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Cultural Pluralism and the Israeli Nation-Building Ideology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Raphael Cohen-Almagor
Raphael Cohen-Almagor
Affiliation:
lecturer in the Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel.
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Extract

Know from where you come and where you are going. (Akavya Ben-Mahalalel, Avot, 3)

It has been argued that the difference between liberal democracies and theocratic, communist, or fascist states is not that liberal states promote different ideals of the good, but that they promote none. Whereas illiberal states regard it as a primary function of the state to prescribe the moral character of society, liberal states shun such attempts and allow freedom to citizens to develop their own conceptions. Liberals hold that governments cannot use as their justification for any action the fact that one person's plan of life is more or less worthy than that of another. Since many people believe in more than one objective “correct” set of values, every person should enjoy the freedom to arrive at her own conception of the good. By “conception of the good” is meant a more or less determinate scheme of ends that the doer aspires to carry out for their own sake as well as of attachments to other individuals and loyalties to various groups and associations. It involves a mixture of moral, philosophical, ideological, and religious notions, together with personal values that contain some picture of a worthy life.

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Articles
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 27 , Issue 4 , November 1995 , pp. 461 - 484
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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References

NOTES

Author's note: An earlier draft of this essay was presented at the Rich seminar in Yarnton, Oxon. I thank the participants of the seminar for their useful suggestions. Specifically, I express my gratitude to Moshe Lissak, Ilan Pappé, Alex Weingrod, Menachem Friedman, Yoseph Gorny, and Ilan Troen for sharing their thoughts with me on various aspects of the issue. Wilfrid Knapp, David Heyd, Stephen Sharot, and Avner De-Shalit also contributed helpful comments that helped me to sharpen some of the arguments. Emanuel Gutmann provided incisive criticism and so did the anonymous referees of IJMES.

1 Raz, Joseph, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 108Google Scholar.

2 Ben-Gurion, David in “Towards a New World,” in Israel: Years of Challenge (London: Anthony Blond, 1964), 212–40Google Scholar, esp. 233; idem, “Laws or a Constitution,” in Rebirth and Destiny in Israel (London: Thomas Yoseloff, 1959), 363–80Google Scholar.

3 Ben-Gurion, , “Freedom and Independence,” in Rebirth and Destiny in Israel, 280Google Scholar.

4 Divrei Haknesset (Knesset Proceedings), 20 02 1950, 117 meeting, 4:817Google Scholar.

5 See the publications of B'TSELEM, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, especially those from April 1993, June 1993, and January 1994 (Hebrew).

6 Notice that the Educational Law of 1953, which I mentioned earlier, stresses universal and modern secular values but casts them in terms of ethnic context. The goal of education is “to base elementary education … upon the values of Jewish culture and scientific achievements, upon love of the homeland.” For further discussion, see Cohen-Almagor, , “The Intifada: Causes, Consequences and Future Trends,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 2, 1 (1991): 12–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Peled, Yoav, “Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the Jewish State,” APSR 86, 2 (1992): 432–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Archives of the State of Israel (henceforth ASI), GL1086/9003, first session of the Supreme Council of Education, 13 March 1952, speech of Professor Ben-Zion Dinburg, minister of education.

8 Ben-Gurion, , “Mission and Dedication,” in Rebirth and Destiny in Israel, 339Google Scholar.

9 There is a continuing debate among scholars concerning the nature of Israeli democracy. All scholars (with the exception of people like Yeshayahu Leibowitz) believe Israel is a democracy. Some (S. N. Eisenstadt, Moshe Lissak, Dan Horowitz) view Israel as a democratic, liberal, and pluralistic state. Yoav Peled sees Israeli political culture comprising three principles: republicanism, liberalism, and ethnicity. Yonathan Shapiro contends that the Russian immigrants who established the state instituted procedural, not liberal, democracy. See Eisenstadt, S. N., Israeli Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967)Google Scholar; Horowitz, Dan and Lissak, Moshe, The Origins of Israeli Polity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978)Google Scholar; Peled, Yoav, “Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship,” 432–43Google Scholar, andShapiro, Yonathan, “The Historical Origins of Israeli Democracy,” in Israeli Democracy under Stress, ed. Sprinzak, Ehud and Diamond, Larry (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 65–80Google Scholar. See also Neuberger, B., “Israel's Democracy—How Liberal? How Stable?”, Kaplan Centre Papers, University of Cape Town (1988), 1–33Google Scholar.

10 For an elaborated analysis of neutrality and impartiality see Cohen-Almagor, , Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance: The Struggle against Kahanism in Israel (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 1994), esp. chap. 3Google Scholar.

11 Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 33, 48–51, 271–74Google Scholar; Ackerman, Bruce A., Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), 11–12, 347–78Google Scholar; Dworkin, Ronald M., “Why Liberals Should Believe in Equality?” The New York Review of Books 30, 1 (1983): 32–34Google Scholar; idem, A Matter of Principle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 191–94, 205Google Scholar; Kymlicka, Will, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), esp. 76–85, 95–96Google Scholar; idem, “Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality,” Ethics 99, 4 (1989): 883–905, esp. 899–905CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Marneffe, Peter De, “Liberalism, Liberty, and Neutrality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 19, 3 (1990): 253–74, esp. 253Google Scholar.

12 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 448Google Scholar.

13 For further discussion, see Cohen-Almagor, , “Harm Principle, Offence Principle, and the Skokie Affair,” Political Studies 41 (1993): 453–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 Raz, , The Morality of Freedom (1986), 110Google Scholar.

15 Similar division was drawn with regard to the Arabs as well as regarding political opponents, such as Herut, Maki, and Mapam.

16 Berger, P. and Luckmann, T., The Social Construction of Reality (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966), 144Google Scholar.

17 Middle Easterners were called “primitives,” “Asiatics” (or “filthy Asiatics”), “Arabushim” (derogatory name for Arabs), and “blacks.” See Amir, Eli, Scapegoat (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1983), 27, 28, 45, 78, 112, 124Google Scholar (Hebrew). Three chapters of Amir's, Eli book were translated to English and appear in The Jerusalem Quarterly 40 (1986): 3–25Google Scholar. The book's title, Tarnegol Kaparot, is here translated to Fowl of Atonement. See also Michael, Sammy, All Men Are Equal—But Some Are More (Tel Aviv: Boostan, 1976, [Hebrew]), 43, 50, 154Google Scholar.

18 I am not suggesting that the Israeli experience is unique. One of the referees of the IJMES pointed out that the situation described in this essay is very reminiscent of American treatment of immigrant groups in the late-19th and early-20th centuries. This may be true. The question is whether illiberal and unjust treatment of immigrants in one part of the world justifies illiberal and unjust treatment in another part of the world. The Middle Eastern immigrants probably would not have been comforted by the idea that other immigrants had experienced similar treatment in America.

19 Literally, mamlakha means “kingdom.” The term mamlakhtiut was part and parcel of the nationbuilding ideology, of the effort to establish a sovereign state that would unite all segments of society under one emblem.

20 Ben-Rafael, Eliezer and Sharot, Stephen, Ethnicity, Religion and Class in Israeli Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21 Borochov, Ber, “The Economic Development of the Jewish People,” in Nationalism and the Class Struggle (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973, second Greenwood printing), 59–74, esp. 69Google Scholar. Ben-Gurion, David reasoned similarly in “The Jews,” in Reflections (London: Macdonald Unit 75, 1970), 15–29Google Scholar.

22 Borochov, Ber, “The National Question and the Class Struggle,” Nationalism and the Class Struggle, 135–66, esp. 144Google Scholar.

23 Ben-Gurion, David, The Restored State of Israel (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975, 7th printing), 456 (Hebrew)Google Scholar.

24 Ben-Gurion, David, Israel: Years of Challenge (London: Anthony Blond, 1963), 211Google Scholar. Quoted in Avishai, Bernard, The Tragedy of Zionism (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1985), 193Google Scholar.

25 Rubinstein, Amnon, The Zionist Dream Revisited, from Herzl to Gush Emunim and Back (Jerusalem: Schocken Books, 1984), 4 (Hebrew)Google Scholar. See also Amir's, EliScapegoat (1983)Google Scholar, where Nuri, the central figure in the book, compared himself with the Sabra “Regionals” and thought that they were “the princes of the valley, its pride and its future.” They were the new, “and I was the old; they were the redemption and I the exile. I wanted to be like them, a new man, and I was neither one nor the other” (118).

26 Gordon, A. D., The Nation and Labour (Jerusalem: The Zionist Library, 1952), 365–67Google Scholar (Hebrew).

27 Ben-Gurion, David, Uniqueness and Mission (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1971), 322Google Scholar (Hebrew).

28 Ben-Gurion, David, “Mamlakhti Education,” in Vision and Way (Tel Aviv: Mapai Publications, 1953), 4:159–64Google Scholar (Hebrew). Notice that it was not decided to apply this concept to the health services. On this matter, partisan interests of keeping the dominance of Kupat Holim and the Histadrut outweighed other considerations.

29 Ben-Gurion, David, The Eighth Convention of the Histadrut, 18–20 03 1956 (Tel Aviv: Ha'vaad Ha'poel), 73 (Hebrew)Google Scholar.

30 The Law of Return is not unique to Israeli democracy. West Germany, prior to its unification with East Germany in 1990, granted automatic citizenship to every East German who wished to settle in the country.

31 I use the terms “Israeli Palestinians” and “Israeli Arabs” as synonymous. Most Israeli Arabs identify themselves as Palestinians.

32 See, for example, Ben-Gurion's, arguments in “Israel's First Steps,” in Israel: Years of Challenge, 45–67Google Scholar. See also Divrei Haknesset, 3 07 1950, 160Google Scholar meeting, 6:2035–37. On some of the problematic aspects of the law, concerning the Israeli Palestinians, see Kretzmer, David, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

33 President Moshe Smoira in High Court (henceforward H.C.) 10/1948, Ziv v Gubernik. In 1987, the court maintained that the declaration is “a judicial norm that reflects the national charter of values.” See H.C. 953”1987, Poraz v The Mayor of Tel-Aviv.

34 H.C. 73/1953; 87/1953, Kol-Ha'am v Minister of the Interior; and Election Appeal (E. A.) 1/1965, Yeredor v Chairman of the Central Committee for the Elections to the Sixth Knesset. See also H.C. 262/1962, Perez v Kfar Shmaryahu Local Council, and judgments of Justices Conn and Landau in H.C. 72/1962, Rufeisen v Minister of the Interior.

35 H.C. 10/1948, Ziv v Gubernik. The court referred to the first part of the declaration as having a normative status. This part is concerned with the establishment of Israel as a sovereign state.

36 During the 1980s, Rabbi Meir Kahane emphasized the tension between the Jewishness of the state and its democratic aspirations. Kahane called the Declaration of Independence a “schizophrenic document,” arguing that an ultimately insoluble contradiction existed between a Jewish State of Israel and a state in which Arabs and Jews possessed equal rights. See Protocol Number 14 of the Central Election Committee (CEC) (17 06 1984), 39Google Scholar (Hebrew). His view was rejected by the CEC and the Supreme Court of Justice. Election Appeal (E.A.) 2/1984, Neiman and Avneri v Chairperson of the CEC to the 11th Knesset. See also President Shamgar's judgment in E.A. 1/1988, Neiman and Kach v Chairperson of the CEC to the 12th Knesset, where he declined the claim that the democratic character of the state might be threatened by the desire for Israel to subsist as the state of the Jewish people. President Shamgar contended that the democratic character of Israel was deeply rooted in its foundations from the day of its establishment, as the Declaration of Independence explicitly postulated.

37 On this issue, see Lissak, Moshe, “Paradoxes of Israeli Civil-Military Relations: An Introduction,” in Israeli Society and Its Defense Establishment, ed. Lissak, Moshe (London: Frank Cass, 1984), 1–12Google Scholar.

38 Liebman, Charles S. and Don-Yehiya, Eliezer, “The Dilemma of Reconciling Traditional Culture and Political Needs,” Comparative Politics 16, 1 (October 1983): 53–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. 56–59. For further discussion, see their book, Civil Religion in Israel: Traditional Judaism and Political Culture in the Jewish State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983)Google Scholar.

39 We may note that a distinctive feature of the French Revolution was the lack of distinction between noble and common people. In France, all were citizens. Also notice that military ranks were resisted during the Chinese Revolution, and that a lack of formal codes characterized the Iranian Revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini did not hold a formal position in the new regime, and he preferred to sit in Qum, not in Tehran.

40 Elon, Amos, The Israelis (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), 329Google Scholar.

41 The wave of name changing receded during the 1960s. Today, the inclination of many is to cling to the names of the ayarah, the lives in Europe before their destruction by the Nazis.

42 Ben-Amotz's, Dahn personal story illustrates the then prevailing attitude. See his Screwing Isn't Everything (Tel Aviv: Metziuth Publishers, 1979), 116Google Scholar (Hebrew).

43 The reading of Yigal Mossenson's Hasamba—arguably the most popular series of books—reveals what names were fashionable, that is, compatible with the Sabra image. The only traditional name of a Hasamba member was Menashe, emphasizing his origin by frequently referring to him as “Menashe Ha'teimani” (from Yemen). The edot (ethnic affiliation) of the other members were not mentioned in this explicit way.

44 Matras, Judah, “The Jewish Population: Growth, Expansion of Settlement, and Changing Composition,” in Integration and Development in Israel ed. Eisenstadt, S. N., Bar-Yosef, Rivkah, and Adler, Chaim (New York: Praeger, 1970), 307–40, esp. 320Google Scholar.

45 Ben-Gurion, David, Uniqueness and Mission (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1971), 336 (Hebrew)Google Scholar.

46 Divrei Haknesset, 12 12 1951, 31 meetingGoogle Scholar, 10:634–37. See also Protocols of the 23rd Zionist Congress (Jerusalem: Zionist Histadrut, 1951), 10–21Google Scholar (Hebrew), and Ben-Gurion, , “The Nation and the People,” in Vision and Way (Tel Aviv: Mapai Publications, 1952), 3:95–102 (Hebrew)Google Scholar.

47 I reiterate that this strong claim refers mainly to the first decade of independence. The attitude toward the Middle Easterners had slowly changed after the 1956 Sinai campaign in which Middle Eastern soldiers proved themselves to be good soldiers. Lissak argues that this fact had positive implications on the integration of the Middle Eastern communities in society.

48 See Michael's, Sammy testimonial in “Victoria Is Winning,” Yedioth Ahronoth (Israeli daily), 2 07 1993 (Seven Days Suppl.), 48Google Scholar; and Amir's, EliTarnegol Kaparot (Scapegoat) (1983, [Hebrew]), 34, 111, 112.Google Scholar

49 Guri, Israel and Zuberi, Rachel, both members of Knesset of Mapai, in Divrei Haknesset, 148 meeting, 6 06 1950, 5:1631Google Scholar; and 101 meting, 1 July 1952, 12:2484.

50 Divrei Haknesset 13 02 1951, 226 meeting, 13:1102Google Scholar. See also Levin's, Nachum testimony before Justice Proomkin Commission of Enquiry on Education in Olim Settlements, 1950, in ASI, G5543/3631, file 607 (I), 7 03 1950, 2Google Scholar.

51 ASI, G5543/3631, file 607 (I), esp. 49, 105–6, and depositions of 9 March 1950, 10–13; 17 May 1950, 8–10.

52 ASI, G5543/3631, file 607 (II), testimonials that were brought before the two chief rabbis of Israel, Rabbi Herzog and Rabbi Uziel. See also G5543/3631, file 607 (III).

53 Yedioth Ahronoth, 12 02 1988, 6 (Pol. Suppl.)Google Scholar.

54 Divrei Haknesset, 6 03 1950, 122 meeting, 4:940Google Scholar.

55 For further discussion on the ideological differences between the parties, see Horowitz, and Lissak, , The Origins of Israeli Polity, esp. 120–56Google Scholar.

56 Elon, , The Israelis, 311Google Scholar. To his critics, Ben-Gurion once said: “I do not know what the people want. I know what is preferable for them to have!” See Yedioth Ahronoth, 21 06 1985, 17 (Pol. Suppl.)Google Scholar.

57 Ben-Gurion, , “Two Revolutions,” in Vision and Way, 3:270–73, esp. 270 (Hebrew)Google Scholar. On the importance of the Hebrew language, see the speeches of Minister of Education Dinburg, Ben-Zion (Mapai), in Divrei Haknesset, 03 1952, 65 meeting, 11:1554–55, and in ASI, GL1086/9003Google Scholar.

58 See Smooha, Sammy, Israel: Pluralism and Conflict (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 87, 190Google Scholar.

59 Yoseftal, Senta, Ingathering of Exiles and Absorption of Immigration (Tel Aviv: Ha'vaad Ha'poel, n.d.), 4 (Hebrew)Google Scholar. Lavon Archive, no. DO3–35–021.

60 “Standard of Living in Moshavim of Immigrants,” Lavon Archive, sec. IV, 307, file 283Google Scholar.

61 Smooha, , Israel: Pluralism and Conflict, 88Google Scholar.

62 Note that early in this century, during Hashomer days (1909–20), an organization that was established by people of the second aliya, Arab customs were adopted and no such fears were predominant. The tendency was toward becoming an integral part of the Middle Eastern environment. Most notably, Hashomer people used to dress like Arabs, and they adopted many of the Arab modes of behavior.

63 Ronald Dworkin expressed this view in comments on my paper “Between Neutrality and Perfectionism,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 7, 2 (07 1994), 217–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

64 The disillusion and astonishment of the immigrants when confronted with the secular modes of behavior came into expression by olim from Yemen and Kurdistan. See Danino, Shalom in conference of educators, 29 03 1951, second meeting (Lavon Archive, sect. IV, 307, file 471), 59Google Scholar.

65 ASI, Justice Proomkin Commission of Enquiry on Education in Olim Settlements, 1950. G5543/3631, files 607 (I), (II), (IV), (V).

66 Shlomo Swirsky speaks in terms of an Ashkenazi conspiracy to exploit the Middle Eastern immigrants. See Not Backwards But Being Deprived (Haifa: Notebooks for Research and Criticism, 1981, [Hebrew])Google Scholar, and also Bernstein, D. and Swirsky, S., “The Rapid Economic Development of Israel and the Emergence of the Ethnic Division of Labour,” British Journal of Sociology 23, 1 (1982): 64–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Smooha sometimes sounds as if making similar claims, Israel: Pluralism and Conflict, 41Google Scholar. Michael's book, All Men Are Equal-But Some Are More, is saturated with feelings of resentment, hatred, and alienation toward the Ashkenazi domination (see esp. 178).

67 Ben-Gurion, , Uniqueness and Mission (1971), 337–38 (Hebrew)Google Scholar.

68 According to Sikron, Moshe (The Immigration to Israel, 1948–1953 [Jerusalem: Falk Center for Economic Research and the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 1957], Hebrew)Google Scholar, in 1950–52 16.1 percent of the immigrants from Asia and Africa were unskilled workers versus 9.7 percent of immigrants of European origins. Five percent of Middle Easterners worked in liberal and technical professions at their home countries versus 12 percent of immigrants of European origins (94–95).

69 Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1952/1953, no. 4, 148Google Scholar.

70 Kalfon's, Abraham speech (Mapai) in Divrei Haknesset, 16 03 1953, 207 meeting, 13:964Google Scholar.

71 Smooha, , Israel: Pluralism and Conflict, esp. 91, 157, 192Google Scholar.

72 Avishai, , The Tragedy of Zionism, 216–17Google Scholar.

73 On the conditions at the ma'abarot, see Divrei Haknesset, 13 12 1950, 200 meeting, 7:466–74Google Scholar; 5–6 February 1951, 222–223 meetings, 8:966–69, 991–99; 12–14 February 1951, 225–226 meetings, 8:1037–1110; 20 December 1951, 35 meeting, 10:783–801.

74 See a letter from the people of Sakia ma'abarah to the prime minister asking to open a cultural center in the ma'abarah. 24 April 1952, ASI, G1900/6600.

75 Inbar, Michael and Adler, Chaim, Ethnic Integration in Israel (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1977), chap. 6Google Scholar.

76 Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1957/1958, no. 9, 25Google Scholar.

77 The values of socialism, especially labor and pioneerism, were of prime importance during the 1950s. See ASI, GL1086/9003, first session of the Supreme Council of Education, 13 March 1952, speech of S. Yavneeli.

78 Avishai, , The Tragedy of Zionism, 216Google Scholar. See also Segre, V. D., A Society in Transition (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), esp. 193Google Scholar.

79 The development towns, predominantly settled by Middle Easterners, were for a long time denied symbolic recognition as pioneering settlements that had an essential role in the building of the nation. They never achieved the prestige of the early agricultural settlements. See Cohen, Erik, “The City in Zionist Ideology,” The Jerusalem Quarterly, 4 (1977): 126–44Google Scholar.

80 The majority of European immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s also did not have much sympathy for socialist ideas, cherished so much by the pioneers of the second and third aliyot (immigration waves). Those ideas, however, were much more familiar to them than to the Middle Easterners.

81 Eisenstadt, , Israeli Society, 198Google Scholar.

82 Blass, S., The Ma'abara (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1964)Google Scholar and Yaoz-Kest, I., The Neo-Jewish Attitude (Tel Aviv, 1974) (both in Hebrew)Google Scholar.

83 Smooha, , Israel: Pluralism and Conflict, 194Google Scholar.

84 Ibid., 195. For further reading, see Ben-Rafael, and Sharot, , Ethnicity, Religion and Class in Israeli Society, esp. 39Google Scholar.

85 According to recent research, intra-Jewish ethnic marriages are on the increase. The proportion of grooms of European origin marrying a bride from the Afro-Asian group increased from 18 percent at the beginning of the 1960s to about 32 percent in 1979–83. Eisenbach, Zvi, “Marriage and Fertility in the Process of Integration: Intermarriage among Origin Groups in Israel,” in Population and Social Change in Israel ed. Godscheider, Calvin (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), 131–47Google Scholar.

86 Patai, Raphael, Israel between East and West (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1970, 2nd ed.), 385Google Scholar. Emanuel Gutmann, who provided many comments on a draft of this essay, writes that “it is time to be unpopular and say that basically the ideology and policy of ‘uplifting’ and modernizing was the correct one; what was wrong (and often very wrong) were the methods used and sometimes the language used in propagating these conceptions.” Gutmann maintains that “there was a very heavy price to be paid for mass immigration; within two generations everybody will be happy that the state was not neutral between west and east.”

87 The same attitude guided the decision makers toward Yiddish. A Supreme Educational Council was established with the aim of instructing the Hebrew language and the Israeli culture. Attempts were made to wean the public from the Yiddish theater. See ASI, 24 April 1952, GL1086/9003.

88 Yaar and Semyonov found that discrimination against Middle Easterners occurs also in sports. On the whole, soccer players of Middle Eastern origin are prominent in the second level of professional football, whereas Ashkenazi players occupy the top positions. See Yaar, Ephraim and Semyonov, Moshe, “Ethnic Gap at Schools and in Sport,” Megamot 27, 4 (1982)Google Scholar (Hebrew).

89 Liebman, Charles S. and Don-Yehiya, Eliezer, “Israel's Civil Religion,” The Jerusalem Quarterly 23 (Spring 1982): 57–69, esp. 68Google Scholar. See also Liebman, Charles S., “Religion and Political Integration in Israel,” Jewish Journal of Sociology 17 (1975): 17–27Google Scholar; and Deshen, Shlomo and Shokeid, Moshe, Predicament of Homecoming: Cultural and Social Life of North African Immigrants of Israel (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974)Google Scholar.

90 Cohen, Erik, “Ethnicity and Legitimation in Contemporary Israel,” Politics and Society in Israel, ed. Krausz, Ernest (1985), 330Google Scholar.

91 For further discussion, see Yael Yishai, “Israel's Right-Wing Jewish Proletariat,” in ibid., 233–44, esp. 234.

92 Yedioth Ahronoth, 12 02 1988, 6 (Pol. Suppl.)Google Scholar. I spoke of this matter with a clerk in the absorption department who explained that this policy is carried out “for their own sake, so that children will not suffer at schools because of their peculiar names.” This patronizing attitude of converting names into customary, standard names instead of enriching our culture and extending our vocabulary is very much part and parcel of existing policies.