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The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2003

Frances Rosenbluth  and
Ross Schaap
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Abstract

This article seeks to ground financial regulatory choices in domestic politics. Based on evidence from twenty-two industrialized countries, we argue that electoral rules—specifically, the extent to which they are centrifugal or centripetal—have a significant effect on whether the banks or their consumers pay for the security of the banking system. Moreover, despite the homogenizing effects of global financial integration, the political dynamics generated by these electoral rules continue to shape the nature and extent of prudential regulations that countries adopt in the place of banking cartels.

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Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 57 , Issue 2 , Spring 2003 , pp. 307 - 336
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2003

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