Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 January 2010
The ancient dream of international criminal jurisdiction is gradually becoming a reality. Article 227 of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles provided that German Emperor Wilhelm II should be tried by an international court to answer charges of “flagrant offences against international morality and the sacred authority of treaties”. But since the Netherlands refused to give up the accused, the trial never took place, and Wilhelm II died in exile in Holland in 1941. Articles 228 and 229 of the Treaty providing for the prosecution of war criminals were applied in a disappointing way in the Leipzig trial. The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after the Second World War undeniably represented progress towards the creation of a body with truly international criminal jurisdiction, but they were greatly influenced by their origins and in effect applied the law and justice of the victors rather than those of the universal community of States.
Paul Tavernier is a professor at the University of Paris-XI and Director of the “Centre de reeherches et d'etudes sur les droits de l'homme et le droit humanitaire” (CREDHO). He has taught international law and international relations at the Universities of Paris, Grenoble, Rouen and Algiers. His research work and publications have also focused on international humanitarian law.
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5 Despite the criticisms it has drawn and the crisis it has undergone, the record of the Tribunal for Rwanda is not negligible. In this connection, see Laucci, Cyril, “Quelques aspects de l'actualité des Tribunaux pénaux internationaux pour l'ex-Yougoslavie et le Rwanda”, L'Observateur des Nations Unies, No. 2, 1997, pp. 119–137 Google Scholar, at p. 136: “The results recorded by the Arusha Tribunal show that it has not done its work so badly.” Of the 21 persons indicted, 13 have been arrested, whereas the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has indicted 74 persons, only seven of whom had been arrested and transferred to The Hague by December 1996.
6 In a completely different context, mention may be made of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea provided for in the Montego Bay Convention of 1982. which was established after the Convention came into force in 1994 and which has not yet had any case brought before it. In the sphere of humanitarian law, the record of the International Fact-Finding Commission provided for in Article 90 of 1977 Additional Protocol I is also indicative of the impact of State sovereignty on the functioning and effectiveness of judicial or quasi-judicial bodies and even simple investigating bodies.
7 Some authors minimize the role of the UN Secretariat in drawing up the Statutes; see. tor example, Philippe Weckel, “L'institution d'un tribunal international pour la répression des crimes de droit humanitaire en Yougoslavie”, Annuaire français de droit international, 1993, pp. 232–261 Google Scholar. For the opposite view, see Shraga, Daphna and Zacklin, Ralph, “The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”, European Journal of International Law/Journal européen de droit international, 1994, pp. 360–380 Google Scholar, in particular p. 362.
8 The powers of the Tribunal for Rwanda are more limited, as Article 14 of its Statute provides that it is to apply the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, introducing any amendments to those Rules that it may deem necessary.
9 See Ascensio, Hervé and Pellet, Alain, “L'activité du Tribunal pénal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie (1993–1995)”, Annuaire français de droit international, 1995, pp. 101–136 Google Scholar, and in particular p. 119 concerning the decision of the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case (2 October 1995).
10 For example, Article 103 may be invoked to invalidate the application of extradition agreements, assuming that the transfer and delivery of an accused person to either of the International Criminal Tribunals may be assimilated to extradition.
11 See Tavernier, Paul, “Le caractère obligatoire de la résolution 598 (1987) du Conseil de sécurité relative à la Guerre du Golfe”, Journal européen de droit international/European Journal of International Law, Vol. I, No. 1–2, 1990, pp. 278–285.Google Scholar
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13 The composition of the Chambers, particularly that of the Appeals Chamber, might give rise to certain difficulties on account of the provisions laid down for the disqualification of judges (Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia). Moreover, the composition of the Appeals Chamber should reflect more closely that of both Tribunals, and not only that of the Hague Tribunal.
14 King, Faïza Patel and Rosa, Anne-Marie La, “The jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal: 1994–1996”, European Journal of International Law/Journal européen de droit international, 1997, pp. 123–179, in particular pp. 128–142.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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16 According to H. Ascensio and A. Pellet (op. cit. (note 9), p. 110), Rule 61 is “an imperfect substitute for trial in absentia”. F. Patel King and A.-M. La Rosa stress the legal problems raised by this procedure (op. cit. (note 14), p. 142). André Klip severely criticizes the Rule 61 procedure both from the point of view of the accused and from that of witnesses in his article entitled “Witnesses before the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia”. Revue internationale de droit penal, Vol. 67, 1996, pp. 267–295.Google Scholar
17 See our report to the symposium of the “Société française pour le droit international”, Strasbourg, May 1997, in Andrew Drzemcewski and Paul Tavernier. L'exécution des “decisions” des instances Internationales de contrôle dans le domaine des droits de l'homme (to be published), Editions Pedone, Paris.
18 Eric David expressed doubts as regards the practical use of such absence of publicity in his article entitled “Le Tribunal international pénal pour l'ex-Yougoslavie”, Revue belge de droit international, No. 2, 1992, pp. 565–598, in particular pp. 590–591.Google Scholar
19 Stabilization Force for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
20 See Tavernier, Paul, “Le droit à un procès équitable dans la jurisprudence du Comité des droits de l'homme des Nations Unies”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l'homme, No. 25. 1996. pp. 3–22, in particular pp. 13 and 14.Google Scholar
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22 The Tribunal seeks to strike a balance between the interests of the accused and those of witnesses, setting five fairly stringent conditions for the admissibility of anonymity. The Tribunal's decision is accompanied by the well-structured dissenting opinion of Judge Stephen, based on a strict concept of fair trial, close to the common law concept.
23 The first hearing of witnesses before the Rwanda Tribunal was held on 17 January 1997, in connection with the Akayezu case.
24 For a detailed analysis and critique of the problem, see Ascensio, H. and Pellet, A.. op. cit. (note 9), pp. 125 ff.Google Scholar
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26 Interview in Le Monde, 30 08 1997.Google Scholar