The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“the International Tribunal”) was established over four years ago in response to the mass killings, widespread and systematic rape and “ethnic cleansing” being practised in the former Yugoslavia on a scale and of a ferocity not seen on the European continent since the end of the Second World War. The United Nations Security Council considered that this situation constituted a threat to international peace and security. It therefore established the International Tribunal as a subsidiary judicial organ, in the belief that this would help halt and redress such violations.

The decision to devote an issue of the International Review of the Red Cross to a series of articles on the two ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals set up by the United Nations to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda reflects the increasing importance of these courts both for the general public and for legal experts.

The ancient dream of international criminal jurisdiction is gradually becoming a reality. Article 227 of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles provided that German Emperor Wilhelm II should be tried by an international court to answer charges of “flagrant offences against international morality and the sacred authority of treaties”. But since the Netherlands refused to give up the accused, the trial never took place, and Wilhelm II died in exile in Holland in 1941. Articles 228 and 229 of the Treaty providing for the prosecution of war criminals were applied in a disappointing way in the Leipzig trial. The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after the Second World War undeniably represented progress towards the creation of a body with truly international criminal jurisdiction, but they were greatly influenced by their origins and in effect applied the law and justice of the victors rather than those of the universal community of States.

Shortly after the Second World War the community of States, still shocked by the explosion of violence that had torn the world apart for more than five years, ratified an updated version of the Geneva Conventions in the hope of acquiring a sound legal instrument which would preserve human dignity even in times of war. They undertook to respect the fundamental rights of the individual in armed conflicts, whether international or otherwise, and to limit the use of force to what was strictly necessary to place an enemy hors de combat. Their resolve found confirmation in the two Additional Protocols of 1977.

The two International Criminal Tribunals set up by the United Nations Security Council in 19931 and 19942 are in the process of demonstrating that international repression of serious violations of international humanitarian law is no longer a purely theoretical concept. A total of 21 persons charged with or suspected of committing such breaches have been transferred to the seat of the Arusha Tribunal, and two judgments sentencing the defendants to prison terms have been handed down by the Hague Tribunal. The two Tribunals are competent to hear cases against persons allegedly responsible for serious violations of humanitarian law, but in so doing they are also required, under their respective Statutes, to ensure that the internationally recognized rules relating to the rights of the accused are fully respected at all stages of the proceedings. Article 20 of the Statute of the Tribunal for Rwanda and Article 21 of that of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, modelled on Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, enumerate in detail the rights that must be accorded to every accused person.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were established on 11 February 1993 and 8 November 1994 respectively by the Security Council to prosecute persons responsible for flagrant violations of international humanitarian law. The aim of the Security Council was to put an end to such violations and to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace, and the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals undoubtedly represents a major step in that direction. Moreover, it sends a clear signal to the perpetrators and to the victims that such conduct will not be tolerated.

If we look back to the diverse origins of the laws of warfare, one basic question which seems to have occupied the early lawmakers was: why, in fact, should there be legal limitations to belligerent actions aimed at destroying a foreign foe? At first glance, any such constraints would appear to be contrary to the very purpose of warfare and thus of no value to those who were either forced to resist an armed attack or who themselves wished to wage war against an enemy.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was created on 8 November 1994 by the United Nations Security Council, of which it is a subsidiary body. Its task is to help restore and maintain peace and bring about national reconciliation by trying persons allegedly responsible for acts of genocide and other grave breaches of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and Rwandan citizens suspected of committing such acts and violations in the territory of neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994.

In the face of the atrocities committed in Rwanda between April and July 1994, the international community committed itself to ensuring respect for international humanitarian law and trying those responsible for breaches of it. Thus, on 8 November 1994, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 955 creating the International Criminal Tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and of Rwandan citizens responsible for such acts committed in the territory of neighbouring States.

In the spring of 1994 more than 500,000 people were killed in Rwanda in one of the worst cases of genocide in history. The slaughter began on 6 April 1994, only a few hours after the plane bringing the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi back from peace negotiations in Tanzania was shot down as it approached Kigali Airport.

The response of the international community to the massacres and genocide in Rwanda was at times “reluctant” and “inadequate”. This can partly be explained by the amount of human and material resources that would have been required to restore peace and address the more fundamental issues of the failure of the State itself. The Rwandan experience does, however, also raise serious questions about the adequacy of international and regional structures responsible for maintaining and restoring peace.

Questions inevitably arise about the concurrent competence and complementary nature of an international tribunal and national courts, and about cooperation between them. Those questions may well apply to any State on earth because, by virtue of the principle of universal competence, many crimes which international tribunals are competent to try may also be tried by any State irrespective of the place where they are committed or the nationality of the perpetrator.