A transnational community of disarmament proponents achieved considerable success in influencing Soviet security policy in the 1980s on several issues, including two examined here: nuclear testing and strategic defenses. Fundamental changes in the Soviet domestic structure after 1989, however, had the paradoxical effect of making transnational actors simultaneously less constrained in promoting their favored policies and less effective in getting them implemented. Transnational relations and domestic structures in combination affect security policy. This interaction likewise has implications for theories of ideas, learning, and epistemic communities.

The collective goods theory of alliances and neorealist theory yield conflicting expectations about the security policies of states. The former emphasizes the temptation to “ride free” on the efforts of others, while the latter emphasizes the incentives for self-help. In the cases of Britain, China, and France during the early cold war, the constraints identified by neorealist theory, reinforced by the advent of nuclear weapons, prevailed. Each discounted the value of the security benefits superpower partners could provide. The second-ranking powers' decisions to shoulder the burden of developing independent nuclear forces are at odds with collective goods arguments that portray especially strong temptations to ride free in the circumstances that prevailed at that time—an international system dominated by two superpowers, each possessing large nuclear deterrent arsenals that could easily be employed on behalf of allies. This analysis suggests that present efforts to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons by offering them international security guarantees are unlikely to succeed.

How is it, that among the countless technological innovations in weaponry, chemical weapons stand out as weapons that carry the stigma of moral illegitimacy. To provide an adequate account of the prohibitionary norm against chemical weapons use, one must understand the meanings that have served to constitute and delegitimize this category of weapons. Such an account is provided by genealogy, a method that examines the interpretive practices around which moral orders are constructed and behaviors are defined as normal or unacceptable. The genealogical method yields insights that illuminate neglected dimensions of the chemical weapons taboo: namely, the roles that contingency, domination, and resistance have played in the operation of this norm as a symbol of “uncivilized” conduct in international relations.

One of the lessons drawn by many scholars from the 1982 U.S. sanctions against the Soviet-European gas pipeline was that the decline of American hegemony and the global spread of American business placed the overseas networks of U.S. multinational corporations beyond the control of the U.S. government for the purposes of economic sanctions. Through systematically examining three subsequent sanctions efforts (Nicaragua, Libya, and South Africa), this study qualifies the generalizability of this “lesson.” In none of the cases was the United States willing to incur alliance costs through applying extraterritorial controls, nor was it able to persuade American firms to substitute public preferences for private ones. Nonetheless, in each case, the U.S. government influenced corporate decision making by augmenting corporate perceptions of risk so that prudent business stategies reinforced diplomatic preferences.

Measured against institutionalism and modified structural realism, realism provides the most coherent explanation of the international arrangements pertaining to the issue-area of civil aviation. Although institutionalized international organizations govern technical and safety issues, no single regime has emerged to govern the important commercial matters that bear on states' relative gains and losses. Instead, since World War I states have entered into a multiplicity of denounceable bilateral agreements that in turn reflect the balance of bargaining power between them. States that have attempted to reorganize the system have been driven by their own interests and capabilities, with the stronger aviation powers professing a preference for liberalism.