Recent studies of public attitudes toward trade have converged on one central finding: support for trade restrictions is highest among respondents with the lowest levels of education. This has been interpreted as strong support for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the classic economic treatment of the income effects of trade that predicts that trade openness benefits those owning factors of production with which their economy is relatively well endowed (those with skills in the advanced economies) while hurting others (low-skilled workers). We reexamine the available survey data, showing that the impact of education on attitudes toward trade is almost identical among respondents in the active labor force and those who are not (even those who are retired). We also find that, while individuals with college-level educations are far more likely to favor trade openness than others, other types of education have no significant effects on attitudes, and some actually reduce the support for trade, even though they clearly contribute to skill acquisition. Combined, these results strongly suggest that the effects of education on individual trade preferences are not primarily a product of distributional concerns linked to job skills. We suggest that exposure to economic ideas and information among college-educated individuals plays a key role in shaping attitudes toward trade and globalization. This is not to say that distributional issues are not important in shaping attitudes toward trade—just that they are not clearly manifest in the simple, broad association between education levels and support for free trade.The authors would like to thank James Alt, Jeffry Frieden, Robert Lawrence, Dani Rodrik, Ron Rogowski, Ken Scheve, Andy Baker, Peter Gourevitch, and Beth Simmons for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

Retributiveness and humanitarianism, predispositions that shape individuals' moral judgment and criminal punishment attitudes, should also influence their positions on war against evil-seeming states. Retributiveness should heighten support for punitive uses of military force, satisfaction from punitive wars, and threats perceived from transgressor states, while humanitarianism should have the opposite effects. Using death penalty support as a proxy measure for these values, public opinion about the 1991 and 2003 Persian Gulf wars provides evidence for a moral-punitiveness effect. Death penalty supporters were significantly more hawkish than death penalty opponents in both cases, controlling for ideology, utilitarian logic, and other potential confounders. These findings explain why foreign villains and good-versus-evil framing heighten public support for war.Earlier versions of this article were delivered at the 2003 and 2005 annual meetings of the American Political Science Association. I am grateful to Kurt Gaubatz, Daniel Geller, Paul Goren, Jon Hurwitz, Keena Lipsitz, Shoon Murray, Felicia Pratto, and International Organization's reviewers for comments on earlier drafts. Craig Enders, Keith Markus, and Cornell University Peace Studies Seminar participants gave me helpful suggestions, and Linda Skitka shared useful unpublished findings. This study benefited from a PSC-CUNY grant from the City University of New York, and Ahuva Spitz's able research assistance.

Recently, scholars have questioned whether enforcement mechanisms are necessary to make regimes effective. This article provides a model of the international criminal regime in which the regime changes state behavior even though it possesses no enforcement mechanisms. The article also answers several prominent criticisms of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Critics claim that the ICC is at best futile because it lacks the power to apprehend the criminals it is meant to prosecute. Even worse, the ICC may be harmful because it will induce atrocious leaders to hold on to power longer than they would if they could step down with immunity for past crimes. The model in this article suggests those criticisms may be inaccurate. I model the interaction between a leader and a foreign state that has the option of offering that leader asylum. I examine the effect of the creation of an ICC-like institution on that interaction. The model produces three main findings. (1) Leaders' reigns will not be prolonged as a result of the regime. (2) Although the institution has no enforcement power, some leaders (those with such a high probability of being deposed that they would willingly surrender to the institution rather than try to stay in office) will be punished by it. In those circumstances, the foreign state has no incentive to offer the leader asylum. (3) The institution may deter some atrocities at the margin.I would like to thank Tanaz Moghadam, whose undergraduate honors thesis, which William Clark and I advised, provides an earlier game-theoretic analysis of the Court and introduced me to the topic of the ICC. Special thanks go to William Clark for the idea of treating the ICC game-theoretically and for valuable comments at various stages of this project. I am grateful to Lisa Martin and two anonymous reviewers who provided exceptionally helpful insights. I would also like to acknowledge Sandy Gordon, Dimitri Landa, James Morrow, Steve Ratner, Shanker Satyanath and Ken Scheve for their much-appreciated input. All errors remain my responsibility.

Although formal work on war generally sees war as a kind of bargaining breakdown resulting from asymmetric information, bargaining indivisibilities, or commitment problems, most analyses have focused on informational issues. But informational explanations and the models underlying them have at least two major limitations: they often provide a poor account of prolonged conflict, and they give an odd reading of the history of some cases. This article describes these limitations and argues that bargaining indivisibilities should really be seen as commitment problems. The present analysis then shows that a common mechanism links three important kinds of commitment problem: (1) preventive war, (2) preemptive attacks arising from first-strike or offensive advantages, and (3) conflicts resulting from bargaining over issues that affect future bargaining power. In each case, large, rapid shifts in the distribution of power can lead to war. Finally, the analysis elaborates a distinctly different mechanism based on a comparison of the cost of deterring an attack on the status quo with the expected cost of trying to eliminate the threat to the status quo.For helpful comments and criticisms, I thank James Fearon, Hein Goemans, Lisa Martin, Sebastian Mazzuca, Branislav Slantchev, and seminar participants at the University of Montreal–McGill Research Group in International Security, the Institute in Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Irvine, and University of California, Santa Barbara. I also gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-0315037).

Most combatants in armed conflict are men, so naturally men are the major direct victims of military operations. Yet armed conflicts have important indirect negative consequences on agriculture, infrastructure, public health provision, and social order. These indirect consequences are often overlooked and underappreciated. They also affect women—arguably more so than men. This article provides the first rigorous analysis of the impact of armed conflict on female life expectancy relative to male. We find that over the entire conflict period, interstate and civil wars on average affect women more adversely than men. In peacetime, women typically live longer than men. Hence, armed conflict tends to decrease the gap between female and male life expectancy. For civil wars, we also find that ethnic wars and wars in “failed” states are much more damaging to women than other civil wars. Our findings challenge policymakers as well as international and humanitarian organizations to develop policies that tackle the large indirect and long-term negative health impacts of armed conflicts.Equal authorship. We are grateful for helpful suggestions by Andrew Mack, Håvard Hegre, David Hugh-Jones, Lisa Martin, and the anonymous referees. Eric Neumayer acknowledges financial assistance from the Leverhulme Trust and Thomas Plümper financial assistance by the European Commission-DG Research Sixth Framework Program (CIT-2-CT-2004-506084). Data and do-files to generate the results are available on request.

In Lisa Blaydes's article, “Rewarding Impatience: A Bargaining and Enforcement Model of OPEC,” (International Organization, Spring 2004), the oil production of members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) depends on the extent to which they discount future gains. This comment discusses computer-related errors in the original article and determines how the results change when the errors are rectified. I then add country fixed effects and some additional control variables to the corrected models.I would like to thank Lisa Blaydes for data and helpful discussions and to thank Jim Alt and Mike Kellerman for comments on previous drafts. All remaining errors are my own.

The Kantian peace research program has produced generally robust results on the role of democracy and international trade in reducing the risk of international conflict. Yet a key theoretical linkage in the Kantian argument, that of international governmental organizations (IGOs) to peace, has proved less robust and more problematic. We propose a new theoretical perspective focusing on the contributions of a particular kind of IGO—that composed largely of democracies—to peaceful conflict resolution through aiding credible commitments, dispute settlement, and socialization to peaceful behavior. A set of statistical tests provides strong support for our hypotheses that such densely democratic IGOs are far more likely to engender peaceful relations between members than are more homogenous IGOs. This is true when controlling for regime type, interdependence, and several realist-oriented influences. The peace-inducing influences affect both democratic and nondemocratic member states.We thank Robert Axelrod, Erik Gartzke, Edward Mansfield, Thomas McCarthy, and Nicholas Sambanis for comments, the Ford Foundation and the University of Wisconsin Research Foundation for financial support, and Ann Fishback and Courtney Hillebrecht for research assistance. All our data and computations will be available at 〈http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/pevehouse〉 at the time of publication.

This article challenges a long-held development-policy assumption that aid and foreign-direct investment (FDI) serve as substitutes or complements in accelerating the development of the world's poorer countries. We show both theoretically and empirically that aid and FDI affect development differently. Aid contributes powerfully to both economic growth and human development, and the higher the level of human capital in a country, the more aid contributes. By contrast, FDI, at best, has no effect on economic growth and actually slows the rate of human development in less-developed countries. We find no evidence that the degree of democratic responsiveness in government conditions the effectiveness of either aid or FDI, although we do find that democracy independently increases human development in all but the most developed countries. Our results demonstrate that FDI and aid are not, and cannot be, substitutes in the development of the world's poorer countries. Nor even can they be thought of as complements—certainly not at mid to low levels of development. In the end, poor countries need democracy and aid, not FDI.We are extremely grateful to Susan Rose-Ackerman, Gustav Ranis, Frances Rosenbluth, Kenneth Scheve, and participants at the Leitner Political Economy Seminar at Yale University in December 2003 for very helpful comments. We also received valuable suggestions from two anonymous reviewers. Stephen Kosack would like to thank the National Science Foundation for the support of a Graduate Research Fellowship.

A central component of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs is reducing government budget deficits. We ask how domestic political considerations shape the distribution of cuts made by governments in IMF programs. Our central finding is that IMF programs shrink the role played by domestic politics. While democracies allocate larger shares of their budgets to public services in the absence of IMF programs, the difference between democracies and nondemocracies disappears under IMF programs. This result has important implications for our understanding of government spending priorities under different resource constraints.We dedicate this article to the memory of Harold K. Jacobson. Robert Kaufman, Lisa Martin, Joan Nelson, and two anonymous reviewers for IO provided valuable comments on earlier drafts, and Chris Achen, Chris Adolph, Leah Anderson, Carew Boulding, Sarah Brooks, Chelsea Brown, Lawrence Broz, Eric Chang, Dan Corstange, Rob Franzese, Nate Jensen, Marcus Kurtz, Margaret Levi, Autumn Payton, Nita Rudra, Heidi Sherman, and James Vreeland offered helpful advice. We thank Autumn Payton for research assistance. Earlier versions were presented at the 2004 Midwest Political Science Association Meetings, the 2004 American Political Science Association Meetings, the 2005 workshop on “Distributive Politics and Social Protection in the 21st Century” at Ohio State's Mershon Center, and the 2005 International Studies Association Meetings. All errors remain our own.

Currency crises are costly phenomena that have been exceptionally difficult to explain and predict. We comprehensively examine the relationship between political institutions and currency crises and emphasize the causal linkage between institutions, expectations, and crises. Specifically, we argue that institutional variables—particularly divided government and government turnover—increase the variance of expectations held by speculators thereby increasing the likelihood of currency crises. We test these hypotheses using three existing economic models of currency crises and find that institutional variables are not only statistically significant, but also substantially improve the ability of these models to forecast crises.We are grateful to Helen Milner, Charles Cameron, William Bernhard, and seminar participants at the University of Wisconsin and the University of Southern California for helpful comments. Lisa Martin and our referees provided feedback that helped dramatically improve our arguments and exposition. Andy Rose, Steve Kamin, Mathieu Bussiere, and Marcel Fratzscher generously provided data and advice that helped us replicate their findings. David Leblang acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES-0136866).

Are most voters opposed to globalization? A growing body of empirical research, using data from available surveys of public opinion, suggests that antiglobalization sentiments are strong, especially among blue-collar workers. This article reports the findings from a survey experiment aimed at measuring the impact of issue framing on individuals' stated attitudes toward international trade. Respondents given an antitrade introduction to the survey question, linking trade to the possibility of job losses, were 17 percent less likely to favor increasing trade with other countries than were those asked the same question without any introduction at all. Curiously, respondents who were given a protrade introduction to the question, suggesting that trade can lead to lower prices for consumers, were not more likely to express support for trade than those who received no introduction. In addition, the responses of less educated individuals were more sensitive to framing effects than those of highly educated individuals. Without measuring and taking these types of framing effects into account, opinion surveys offer unreliable guides to gauging the extent (and distribution) of opposition to trade among voters. Results from a second experiment reveal that knowledge of the endorsement of trade openness by economists mitigates framing effects and raises overall support for trade liberalization by a substantial degree.I would like to thank Adam Berinsky, Mac Destler, Jeffry Frieden, Judith Goldstein, Jens Hainmueller, Helen Milner, Diana Mutz, Dani Rodrik, Ken Scheve, Mike Tomz, and seminar participants at Harvard, Duke, Columbia, Stanford, Princeton, Berkeley, the University of Minnesota, and the University of Pennsylvania for helpful comments on earlier drafts. My thanks also go to Lisa Martin and two anonymous IO reviewers.

In “Rewarding Impatience: A Bargaining and Enforcement Model of OPEC” (International Organization, Spring 2004) I presented a theoretical model that suggested that in strategic situations where a bargaining phase is followed by an enforcement phase that resembles a prisoners' dilemma, impatient actors earned better outcomes than their more patient rivals. I also modeled the division of cartel profits in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), particularly with regard to the relationship between bargaining strength and disparate time horizons, and found that there is some threshold level for which states that discount the future more heavily tend to receive better production offers than those that do not. The critique presented in Goodrich deals with the final section of the article, which presents the results of statistical analysis testing the implications of these theoretical models.I am grateful to Jeff Lewis, Drew Linzer, and Ken Schultz for suggestions and advice. Many thanks to Thomas Plümper for sharing the computer code for his procedure to analyze fixed effects with time-invariant covariates in Stata. The usual disclaimers apply.

In this article we examine the effects of interest group pressure and the structure of political institutions on infrastructure deployment by state-owned electric utilities in a panel of seventy-eight countries during the period 1970–94. We consider two factors that jointly influence the rate of infrastructure deployment: (1) the extent to which the consumer base consists of industrial consumers, which are capable of exerting discipline on political actors whose competing incentives are to construct economically inefficient “white elephants” to satisfy the demands of concentrated geographic interests, labor unions, and national engineering and construction lobbies; and (2) veto points in formal policymaking structures that constrain political actors, thereby reducing these actors' sensitivity to interest group demands. A higher fraction of industrial customers provides political actors with stronger incentives for discipline, reducing the deployment of white elephants and thus the infrastructure growth rate, ceteris paribus. Veto points reduce political actors' sensitivity to interest group demands in general and thus moderate the relationship between industrial interest group pressure and the rate of infrastructure deployment.Both authors contributed equally and list their names alphabetically on this joint work. Both authors acknowledge funding for this research from the University of California Energy Institute. Zelner acknowledges additional funding from the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation and the Edgar F. Kaiser Chair at the Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley. Henisz acknowledges additional funding from the Reginald H. Jones Center for Management Policy, Strategy, and Organization at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Severin Borenstein, Rachel Croson, José de la Torre, Alexander Dyck, Tom Gilligan, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Edward Mansfield, Mathew McCubbins, Will Mitchell, David Mowery, Jeffrey Nugent, Dennis Quinn, George Tsebelis, Joel Waldfogel, Oliver Williamson, and Jan Zabojnik for their comments on previous drafts. Any errors are the responsibility of the authors.