Some of the current spate of writing about outer space is so highly imaginative as to discourage serious students of international organization and law from pursuing detailed studies of very real problems which now confront the UN. Antarctic possibilities are only slightly less fabulous and some of the problems there raised may be even more immediate. There are those who are troubled by the difficulty of mastering a new massive subject matter some of which is shrouded in unfamiliar scientific terminology and some of which is imprisoned in official security classifications. Actually these difficulties are no greater here than elsewhere. A study of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) like Codding's required familiarity with pulse radionavigation systems as well as voting procedures; the political and legal delegates to the recent Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea were also required to deal with hydrography and ichthyology. The dark shadow of secret archives clouds the crystal ball for many a student of international relations who wishes to edge up on the contemporaneous scene. When charged with inadequacies, the present writers will not “take the Fifth” but will plead guilty.

In 1952 the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace initiated a series of national studies on international organization which were to be carried out by private groups and individuals in more than twenty countries. They were to provide an appraisal of the national experience of these countries in international organizations, especially the United Nations, ten years after the San Francisco conference. Fourteen volumes in the series have now been published. Three more will be published soon, including the two final volumes which summarize and discuss the conclusions of the individual studies. These two works have been written, respectively, by Maurice Bourquin, Professor of International Public Law at the University of Geneva, and by Robert MacIver, Lieber Professor Emeritus of Political Philosophy and Sociology at Columbia University. Other national studies have been completed and were available to Professors Bourquin and MacIver, but they have not been published yet; this reviewer has not seen them and will therefore limit his own remarks to the reports which have been or are soon to be published. I will examine first the questions which the national studies were supposed to answer and the way in which the various authors have tried to answer them; then I will present some general comments about the national attitudes toward international organization, as they emerge from the series; finally I will discuss the role of the UN in present world politics, as it can be interpreted on the basis of the national reports.

A proposal for an international inspectorate lies at the heart of every contemporary plan for armament control. Alternatives to the increasing perils of the unprecedented arms race of our era are made dependent on the development of a reasonably effective method of monitoring treaty compliance. Reduction of tension through control of weapons can be attempted only by the creation of a type of political instrument with which the world has had little previous experience. The achievement of a system of inspection, when viewed in the perspective of the history of international organization, is a task of political and administrative architecture on an unprecedented scale. Even the more modest proposals envisage staff and budgetary resources comparable, if not greater, in size than those of the present UN. More significantly, these plans imply an extension of international authority within national borders. Therefore, if arms control should become a viable instrument of international diplomacy, a rapid development of international political, judicial, and administrative techniques will be required.

Thousands of words have been written on “strains within NATO” and the “conflicts of interest” which attend any international organization. For several years—almost from its inception—various prognoses have been made as to how soon NATO or its subordinate agencies would fly apart from the centrifugal forces of diverging self-interest. As early as 1953 General Gruenther warned that with the recovery of self-confidence, the cohesive glue of fear would have less effect. Yet, as Secretary Dulles stated last spring at Copenhagen, we are often inclined to ignore the successes of NATO and to concentrate on its problems.

There is an old adage that beauty lies in the eye of the beholder. It is certain that the beauty, the utility, and the significance of the Commonwealth association appear very differently to its various members. This was true of the pre-war Commonwealth: between the end of the first world war and the beginning of the second there were marked differences of attitude among the members. The central problem was seen as the definition of the relationship between the United Kingdom and what were then described as the self-governing dominions. To South Africa, the Irish Free State, and Canada—in varying degrees—it was important that the relationship should be spelled out in terms which assured, so far as was possible through the medium of statute and the articulation of conventional rules, a status of equality between the United Kingdom and the dominions. To Australia and New Zealand the attempt at such a definition appeared undesirable; quieta non movere seemed to them the counsel of wisdom.

The United States has played a dominant role in the establishment of international organizations since World War I, especially with respect to the League of Nations and the UN. However, the United States is also largely responsible for some vital limitations on the functioning of these organizations. One, perhaps the most important, is the subject of this study.

The growth of international cooperation in the South Pacific region has been one of the remarkable developments in regional collaboration in the post-war era. During the past twelve years, three multilateral arrangements have come into existence bearing upon South Pacific affairs. These are the six-power South Pacific Commission (SPC), the three-power Australian—New Zealand—United States Mutual Security Treaty (known as ANZUS), and the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty Organization (SEATO).

On an evening in the large, comfortable Circuit House (guest house for government officials on tour) in a city in the interior of West Pakistan, a dapper young Pakistani District Commissioner (our official host) burst in on a group of UN experts from Iceland, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States. After a few perfunctory salutations while we were unpacking our bags after a long day's drive from Karachi—my first visit up-country a few weeks after my arrival —we were subjected to a blunt attack on foreign aid to countries like Pakistan. The target was western aid in general—and the concluding blast of an hour's discussion over our scotch and soda was something like this: “Your aid is not of much importance. What the western nations are doing does not represent a ‘drop i n the bucket’ in relation to their wealth or to the needs and poverty of the East”. This was a rare experience in my two years’ duty as Resident Representative of the UN Technical Assistance Board (TAB) in Pakistan, as Pakistanis seldom show signs of temperament and are usually soft-spoken and very friendly. I should add that a few days later this young commissioner and his wife invited us to a nice dinner at his sumptuous official residence and carried through the formalities of the occasion in a very “correct” manner reminiscent of the days of the British regime.

Much has been written about the international civil service. The more serious literature is often produced by those who have had at least a limited personal experience within one or the other of the Secretariats, and some of it is by veterans of many years’ standing. Other writings range all the way from popular attempts to bring home to the wider public the spirit and objectives of this relatively new profession to the kind of running, petty vendettas pursued by certain factions, such as the Beaver brook press in Great Britain and isolationist or xenophobic elements in the United States, France, and elsewhere, against what they conceive to be the thin end of a subversive wedge which will eventually sunder national sovereignties and the freedom of an already largely illusory power of self determination.

The negotiations leading to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), both in their political and psychological contexts, are an interesting and indeed unique episode in post World War II diplomatic history. The most significant feature of the negotiations was that they succeeded. The Soviet Union and the United States reached a measure of agreement in the vital field of atomic energy. Virtually the entire world joined enthusiastically in this agreement. An international organization came into being with vast potential—even though today in a changed political atmosphere doubts exist that the potential will ever be realized.

The objectives of the founders of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reflected the dual nature of atomic power: it was the embodiment of both the highest hopes and the deepest fears of mankind. First, the Agency's developmental responsibility was to accelerate the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world. Second and equally important was to be the Agency's control function: to create a reliable system of safeguards against diversion of fissionable material to military uses in order that the broadening of the peaceful applications of atomic energy should not increase the danger of strengthening the military potential of nations. Within this broad framework, the Agency was to plan and carry out specific projects and activities. This responsibility was largely to be a function of the Board of Governors, whose establishment was an immediate necessity if IAEA was to begin operations.

The Uniting for Peace Resolution—or the Acheson Plan, as it was once popularly called—was adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 3, 1950. It is commonly conceded that its procedures were designed to help surmount an apparently major obstacle to the operation of the UN: the Soviet veto or its alleged abuse, and the concomitant stagnation of the Security Council. Its particulars were the product, at least in part, of both the accidents and the demands of the Korean War—for example, that the Security Council could and did adopt resolutions of substance pertaining to Korea up until the time (August 1, 1950) the Soviet delegate returned, after which it adopted no other; or that there was a UN commission already stationed in Korea which could and did report to the Security Council immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities in June of 1950. The resolution belonged to a longer evolutionary history, too: the general shift in emphasis away from the Security Council was manifested even before the Korean War by the creation in 1947 of an “Interim Committee” of the General Assembly. The Uniting for Peace Resolution was more or less a reflection of the immediate environment of the Korean crisis, but it was also part of the main stream of basic institutional change to which it at the same time contributed.

So fast has been the development of trust territories toward self-government or independence that a situation will arise in 1960 that seems not to have been foreseen by the founding fathers of the United Nations. Togoland and the Cameroons under French administration and Somaliland under Italian administration will, according to present plans, cease to be trust territories during the course of 1960. Italy's automatic membership in the Trusteeship Council will thus cease, but France, as a permanent member of the Security Council, will remain a permanent member of the Trusteeship Council. This will have both short-term and long-term implications for the balance of membership in the Council, which according to the Charter should be divided equally between states which administer trust territories and states which do not administer such territories.

Listed below is membership of UN bodies for 1959. Unless otherwise noted, membership expires on December 31 of the year indicated.

In a year which sees the tenth anniversary of both the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) there are a number of good reasons for looking again at some aspects of the problems of these organizations of limited membership. The most important reason is that there is a general feeling in the western world that neither the “European” organizations nor NATO are working as well as might have been hoped, and that there is probably a good deal of room for improvement even within the limits set by the present public attitudes toward the counter-claims of “integration” and “national sovereignty” in the countries concerned.

The English parliamentary system emerged from the dramatic struggle between the English Parliament and the Crown over the principle of political or “democratic” control. For leaders of the Commons such as Edward Coke a single false step beyond the line of the sovereign's endurance meant the Tower of London. Another struggle in a different key and on a different level has begun with little publicity on the Continent. The European Parliamentary Assembly in the newly established European Communities is seeking to assert some degree of control and influence not only over the mushrooming Commissions, but also over the powerful Councils of Ministers. Obviously, there is no danger of an irate Council of Ministers confining the obstreperous parliamentarians to the dungeons of Strasbourg. Moreover, the European Parliamentary Assembly is far from being a parliament. Members of the Community “executive” such as Jean Monnet have encouraged rather than fought the Assembly. In these as in other respects the analogy with the development of the English parliamentary system must not be pressed too far. But the broad contours of the contest, the pressures and counter-pressures, the use and abuse of legal argument, and the reliance on genuine and fabricated precedent offer an interesting study in the development of a parliamentary body.

The thirteenth session of the General Assembly met at UN Headquarters from September 16 through December 13, 1958, when it was adjourned. It was decided at the Assembly's 782d plenary meeting to reconvene on February 20, 1959, to consider exclusively the question of the future of the trust territories of the Cameroons under French administration and the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration. At the opening plenary meeting, Mr. Charles Malik (Lebanon) was elected President of the session, having obtained 45 votes to 31, which were cast for Mr. Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub (Sudan). At its 755th plenary meeting, the Assembly adopted the recommendation contained in the report of the General Committee that the Assembly reject the request of India for the inclusion in its agenda of the question of the representation of China in the UN and decide not to consider at its thirteenth session any proposals to exclude the representatives of the government of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.

In their first full year of operation, the United Nations and the specialized agencies spent under $25 million; ten years later, in 1956, their total regular budgets were almost $85 million. In that same year the Suez crisis led to the creation of the Emergency Force and the clearing of the Canal, adding about $25 million to the 1957–1958 expenditures. During the past three years 22 governments joined the Organization, adding much to its operating costs but little to its coffers. With the Middle East still in turmoil, and social upheaval dominating world politics, there is increasing agitation for both a permanent UN Force and a drastically expanded economic assistance program. As the Organization seeks to grapple with an ever-mounting range of responsibilities, with the consequent shift from reliance on voluntary programs to regular budgetary outlays, it is quite likely that the estimated expenditures of over $98 million for the Organization and the agencies in 1958 will be doubled within the next five years.

The following analytical study is divided into two main parts. The first is devoted to general considerations about the literature on international organization; the second seeks to convey a picture of the range and variety of publications which have appeared during the period 1954–1958. The intention is not so much to furnish complete bibliographical references as to survey the present state of theory and literature on international organization.

The purpose of this study is not to describe the principles and procedures upon which the International Trusteeship System is based—for these are set out in Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter of the United Nations. Rather will an attempt be made, on the basis of three years' personal experience (1948–1951) of the workings of the Trusteeship Council and three years' service (1956–1959) in Tanganyika, the largest of the trust territories, to assess the real impact of the system on the governments and peoples of the trust territories themselves.