysis in Support to the Secretary-General's Panel of Experts on Sri Lanka’, unreleased UN Doc, 17 January 2011.

40 Report of the Secretary-General's Panel of Experts, above note 38.

41 These facilities were seven hospitals, the UN distribution centre, and two cultural/religious sites (New Housing Colony Kandaswamy Temple in PTK, and Kumara Kanapathi Pillaiyar temple in Mullivaykkal West division, NFZ-2).

42 The Red Cross symbol was generally easily visible in the commercial satellite imagery used in the report.

43 Assessment maps for the protected sites were included publicly in the Report of the Secretary-General's Panel of Experts, above note 38.

44 Defined as individual impact craters located on building roofs, open fields, wetlands, and roads, as well as permanent buildings that show damage signatures more severe than limited rooftop impact craters (i.e. partial or total destruction).

45 ‘Geospatial analysis’, above note 39.

46 There was no remaining LTTE air force by late January 2009.

47 Specific site examples included the construction of defensive earthen berms and trenches, building activity immediately adjacent to thick tree-cover near the front line, visible troop formations along roads and beaches, and small boats partially buried on beaches.

48 Satellite-Detected Damages and IDP shelter Movement Report for March 2009, internal UN distribution, 2 April 2009. It was noted in the report that the air strike location identified was within a section of the NFZ-2 without visible civilian tent shelters.

49 ‘Sri Lanka admits bombing safe zone’, in Al-Jazeera, 2 May 2009, available at: http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/05/20095141557222873.html (last visited 3 May 2012).

50 Video available at: http://link.brightcove.com/services/player/bcpid1529573111?bclid=20223644001&bctid=20379565001 (last visited 3 May 2012).

51 See artillery time series analysis maps in Annex: Report of the Secretary-General's Panel of Experts, above note 38.

52 It is unlikely that either of these public facilities was functioning at the time; however, the school was later demolished and as of late 2010 there were no indications that the hospital had been reconstructed.

53 This explosion was detected by the same fire-monitoring sensors used during the Georgian conflict (2008).

54 SAR sensors are especially well suited for monitoring vessel traffic on open bodies of water, which would be of specific value to detailed studies on potential human-trafficking routes, as well as large-scale forced population displacements by boat.

55 Dekker, Rob, et al. , ‘Change detection tools’, in Jasani, Bhupendra, et al. , (eds), Remote Sensing from Space – Supporting International Peace and Security, Springer, 2007, pp. 119–140Google Scholar.

56 The German SAR sensor TerraSAR-X is subject to the Satellite Data Security Act (SatDSiG) of 2007, which restricts civilian access to radar data collected over designated sensitive areas. It is not known at the time of writing to what extent in practice this policy has actually restricted data access over conflict zones. See ‘German national data security policy for space-based earth remote sensing systems’, 2010, available at: http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/pres/lsc2010/tech-02.pdf (last visited June 2012). See also ‘PPP between DLR and Infoterra the SatDSiG – German Satellite Data Security Act’, 2008, available at: http://www.gwu.edu/∼spi/assets/docs/PPP_DLR_SatDSiG-Datenpolicy_Bernhard.pdf (last visited June 2012).

57 Based on the author's experience at UNITAR/UNOSAT (2005–2012).

58 The only information collected in relation to potentially unlawful acts in Gaza by Hamas was the identification and analysis by UNOSAT of damage to the retaining wall of a sewage treatment plant that resulted in a massive outflow event over 1.2 km long. The Goldstone Report assumed Israeli forces had been responsible; however, there were no eyewitnesses and little physical evidence. The Israeli government reviewed the case and concluded that although they could not rule out an accidental air strike, they thought it could have been committed by Hamas as part of a defensive plan to hamper the movement of IDF tank forces in the area. If this were the case then it would potentially represent a violation of customary international law as reflected in Article 56 of Protocol I and Article 15 of Protocol II, prohibiting the destruction of installations containing dangerous forces. See ‘Gaza operation investigations: an update’, in Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 2010, paras. 150–164, available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/8E841A98-1755-413D-A1D2-8B30F64022BE/0/GazaOperationInvestigationsUpdate.pdf (last visited 1 May 2012).

59 Based on the author's internal UN correspondence with Human Rights Watch, August–September 2009.

60 The 2004 US Senate report on US pre-war intelligence on Iraq indicated that when imagery analysts came to strongly divergent opinions about the significance of vehicle activity at the Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, there was no mechanism or review process to resolve the conflict, allowing the erroneous interpretation of ‘unusual’ activity to go into the Powel presentation. Further, it appears that imagery analysts may have shaped their findings on the locations of alleged mobile biological weapons (BW) agent production units to conform to fabricated reports by the informant ‘Curve Ball’. See ‘Report on the US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq’, US Senate, 7 July 2004, pp. 244–256, available at: http://web.mit.edu/simsong/www/iraqreport2-textunder.pdf (last visited June 2012).

61 A clearly associated risk with the proliferation of satellite imagery use by the humanitarian and NGO community is that groups may release products out of inexperience, excitement, or pressure to confirm preconceived expectations that do not necessarily account for this uncertainty or fully communicate it to end users, risking a typical rush to judgement error, as exemplified by the presentation of satellite imagery interpretations by then US Secretary of State Colin Powell at the UN Security Council in February 2003.

62 See Y. A. Dehqanzada and A. M. Florini, above note 1.

63 National Defence Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 1997, US Government, 23 September 1996, Sec. 1064.

64 ‘Turkey dismisses Israel's concerns over satellite’, in Reuters, 11 March 2011, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/11/turkey-israel-satellites-idUSLDE72A1VM20110311. See also ‘Göktürk – project of reconnaissance and surveillance satellite system’, Turkish Air Force, available at: http://www.hvkk.tsk.tr/EN/IcerikDetay.aspx?ID=167&IcerikID=154 (both last visited 5 May 2012).

65 Ibid.

66 Based on internal UN correspondence and private discussions with UN colleagues (2005–2012).