By a notice published as a supplement to the Royal Gazette of July 7, 1949, the government of Trinidad and Tobago extended diplomatic privileges and immunities to the Caribbean Commission and its officials and staff members. On September 22, 1949, Clovis Beauregard, newly appointed Deputy Secretary General of the commission arrived in Port-of-Spain to assume his duties. During the period under review the commission participated in the meeting of the British West Indies Sugar Technologists, held at Antigua from September 27 to October 1, 1949, and announced its acceptance of an invitation to participate in a United Nations meeting of experts on housing in tropical Africa, scheduled for the second half of 1950.

On December 21, 1949 representatives of the five powers signatory to the Brussels Pact signed an agreement laying down the status of Members of the armed forces of any one of the Brussels Treaty Powers stationed in the territory of any one of them.

It was announced in the press on February 9, 1950 that the Althing at Reykjavik had passed by 35 votes to 8 the government motion for the adherence of Iceland to the Council of Europe. Iceland thus became the thirteenth member of the Council.

Tripartite arrangements were completed in December 1949 for collaboration in military standardization among the armed forces of Britain, the United States and Canada, as a step toward fulfillment of the provisions of the North Atlantic Military Production and Supply Board. Under these arrangements, which were similar to those made by the Brussels Treaty Powers, the three countries would pool information on almost every kind of conventional weapon used by their fighting forces and would study together such advanced weapons as guided missiles. “These arrangements will insure that in time of necessity there will be no material or technical obstacles to full cooperation among the armed forces concerned and the greatest possible economy in the use of combined resources and effort will be obtained,” the announcement stated. Military liaison committees had already begun work on the first phases of the exchange.

On January 6, 1950 the Council again turned to the consideration of the dispute between Haiti and the Dominican Republic and resolved to 1) convoke the Organ of Consultation at a time and place to be determined in the future, 2) constitute. itself provisionally as the Organ of Consultation, and 3) appoint a committee to conduct an on-the-spot investigation of the facts of the situation and their antecedents. The Council then communicated its decisions on the matter to the United Nations Security Council.

Two topics were the subject of discussion in the Allied Council and Executive Committee during August 1949: 1) the question of Allied Control over Austrian political parties; and 2) the western attempt to eliminate censorship over Austrian communications. Concerning the political parties two resolutions were submitted by the French and by the United Kingdom Commissions. The French draft was rejected by the three other commissions and the United Kingdom draft, declaring that the Allied Council had decided that political parties needed “no longer obtain the authorization of the Allied Council as required by the decision of the 11th September 1945“ and the “Austrian Government will be responsible for regulating the formation and activity of political parties or organizations according to provisions of international laws,“ was adopted by the Council. The Soviet representative objected to this and to a second French proposal. The United States and United Kingdom agreed to a French suggestion that the Allied Council meet in an extraordinary session to consider further the French positionand the question in general but the Soviet High Commissioner refused to accept

At a meeting of the Allied Council for Japan on March 1, 1950, the British Commonwealth representative, Colonel W. R. Hodgson of Australia, urged General MacArthur to take “positive action” on Japanese charges that war prisoners in the Soviet Union had been denied repatriation unless they agreed to join the communist party upon their return. Colonel Hodgson criticized General MacArthur's policy of maintaining that the Allied Council could only discuss the issue, and demanded that the Council order Japanese authorities to make a thorough investigation of the accusations, particularly to determine if charges of treason should be brought against Kiyuchi Tokuda, general secretary of the Japanese communist party. William Sebald, United States representative on the Council, after an original statement that Colonel Hodgson's proposal was “not appropriate,” agreed to suggest that Japanese authorities launch a “positive” inquiry. The Japanese government on the following day announced initiation of an investigation.

Negotiations on the Saar Territory: Negotiations between France and the government of the Saar on a convention to define their relationship toward each other were the subject of considerable discussion in Germany. On January 7, 1950, Jacob Kaiser, Minister for the Reunification of Germany in the west German government, proposed that the Saar's future political status be determined by a referendum, while President Theodor Heuss suggested that final settlement of the question could only be made in a German peace treaty and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer announced that any step to separate the Saar from Germany would meet “the same opposition that we have offered to creation of the Oder-Neisse line.” French Foreign Minister Schuman stated on January 15 that his government would continue with the policy defined in the Saar statute; the discussions were technical, and would have to be confirmed by the peace treaty.

The Council of Foreign Ministers Deputies on the Austrian Treaty reopened their sessions in London on January 9, 1950. At the first meeting the Soviet deputy (Zarubin) reported that he was without instructions and was still awaiting conclusion of Soviet-Austrian negotiations on Austria's payments for post-war supplies and services by the USSR. After several subsequent meetings at which Mr. Zarubin was still without instructions, the United States, United Kingdom, and French ambassadors in Moscow protested to Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko against the delays encountered in the treaty negotiations. The three ambassadors requested “assurances” that the treaty negotiations would not be further delayed but did not receive them.

In February 1950 the annual report of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation was presented to the United States Economic Cooperation Administration. The report stated that future progress of European recovery would depend to a large extent upon the level of economic activity in the United States, upon United States tariff policy; and upon international investments made by the United States. The forecasts of European trade were based on the assumption that United States business activity would remain at least as high as in the second and third quarter of 1949; it was pointed out that even small setbacks in the United States economy would have disproportionately large consequences for western Europe whose reserves were not great enough to stand much strain. The report insisted that what remained to be done to solve the dollar problem was not a task for Europe alone but was rather a “joint problem.” Western Europe's dollar deficit could not be eliminated unless its exports to the United States amounted to 75 percent of its imports in value. It was necessary that the emphasis shift from the expansion of total production to the development of dollar earning and dollar saving types of production, as well as a reduction in costs. Inflationary pressure had been greatly relieved but nearly all the Marshall Plan countries were still suffering from some inflationary pressure which tended to reduce their exports and increase their imports. This pressure was likely to continue unless a world depression developed.

Whereas, Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter of the United Nations provide for an International Trusteeship System;

Whereas, by Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy, signed in Paris on 10 February 1947, Italy renounced all right and title to the Italian territorial possessions in Africa;

Whereas, under paragraph 3 of Annex XI of this Treaty, the General Assembly of the United Nations was requested to make recommendations regarding the future status of the territories referred to in Article 23 thereof;

Whereas, under paragraph 3 of Annex XI of this Treaty, the Governments of France, of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and of the United States of America agreed to accept the recommendation made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in this matter;

The primary difficulty in the current question of the representation of Member States in die United Nations is that this question of representation has been linked up with the question of recognition by Member Governments.

It will be shown here that this linkage is unfortunate from the practical standpoint, and wrong from the standpoint of legal theory.

On 8 March, at 4:30 p.m., two hours after you circulated your memorandum on “Legal Aspects of Problems of Representation in the United Nations” (S/1466), I protested to you orally against your memorandum and reserved my right to make a further statement on it. I have now been instructed by my Government to lodge with you the formal protest of my Government.

The Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

Being parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington on April 4, 1949;

Considering their reciprocal pledges under Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty separately and jointly with the other parties, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack;