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A genealogy of the chemical weapons taboo

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Richard Price
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How is it, that among the countless technological innovations in weaponry, chemical weapons stand out as weapons that carry the stigma of moral illegitimacy. To provide an adequate account of the prohibitionary norm against chemical weapons use, one must understand the meanings that have served to constitute and delegitimize this category of weapons. Such an account is provided by genealogy, a method that examines the interpretive practices around which moral orders are constructed and behaviors are defined as normal or unacceptable. The genealogical method yields insights that illuminate neglected dimensions of the chemical weapons taboo: namely, the roles that contingency, domination, and resistance have played in the operation of this norm as a symbol of “uncivilized” conduct in international relations.

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International Organization , Volume 49 , Issue 1 , Winter 1995 , pp. 73 - 103
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Copyright © The IO Foundation 1995

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References

Earlier drafts of this article were presented at Cornell University's Peace Studies Program; a Social Science Research Council/MacArthur workshop on norms and national security, Ithaca, New York, February 1993; and the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 2–5 September 1993. I thank those who commented on the paper at those forums, as well as Joseph Camilleri, Peter Katzenstein, Stephen Krasner, Judith Reppy, Christian Reus-Smit, Henry Shue, Daniel Thomas, Alexander Wendt, Mark Zacher, and three anonymous reviewers, all of whom provided valuable comments on various versions of this project. I gratefully acknowledge the support of a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada doctoral fellowship. The epigraph is from Nietzsche, Friedrich, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Kaufmann, Walter (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), aphorism 108Google Scholar.

1. This article will confine itself to a discussion of chemical weapons and will not directly address biological weapons.

2. Alfred T. Mahan, U.S. delegate to the Hague Peace Conferences, is quoted in Scott, James Brown, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences (New York: Oxford University Press, 1920), p. 366.Google Scholar

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7. The quotation is from Harris, Paul, “British Preparations for Offensive Chemical Warfare 1935–1939,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies 125 (06 1980), p. 61Google Scholar, emphasis mine. Similarly, the international legal restraints against CW were at least partially responsible for the low priority given to CW allocations in Germany. See Dr. Hans Fischer and Dr. Wirth, “What Were the Plans and Intentions of the German High Command in the Question of Using Chemical Warfare? What Were the Reasons for Refraining from the Use of Chemical Warfare?” Historical Office of the Chief of the Chemical Corps, German Chemical Warfare, part 2, Civilian Aspects (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office of the Chief of the Chemical Corps, 1956), p. 328.Google Scholar

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12. The maintenance of the taboo owes no small part to the fortune of history that such circumstances never arose and to the subsequent importance of the resulting abstinence (whatever the reasons), which built a tradition of nonuse and reinforced the stigma against CW. The fact that CW were not used during World War II has in and of itself become a major justification for the CW prohibition. For example, during U.S. Senate hearings over Iraq's use of CW in the early 1980s, it was remarked that CW surely were reprehensible since even Hitler did not use them. No one present knew why Germany refrained from employing CW during World War II, but the salient fact remained: “We do know it did not happen.” See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Policy Toward Iraq Human Rights, Weapons Proliferation, and International Law: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 101st Congress, 2d sess., 15 06 1990, p. 51Google Scholar.

13. These are the words of Major General Henderson. See Harris, and Paxman, , A Higher Form of Killing, p. 110.Google Scholar

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16. Quoted in Healey, “Chemical Attack Would Escalate Allied Retaliation”.

17. Thus, CW were not used even as other restraints against U.S. use of CW versus the Japanese began to erode toward the end of the war. These included the death of President Roosevelt, who had been staunchly opposed to CW use, and the effects of American racist propaganda, which demonized the Japanese and made the use of gas more palatable to much of the American public. See SIPRI, The Rise of CB Weapons, pp. 294–335.Google Scholar

18. Although the United States did not use lethal CW in Vietnam, it did use riot-control agents and defoliants, maintaining that use of those agents did not constitute chemical warfare. See Ibid., pp. 162–210. Allegations of, Soviet use of CW in Afghanistan, while rampant in the atmosphere of the cold war, never have been substantiated.

19. In a similar spirit, the first volume of the SIPRI study argues that while many factors prevented the use of CW, “at a deeper level, there was the whole question of accepting gas as a weapon of war, with all the institutional and psychological disturbances that this would involve.” See Ibid., p. 331.

20. See, for example, Fotion, Nicholas and Elfstrom, Gerard, Military Ethics: Guidelines for Peace and War (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), p. 168.Google Scholar

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23. Indeed, this taken-for-granted quality of the poison taboo was in evidence at the Hague Conferences. Article 23(a) banning poison was reached without controversy or even substantive discussion; the moral taboo against poison had become an uncontested norm that needed no rationale or justification. See Hull, William I., The Two Hague Conferences (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1908), pp. 232–33.Google Scholar This was in evidence some years earlier at the Brussels conference. See Lawrence, T. J., Principles of International Law (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1923), pp. 55–56Google Scholar; and Lorimer, James, The Institutes of the Law of Nations (Edinburgh: Blackwood and Sons, 1883)Google Scholar, Appendix 2.

24. For references to the early disdain for poison see Grotius, Hugo, The Law of War and Peace (De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres), trans. Kelsey, Francis (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1925)Google Scholar, bk. 3, chaps. 15–16; Roberts, Adam and Guelff, Richard, Documents on the Laws of War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 29Google Scholar; and Roberts, A. A., Poison in Warfare (London: William Heinemann, 1915), pp. 52–57.Google Scholar

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26. Grotius, Law of War and Peace, bk. 3, chap. 4, section 15. Vattel in 1758 offered a similar defense of the prohibition against poison weapons, arguing that such means only made war more deadly without either side gaining advantage. See Vattel, Emer de, Le Droit des Gens (The law of nations) (Leide, France: Aux depens de la compagnie, 1758)Google Scholar, vol. 2, bk. 3, chap. 8, par. 155–56. A more recent study has followed a similar line, noting that “the rule entered into international law primarily because medieval monarchs were often eliminated by their rivals via poison in food or drink. Poison was thus a very individualistic method of doing away with an enemy.” See Thomas, Ann Van Wynen and Thomas, A. J., Development of International Legal Limitations on the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, vol. 2, report prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1968, p. 254.Google Scholar

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28. Lawrence, , Principles of International Law, p. 533.Google Scholar In another formulation, it has been argued that “a weapon will be restricted in inverse proportion, more or less, to its effectiveness; that the more efficient a weapon or method of warfare the less likelihood there is of its being restricted in action by the rules of war.” See Royse, M. W., Aerial Bombardment and the International Regulation of Warfare (New York: H. Vinal, 1928), pp. 131–32.Google Scholar

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30. O'Brien, William V., “Biological/Chemical Warfare and the International Law of War,” The Georgetown Law Journal 51 (Fall 1962), pp. 1–663.Google Scholar

31. Asphyxiating shells were discussed at The Hague even though they had yet to be developed. Isolated precursors of chemical warfare had appeared sporadically in the history of warfare, but their appearance was so rare that they play a negligible role in the development of a CW discourse. The history of such methods can be found in Hanslian, Rudolf, ed., Der Chemische Krieg (The chemical war), vol. 1 (Berlin: E.S. Mitler and Son, 1937), pp. 1–8Google Scholar; Miles, Wyndham, “The Idea of Chemical Warfare in Modern Times,” Journal of the History of Ideas 31 (01/03, 1970), pp. 297–304CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; SIPRI, The Rise of CB Weapons, pp. 125–27Google Scholar; and Waitt, Alden, Gas Warfare (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1942), pp. 6–12.Google Scholar

32. The conventions, declarations, and other relevant documents of the Hague conferences are reprinted in Scott, James Brown, ed., The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, vol. 2, Documents (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1909).Google Scholar

33. Ibid, pp. 365–66. The declaration was the product of the Second Subcommission of the First Commission, which was dedicated to discussions on limiting explosives.

34. White, A. D., The First Hague Conference (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1912), pp. 82–83.Google Scholar

35. Suggestions to use choking smoke from ships in the Crimean War were rejected by the British because its effects were perceived to be so horrible that no honorable combatant could use the means required to produce it. See Miles, “The Idea of Chemical Warfare in Modern Times”; and West, Clarence J., “The History of Poison Gases,” Science 49 (2 05 1919), pp. 412–17.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

36. See, for example, Davis, Calvin DeArmond, The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 175.Google Scholar

37. Excellent discussions of this distinction can be found in Taylor, Charles, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 202–3Google Scholar; Cross, Charles, “Explanation and the Theory of Questions,” Erkenntnis 34 (03 1991), pp. 237–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steve, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).Google Scholar

38. See Hoffmann, Stanley, “An American Social Science: International Relations,” Daedalus 106 (Summer 1977), pp. 41–60Google Scholar; and Smith, Steve, “Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science,” Millennium 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 189–206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar This focus also has tended to characterize rationalist regime theory of international relations scholarship, as exemplified by Stephen Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” and Keohane, Robert “The Demand for Industrial Regimes,” both in Krasner, Stephen, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 1–21Google Scholar and 145–71, respectively.

39. On this characteristic of international relations theory, see Smith, Steve, “The Forty Years' Detour: The Resurgence of Normative Theory in International Relations,” Millennium 21 (Winter 1992), pp. 489–506CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Kratochwil, Friedrich, “The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-Realism as the Science of Realpolitik Without Politics,” Review of International Studies 19 (01 1993), pp. 63–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

40. On different styles of interpretive analysis, see Hiley, David, Bohman, James, and Shusterman, Richard, eds., The Interpretive Tum (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991)Google Scholar; Rabinow, Paul and Sullivan, William, eds., interpretive Social Science: A Second Look (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987)Google Scholar; and Dallmayr, Fred and McCarthy, Thomas, eds., Understanding and Social Inquiry (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977).Google Scholar On the relationship between genealogy and interpretation, see Gibbons, Michael, “Interpretation, Genealogy, and Human Agency,” in Ball, Terence, ed., Idioms of Inquiry: Critique and Renewal in Political Science (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), pp. 137–67.Google Scholar

41. Nietzsche is paraphrased by Nehemas, Alexander, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 110.Google Scholar

42. See especially Nietzsche, Friedrich, On the Genealogy of Morals, Kaufmann, Walter and Hollingdale, R. J., trans. (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).Google Scholar This concern recently has gained adherents in the natural sciences. In his work on evolutionary theory, Stephen Jay Gould has expounded upon his contention that “current utility may not be equated with historical origin.” See, for example, the chapter entitled “Of Kiwi Eggs and the Liberty Bell,” in Bully for Brontosaums (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1991), p. 114.Google Scholar

43. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, Preface 3.

44. The term “interpretive” highlights the differences between the “how” questions of understanding meaning and the “why” questions of explaining causal outcomes, while the term “constructivist” calls attention to the ontological assumptions and causal models that distinguish postpositivist methods from the naturalist premises of positivism. See Wendt, Alexander, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391–425CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wendt, Alexander, “The Agent–Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 335–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kratochwil, Friedrich, “Regimes, Interpretation, and the ‘Science’ of Politics: A Reappraisal,” Millennium 17 (Summer 1988), pp. 263–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Neufeld, Mark, “Interpretation and the Science of International Relations,” Review of International Studies 19 (01 1993), pp. 39–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

45. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, 3rd essay, aphorism 23 (hereafter cited as 3.23); emphasis original.

46. Foucault, Michel, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Rabinow, Paul, ed., The Foucault Reader (Pantheon Books: New York, 1984), p. 79.Google Scholar

47. Nehemas, , Nietzsche, p. 113.Google Scholar The quotation is from Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” p. 78.

48. Nietzsche, , On the Genealogy of Morals 2.12.Google Scholar

49. Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” p. 80.

50. Nehemas, , Nietzsche, pp. 98–113.Google Scholar

51. See, for example, the following works by Foucault, Michel, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972)Google Scholar; The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 1990)Google Scholar; and Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977, ed. Gordon, C. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).Google Scholar

52. Keeley, James F., “Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes,” International Organization 44 (Winter 1990), pp. 83–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

53. See the following works by Foucault, Michel: Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage Books, 1979)Google Scholar; Power/Knowledge; and Politics, Philosophy, Culture (New York: Routledge, 1990).Google Scholar

54. Doty, Roxanne Lynn, “The Social Construction of Contemporary International Hierarchy,” vol. 1, Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1991, pp. 26–27 and 69–70.Google Scholar

55. Hoy, David Couzens, “Introduction,” in Couzens, David by, ed., Foucault: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 15.Google Scholar

56. Kratochwil is careful to point out in his work on norms that power is not his particular focus of concern. Rather, he concentrates on the consensual choices of reasoning that lead to collective knowledge. He acknowledges, however, that understanding how socially dominant understandings become authoritative involves investigating not simply rational debates but also historical and cultural experiences-the focus of the genealogist's inquiries. See Kratochwil, Friedrich, Rules, Nouns, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

57. Derian, James Der, On Diplomacy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 483.Google Scholar

58. On the silence of rationalist approaches to questions concerning the constitution of identities and interest—and the contributions of constructivist approaches—see Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It.”

59. As characterized by others, the CW taboo represents an “irrational” attitude towards technology and a “psycho-cultural aversion” that simply fails to meet the realist expectation that effective prohibitions are attained only for useless weapons. See Creveld, Van, Technology and War, p. 177Google Scholar; and Hamm, Manfred R., “Deterrence, Chemical Warfare, and Arms Control,” Orbis 29 (Spring 1985), pp. 119–163Google Scholar at p. 119, respectively.

60. As such, it answers the call for interpretive approaches to the study of norms made by Kratochwil, Friedrich and Ruggie, John Gerard, “International Organization: A State of the Art on the Art of the State,” International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 753–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and offers a concrete rejoinder to Keohane's challenge for a demonstration of the value of the “sociological” approach of “reflectivist” scholars (which he opposes to the neopositivist models of rational actor theory in the study of norms and institutions). See Keohane, Robert, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” in Keohane, , International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), pp. 158–79.Google Scholar

61. From the large literature on the political, social, and moral status of technology, I will confine myself to noting Langdon Winner's summary in Autonomous Technology: Technics Out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977)Google Scholar; George Grant's incisive essays in Technology and Empire (Toronto: Anansi, 1969)Google Scholar and Technology and Justice (Toronto: Anansi, 1986)Google Scholar; and the essays in Darby, Tom, ed., Sojourns in the New World (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1986)Google Scholar and in Durbin, Paul, ed., Technology and Responsibility (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel, 1987).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

62. Keeley, “Towards a Foucauldian Analysis,” pp. 96–99.

63. A more comprehensive study is provided in Price, Richard, “A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo” Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., 1994.Google Scholar

64. Although the ban was rejected by the U.S. delegation at both Hague conferences, the remarks of one member of the U.S. commission attests to the tentative emergence of a norm proscribing gas shells. As he noted, “a certain disposition has been observed to attach odium to the view adopted by this Commission in this matter.” See Scott, , Documents, p. 37.Google Scholar

65. On the emergence of the notion of a civilized family of nations, see Gong, Gerrit W., The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).Google Scholar

66. See, for example, Times (London, 21–29 April 1915); and Read, James Morgan, Atrocity Propaganda: 1914–1919 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1941), pp. 195–96.Google Scholar While many argued that the use of CW was cruel, these arguments rarely compared the effects of CW with other weapons such as high explosives. This stands in contrast to the arguments of those who have opposed prohibitions on CW. This has been a consistent feature of the discourse on the legitimacy of CW.

67. See Ministry of Munitions, pt. 2 of “Chemical Warfare Supplies,” History of the Ministry of Munitions, vol. 11, The Supply of Munitions (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1921)Google Scholar; Foulkes, C. H., Gas! The Story of the Special Brigade (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1934)Google Scholar; and Haber, L. F., The Poisonous Cloud (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).Google Scholar

68. Hanslian, Rudolf, Der Chemische Krieg (The chemical war) (Berlin: E.S. Mittler and Son, 1937), p. 20Google Scholar; and SIPRI, The Rise of CB Weapons, p. 45.Google Scholar The French at first banned the use of shells containing phosgene and prussic acid (as did the British) and only permitted the former when the situation at Verdun appeared critical at the end of February 1916. The prussic acid ban was withdrawn later, the agent was employed for the first time by the French at the Somme on 1 July 1916. See Foulkes, , Gas, p. 305.Google Scholar While postwar accounts must be treated with due caution, it should be noted that the director of the French chemical services argued in 1919 that these shells were held in reserve until the Germans had used gas shells that had a toxicity comparable to phosgene—that is, until the Germans had violated the letter of the Hague declaration. See E. Vinet, “La Guerre de Gaz et les Travaux des Services Chimiques Francais” (The gas war and the operations of the French Chemical Service), Chemie et Industrie 2 (1 January 1919), p. 1403.

69. For evidence that nonuse of CW was the product of such a restraint, see Ministry of Munitions, The Supply of Munitions, pp. 10–11; Haber, , The Poisonous Cloud, pp. 224–25Google Scholar; Foulkes, , Gas, p. 296Google Scholar; and Brown, , Chemical Warfare, p. 45.Google Scholar

70. This view has been expressed by groups such as the American Legion and can be seen in Foulkes's rather enthusiastic assessments of gas as a weapon. See Congressional Record, 69th Congress, 2d sess., 10 11–6 12 1926 and 01 1927, vol. 68, pt. 1Google Scholar; and Foulkes, , Gas, respectivelyGoogle Scholar.

71. The quotation is from Thomas, Ann Van Wynen and Thomas, A. J., Legal Limits on the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Dallas, Tex.: Southern Methodist University Press, 1970), p. 141.Google Scholar

72. The fact that violations often play a crucial role in the development of norms, as noted by Foucault, points to a difficulty of applying the positivist model of explanation to norms: a violation of a norm does not necessarily invalidate it. See Kratochwil, Friedrich and Ruggie, John Gerard, “International Organization: A State of the Art on the Art of the State,” International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 753–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

73. U.S. Department of State, Conference on the Limitation of Armament (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 730.Google Scholar

74. On Hughes's strategy, see Charles E. Hughes, “Possible Gains,” in American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (Washington, D.C.: American Society of International Law, 1927), pp. 1–17.Google Scholar

75. At least until 1992, when agreement was reached on the Chemical Weapons Convention.

76. Nietzsche, Friedrich, Human, All-Too-Human, trans. Faber, Marion with Lohmann, Stephen (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), p. 67.Google Scholar

77. Brown, , Chemical Warfare, p. 180.Google Scholar On these alarmist claims, see also Times (London), 3 April 1923, p. 7; SIPRI, The Rise of CB Weapons, pp. 247–48Google Scholar; and U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry, Munitions Industry: Hearings Before the Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry, 73rd Congress, 2d sess., 1935, pt. 11 and 12, pp. 2403–4 and 2470–71Google Scholar. For example, a New York Times headline (13 March 1921, p. 1) proclaimed “War's Newest and Deadliest Weapon; 3 Drops of Poison Kill Any One They Touch,” based on reports circulated by the U.S. Chemical Warfare Service.

78. The turnaround in assessments of gas warfare by these propagandists was remarkable. In contrast to earlier warnings of the catastrophic potential of CW, see the revised assessments by members of the U.S. Chemical Warfare Service in New York Times, 10 September 1926, p. 6; and 26 November 1926, p. 12. In a moment of unsurpassed irony, the president of the American Chemical Society declared that the widespread feeling against gas was the result of hysteria and propaganda. See New York Times, 11 December 1926, p. 3.

79. SIPRI, The Rise of CB Weapons, p. 247.Google Scholar See also Editorial, Times (London), 3 April 1923, p. 7; and Haber, , The Poisonous Cloud, pp. 288Google Scholar, 307, and 317. By 1927, a New York Times editorial (16 February 1927, p. 22) had dismissed the exaggerated fears of CW as “sheer romancing,” noting that the previous war had demonstrated that high explosives were far more destructive.

80. This argument parallels the case made by David Campbell that representations of “outside” threats are endemic to all states in the ongoing process of securing national identities. These depictions of danger are not simply the response to objective conditions but involve the interpretive scripting of danger through political discourse. See Campbell, David, Writing Security (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).Google Scholar

81. Balfour is quoted in U.S. Department of State, Conference on the Limitation of Armament, p. 750.Google Scholar

82. The quotations are both from Ibid., p. 594.

83. Thus the United States pushed for the prohibition at the Washington conference of 1921–22 and the Geneva conference of 1925 even though it recognized that it “would undoubtedly give up a material advantage if gas warfare were abolished.” See U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament, Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents 1919–55. 84th Congress, 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 701.Google Scholar

84. The rise of the society of states is associated with the work of Bull and Watson. See in particular Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Bull, Hedley and Watson, Adam, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).Google Scholar

85. See Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society. On the history of the questioning and discrediting of the idea of war, see Mueller, John, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989).Google Scholar

86. Creveld, Van, Technology and War, p. 71.Google Scholar

87. O'Connell, Of Arms and Men.

88. See, for example, Anthony Eden's impassioned speech reported in the New York Times, 21 April 1936, p. 18.

89. For example, the U.S. military “denied that there were any lessons to be learned from the use of gas as a weapon of opportunity against a totally unprepared enemy in a colonial war.” See Brown, , Chemical Warfare, p. 145.Google Scholar For a similar German assessment, see Müller, Rolf-Dieter, “World Power Status Through the Use of Poison Gas? German Preparations for Chemical Warfare 1919–1945,” in Deist, Wilhem, ed., The German Military in the Age of Total War (Warwickshire, England: Berg Publishers, 1985), pp. 171–209.Google Scholar

90. Quester, George, Deterrence Before Hiroshima (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1986), p. 78.Google Scholar Thus, while reports of Japan's use of CW against the Chinese were ignored, even the suggestion that CW was being contemplated in Spain drew preemptory attention from Britain. The use of tear gas by government forces was reported and the insurgents claimed that they, too, had gas but “refuse to break the international law which forbids its use.” See Times (London), 19 08 1936, p. 10.Google Scholar In response, Britain sent its diplomats to investigate these allegations and convey the grave consequences that might follow from the use of gas even in reprisal. See Times (London) 8 09 1936, p. 12.Google Scholar

91. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday. Similarly, Fukuyama has drawn a sharp distinction between the power politics behavior of the Third World and peaceful relations among industrial democracies—the historical and posthistorical parts of the world. See Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).Google Scholar See also Doyle, Michael, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” pt. 1 and 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Summer and Fall 1983), pp. 205–235Google Scholar and 323–353; and Goldgeier, James and McFaul, Michael, “A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post–Cold War Era,” International Organization 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 467–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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94. See “Paper Interviews Aziz on Kurds, Other Issues,” Kuwait AL-QABAS, 31 October 1988 (in Arabic), Foreign Broadcast Information Service(FBIS ), 2 November 1988, p. 27; and “WAKH Reports Khayrallah 15 September Press Conference,” Manama WAKH, 15 September 1988 (in Arabic), FRIS 16 September 1988, pp. 23–24.

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98. New York Times, 2 July 1988, p. A3.

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105. Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” pp. 85–86. See also Scott, James, Domination and the Arts of Resistance (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990).Google Scholar

106. Indeed, high-precision conventional munitions had been defined as weapons of mass destruction in Soviet military literature of the 1980s. See Stephen R. Covington, “The Evolution of Soviet Thinking on the Utility of Chemical Warfare in a Major European Armed Conflict,” in Krause, , Security Implications of a Global Chemical Weapons Ban, pp. 9–10.Google Scholar

107. Boston Globe, 17 February 1991, p. 20.

108. This is not to say, however, that the view has not been expressed privately in the developing world—though not in official public discourse—that to die by chemical weapons is neither more nor less horrible than to die by bullet or flame. See, for example, the testimony of Brad Roberts in U.S. Congress, Chemical Warfare. Arms Control and Nonproliferation: Joint Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes, 98th Congress, 2d sess., 28 06 1984. pp. 60–61Google Scholar.

109. Nina Tannenwald and Richard Price, “Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos,” paper presented at a Social Science Research Council/MacArthur conference entitled, “Norms and National Security,” Stanford University, Stanford, Calif., 7–8 October 1994.

110. Leonard, James F., “Rolling Back Chemical Proliferation,” Arms Control Today 22 (10 1992), pp. 13–18.Google Scholar

111. At the time of writing, 157 nations had signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.

112. Lapid, Joseph, “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post–positivist Era,” International Studies Quarterly 33 (09 1989), pp. 235–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

113. See Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It.’