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Dimensions of resource dependence: some elements of rigor in concept and policy analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Bruce Russett
Bruce Russett
Affiliation:
Editor of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, is Professor of Political Science at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.
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Abstract

Many commentators have sounded alarms about the alleged dependence of developed, industrialized countries on assured supplies of raw materials from overseas. Their alarms have disturbing implications for the future of these countries' foreign policies and may, for example, be used to justify political or military interventions in the Third World. These commentators, however, frequently proceed from very primitive conceptual foundations. A careful specification of the dangers involved, and of strategies for measuring various aspects of dependence, points up some of the shortcomings of simplistic analysis. It also suggests that the risks of dependence on foreign sources of most raw materials are easily exaggerated, at least for the United States.

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 38 , Issue 3 , Summer 1984 , pp. 481 - 499
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1984

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References

1. Examples of such a mixture of rhetoric and policy recommendations can be found in Council on Economics and National Security, Strategic Minerals: A Resource Crisis (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1981Google Scholar), and al, James Arnold Miller et., eds., The Resource War in 3-D–Dependency Diplomacy Defense (Pittsburgh: World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh, 1981Google Scholar). Similar considerations have repeatedly been voiced by members of the Reagan administration and by Alexander Haig when president of United Technologies Inc. Magdoff, Harry, The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969Google Scholar), chap. 2, made many of the same points earlier, from a critical perspective.

2. Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), p. 8Google Scholar.

3. See Caporaso, James, “Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis,” International Organization 32 (Winter 1978), pp. 13–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4. Keohane, and Nye, , Power and Interdependence, pp. 12–13Google Scholar.

5. Two examples of a laundry list converted to a single index by equal weighting of all elements (compounded by extremely subjective “measures” of many elements) are Alwyn King, H., Materials Vulnerability of the United States–An Update (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: U.S. Army War College, 1977Google Scholar), and Suprowicz, Bogdan, How to Avoid Strategic Materials Shortages (New York: Wiley, 1981Google Scholar), chap. 15. More general, and much better, attempts to devise measurements of dependence are James Caporaso, “Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Inequality, Dependence, and Exploitation,” in Steven Rosen, J. and Kurth, James R., eds., Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1974Google Scholar), and especially Richardson, Neil, “Economic Dependence and Foreign Policy Compliance: Bringing Measurement Closer to Conception,” in Kegley, Charles and McGowan, Pat, eds., The Political Economy of Foreign Policy Behavior (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981)Google Scholar.

6. See Hirschman, Albert O., National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945Google Scholar), and Ray, James Lee and Singer, J. David, “Measuring the Concentration of Power in the International System,” Sociological Methods and Research, 4 (1973), pp. 403–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7. See, for example, Wright, Brian and Williams, Jeffrey, “The Roles of Public and Private Storage in Managing Oil Import Disruptions,” Bell Journal of Economics 13 (Autumn 1982), pp. 341–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Congress, U.S., Office of Technology Assessment, An Assessment of Alternative Stockpiling Policies (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 08 1976Google Scholar); and Office of Technology Assessment, Strategic and Critical Nonfuel Minerals: Problems and Policy Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 08 1983)Google Scholar.

8. Congressional testimony of Burrows, James C., reported in Tilton, John, The Future of Non-Fuel Metals (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1977), p. 66Google Scholar, and Congress, U.S., Office of Technology Assessment, Cobalt: Policy Options for a Strategic Mineral (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1982), p. 9Google Scholar.

9. See, for example, Morgenstern, Oskar, Knorr, Klaus, and Heiss, Klaus P., Long-Term Projections of Power: Political, Economic, and Military Forecasting (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1973Google Scholar), chap. 8.

10. The literature on economic sanctions is vast. Two recent contributions are Renwick, Robin, Economic Sanctions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1981Google Scholar); and Nincic, Miroslav and Wallensteen, Peter, eds., Dilemmas of Economic Coercion: Sanctions in World Politics (New York: Praeger, 1984)Google Scholar.

11. The most complete political and economic theoretical statement on cartels is probably Bobrow, Davis and Kudrle, Robert, “Theory, Policy, and Resource Cartels,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 20 (03 1976), pp. 3–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Other treatments include Bergsten, C. Fred, Horst, Thomas, and Moran, Theodore, American Multinationals and American Interests (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1978Google Scholar), chap. 3; Doran, Charles F., Myth, Oil, and Politics (New York: Free Press, 1977Google Scholar); and Krasner, Stephen, “Oil Is the Exception,” Foreign Policy no. 14 (Spring 1974), pp. 68–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The more recent decline in OPEC's effectiveness has diminished most observers' expectations that other producers' cartels could have marked, sustained impact on prices.

12. See Duvall, Raymond, Jackson, Steven, Russett, Bruce, Snidal, Duncan, and Sylvan, David, “A Formal Model of ‘Dependencia’ Theory: Structure and Measurement,” in Merritt, Richard L. and Russett, , eds., From National Development to Global Community (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981Google Scholar).

13. One who disagrees might, alternatively, measure hostility by the COPDAB or WE1S indicators of conflict and cooperation, though they suffer serious reliability problems. See, for example, “Symposium: Events Data Collections,” International Studies Quarterly 27 (06 1983), pp. 147–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For 1976 both Australia and South Africa had COPDAB cooperation/conflict scores toward the United States of over 10, while the Soviet Union showed a score of –4.

14. One appraisal of chromium supply prospects put the chances of a medium shortage (10–50% of supply for more than 6 months) of chromite/ferrochrome at about 20% over the period 1980–1985, and the chances of a larger shortage (over 50% shortfall for more than 6 months) at under 10%. The main contributor to these likelihoods was the author's estimate of the chance of major violence in South Africa. He made no estimates for platinum, but with much the same players, the chances would presumably be about the same. By contrast, he put the odds for similar disruptions of bauxite/alumina supply at under 10% to nil. For further comparison, a 1980 U.S. government study of the chances of a major oil supply shortfall from foreign action was using ranges of 5 to 20% for a one-year interruption of one-third of American oil consumption at some time during the decade. This appraisal is of the same order of magnitude as the estimates for chromium and much higher than that for bauxite/aluminum. Metals estimates are by Fischman, Leonard, World Mineral Trends and U.S. Supply Problems (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1980), pp. 500Google Scholar, 512; petroleum estimates reported in Hogan, William W., “Import Management and Oil Emergencies,” in Deese, David and Nye, Joseph, eds., Energy and Security (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1981), p. 298Google Scholar.

15. Tilton, John E. and Landsberg, Hans H., “Nonfuel Minerals–The Fear of Shortages and the Search for Policies,” in N, Emery. Castle, and Price, Kent A., eds., U.S. Interests and Global Natural Resources (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1983Google Scholar), support this conclusion.

16. Note that the scale is essentially limited by the commodities listed in the table. If we were to add some other domestically produced commodity, like wheat, the lower (favorable) end of the scales would drop substantially. The upper end also lacks a firm anchor, since we cannot definitively say how much “dependence” justifies a particular response like military intervention.

17. In 1975 the Office of Minerals Policy Development, U.S Department of the Interior, estimated the optimal size of the strategic chromium stockpile. On the assumption of a 20% chance of an embargo lasting 4 years, the office's optimum stockpile was just under 1.3 million tons, which happens to be the actual holdings of the stockpile in 1981. On the same probability estimate, the same size stockpile would be optimal for containing serious cartel-induced price increases for more than 3 years. Reported in Office of Technology Assessment, An Assessment of Alternative Stockpiling Plans, pp. 275–76.

18. See the comparisons in Landsberg, Hans H. and Tilton, John H., “Nonfuel Minerals,” in Portney, Paul R., ed., Current Issues in Natural Resources Policy (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1982), pp. 75, 100Google Scholar.