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Succession and Social Change in Tunisia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2009

Douglas E. Ashford
Douglas E. Ashford
Affiliation:
Cornell University Ithaca,, New York
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Extract

The new states of Africa encounter particularly difficult problems of reconciling pressures for rapid socio-economic change with the orderly transfer of power to new leadership. A number of recent commentaries on the discontinuities and crisis of developing countries have challenged the notion, in large part derived from Western political experience, that some sort of incremental reconciliation between the social effects of development and the political restructuring of society will steadily occur. The models used in comparative politics admit conflict, but they do not go very far in telling us how these forces interact in the policy machinery of a developing country. Moreover, while the primacy of politics continues, it is doubtful if new social and economic forces in the society are welcomed, and sometimes even recognized, by the existing élite.

Type
Articles
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , January 1973 , pp. 23 - 39
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1973

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References

page 23 note 1 The clearest advocate of this viewpoint is Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968). His theory of the interdependence of institutional change and participation is considerably more complex than this simple statement, but like much of the current comparative theory, the distribution and allocation of new status in new organizations tends to assume that governments are able and willing to change their goals.Google Scholar More attention to the political implications of disparities and discontinuities in development is found in Nettl, J. P., Political Mobilization (New York, Basic Books, 1967)Google Scholar and Johnson, Chalmers, Revolutionary Change (Boston, Little Brown, 1966).Google Scholar

page 24 note 1 The most dramatic illustration is China, where many of the issues raised in this article have been central political concerns for years. See Schurmann, Franz, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1968)Google Scholar and Lewis, John W., Leadership in Communist China (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1963).Google Scholar

page 24 note 2 Tunisia Since Independence: The Dynamics of One-Party Government (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1965), p. 43.Google Scholar Also Ashford, Douglas E., ‘Neo-Destour Leadership and the “Confiscated Revolution”’, World Politics, vol. 17 (01 1965), pp. 215–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 25 note 1 One of the interesting implications of looking at the policy process rather than formal institutions is that the conventional categories become less persuasive. This condition is much like the hesitance and ambiguity of the élite in Morocco. See Waterbury, John, The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite (New York, Columbia University Press, 1970). In handling controversial politics, the traditional monarchy and the charismatic leader may act much alike.Google Scholar

page 25 note 2 The best study in depth, including rich materials on the selection and recruitment of leaders, is Rudebeck, Lars, Party and People: A Study of Political Change in Tunisia (Stockholm, Almquist and Wiksell, 1967), especially pp. 75–85.Google Scholar See also Moore, op. cit. pp. 132–45Google Scholar, and Germain, Raimund E., ‘L'Administration dans le Système Politique Tunisien’, Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, vol. 7 (1968), pp. 139–56.Google Scholar

page 26 note 1 An account of this early period of development can be found in Ashford, Douglas E., National Development and Local Reform: Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 135–300.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also the special issue of the Revue Tunisienne de Sciences Sociales, titled ‘Structures Sociales et Développement’, vol. 3, no. 6 (06 1966)Google Scholar, and Colmant, Jean-Louis, Le Mouvement Coopératif Agricole en Tunisie: Bilan et Perspective d'une Réforme Agraire (Brussels, Free University of Brussels, Institute of Sociology, n.d. [1969?]).Google Scholar

page 27 note 1 See Lelong, Michel, ‘L'Enseignment Tunisien en 1961: Bilan et Perspectives’, I.B.L.A., vol. 19 (1962), pp. 257–70;Google ScholarMicaud, Charles (ed.), Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization (London, Pall Mall Press, 1964), pp. 149–59;Google Scholar and Brown, Leon Carl, ‘Tunisia’, in Coleman, (ed.), Education and Political Development (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 144–68.Google Scholar

page 27 note 2 Perspective Décennales de Développement, 1962–1971, Republic of Tunisia, Secretary of Planning and Finances (n.d.), pp. 69–110. Also Plan de Développement Economique et Social 1969–72, Republic of Tunisia, Secretary of State for Planning and Finance, pp. 14–17.Google Scholar

page 28 note 1 See Rudebec, op. cit. pp. 103–84, and Ashford, National Development…, pp. 60–93.Google Scholar See also Zghal, Abdelkadar, ‘L'Elite administrative et la paysannerie’, Revue Tunisiennes de Sciences Sociales, vol. 4, no. 16 (03 1969), pp. 41–52;Google Scholar and Salem, Lilia Ben, ‘Les Cadres de l'Economie Locale en Tunisie’Google Scholar, ibid. pp. 21–40.

page 28 note 2 The major exception might be Algeria where the farmers seized the land at independence. See Telliac, Jean, Autogestion en Algérie (Paris, 1965);Google ScholarPerroux, Francois (ed.), Problèmes de l'Algérie Indepéndante (Paris, 1963);Google Scholar and Parodi, M., ‘L'Autogestion des Exploitations Agricoles Modernes en Algérie’, Annuaire d'Afrique du Nord (1963), pp. 61–84.Google Scholar One of the curiosities of the Tunisian experience is that they could embark on so ambitious a scheme without learning from the Algerian precedent.

page 29 note 1 L'Action, 8 July 1967. The early phase of the cooperative program is analyzed in Ashford, , ‘Organization of Cooperatives and the Structure of Power in Tunisia’, Journal of Developing Areas, vol. 1 (1967), pp. 317–32.Google Scholar

page 29 note 2 L'Action, 7 04 1967.Google Scholar It is noteworthy that the Medjerda Valley Project, which pre-dates independence and has a heavy technical component in its irrigation program, was excluded. When the U.N.C. was dismantled in 1969 the Director of the project became the new U.N.C. Director.

page 30 note 1 L'Action, 28 September 1967 and 13 January 1968. Mestiri's resignation at the latter date may have been influenced by the decision to proceed with cooperatives in Nabeul, the home of many old party militants.Google Scholar

page 30 note 2 Samarine, Andre and Othman, Mongi, Appréciation de la fonction commerciale et constitution de cadre d'enquète statistique dans le secteur coopératif Tunisien (Tunis, National Institute of Productivity, mimeo., n.d. [1967?]).Google Scholar

page 30 note 3 L'Action, 2 February 1967 and 5 April 1967. However, it is interesting that he makes very few references to Ben Salah and underscores very heavily the preservation of the private sector.Google Scholar

page 31 note 1 Informations Mensuelles, Service de Statistiques Agricoles, Secretary of State for Agriculture, no. 13, January 1968.Google Scholar

page 32 note 1 On the reorganization of commerce see L'Action, 13 January 1968 and 3 March 1968.Google Scholar Also ‘Lois no. 69–1 du 20 janvrier 1969, portant reglementation du commerce de distribution’, Journel Officiel de la République Tunisienne, 17–24 01 1969, p. 76. In addition to Mestiri, Messadi, the Minister for Education before Ben Salah absorbed his ministry, also left the government quietly. Messadi was appointed Minister of State and given special responsibilities for reviewing the state of education when Ben Salah was dropped from the cabinet. Mestiri rejoined the government as Minister of the Interior in June 1970.Google Scholar

page 32 note 2 A close friend of Ben Salah in party headquarters was removed in December 1968. See Maghreb, no. 35, September-october 1969, p. 7.Google Scholar

page 33 note 1 Announced in L'Action, 7 October 1968, and completed according to L'Action, 25 March 1969. The origin of this change is not clear, but given Ben Salah's influence at the time it seems a reasonable assumption that the choice of the 1,200 omdahs or regional supervisors would be under his control. See also Le Monde, 22 March 1969, and Maghreb, no. 33, May-June 1969, p. 6. The projected national council of 500 elected co-op representatives is similar to the party's Central Committee. The magnificent new quarters of the U.N.C. were hastily vacated in November 1969 and steps were taken to convert the organization into an arm of the party.Google Scholar

page 33 note 2 L'Action, 15 July 1969. By this time the maneuver to dismiss Ben Salah must have been well under way. This announcement, the launching of the 1968–72 plan, and a widely publicized initial meeting of the U.N.C. National Council all testify to his aggressive effort to overpower opposition.Google Scholar

page 33 note 3 Maghreb, no. 35, September-October 1969, pp. 7–8.Google Scholar

page 34 note 1 Le Monde, 2 September 1969.Google Scholar

page 34 note 2 Le Monde, 20 September 1969. Unfortunately, the government will not release the earlier draft of the agrarian reform law, which was announced as assigning land its ‘social function’. The law was completely redrafted in September and published.Google Scholar See ‘Loi no. 69–56, 22 September 1969, relative a la réforme des structures agricoles’, Journal Officiel de la République Tunisienne, 23 09 1969, pp. 1141–4. The law made explicit the regulations governing production co-ops, placed them more clearly under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture, and guaranteed every member 2 hectares of private land.Google Scholar

page 35 note 1 Le Monde, 12 November 1969. Ladgham's speech also from Le Monde, 16–17 November 1969.Google Scholar

page 35 note 2 L'Action, 30 December 1969.Google Scholar

page 35 note 3 The summation of what might be called the conventional Tunisian position comes from L'Action, 26, 28, 30 November 1969 and 2, 3, and 6 December 1969. The specific sources will be omitted from the following paragraphs. Following this initial round of attacks the tempo diminished significantly.Google Scholar

page 36 note 1 L'Action, 29 March 1970; and for the new administrative reforms, Ibid., 11 April 1970. One of the paradoxical references in the initial indictment of Ben Salah by the National Assembly was to a speech of the President from January of 1970, when the campaign for rapid conversion to production cooperatives was still supported, by him.

page 38 note 1 This problem is raised in the conclusion of Moore's, Clement analysis of the party's absorption of the U.G.T.T., ‘La Tunisie après Bourguiba?’, Revue française de science politique, vol. 17 (1967), pp. 646–67. The more limited size and scope of the unions made it relatively easy to curb their political tendencies, as has also been the case in other developing countries.Google Scholar

page 39 note 1 Many of the complications of implementing cooperatives have been revealed in research. See, for example, Alouane, Youssef, ‘Attitudes et Compottements des Cooperateurs dans Deux Unités du Production du Nord’, Etudes de Sociologie (Tunisia), vol. 1, no. I (1968), pp. 83–163.Google Scholar