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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 January 2009
From the dawn of Islam to the present, the political history of 'Umān followed a different path from that of the rest of the Arabian peninsula. Until recently, the country was practically unknown, an almost forgotten outpost of a once prosperous maritime Arab civilization.
1 The first Imām, Jalandā ibn Mas'ūd ibn Jayfar al-Uzdi, was elected circa A.D. 750. Scattered Ibādī communities still exist in various parts of the Arab world such as Algeria and Yemen, but they are all in theory subject to the 'Umānī Imāmate (al-Sa'īd, Amīn, al-Khalīj al-'Arabī fī Tarikhih al-Siyāsī wa Nahdatih al-Hadīthah [Beirut: Dar al-Kāteb al-'Arabī,?], p. 20).Google Scholar
2 Oman (Muscat: Department of Information, 1972), p. 30.Google Scholar
3 Ever since the death of the prophet Muhammad in A.D. 632, the problem of orderly succession to the leadership of the Muslim community (Umma) has confronted every Muslim state. Al-Khawārij (sect of seceders), from whence Ibādism evolved, contested the rights of the Prophet's tribe, Quraysh, to the leadership of Islam (Khilāfah), and reaffirmed instead the original, more ‘democratic,’ tribal practice of electing – actually selecting – a successor (Khalīfah) by Muslim notables subject to the endorsement of the people (bay'ah) (Hāfez, Hamdī and al-Shirqāwī, Mahmūd, Qadiyyat 'Umān [Cairo: al-Dar al-Qawmiyyah, ?], p. 11).Google Scholar
4 Landen, Robert Geran, Oman since 1956: Diruptive Modernization ina Traditional Arab Society (Princeton, N.J.,: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 34–35.Google Scholar
5 Oman, p. 32.Google Scholar See for example the sketchy reference to this period in the otherwise well-researched work of Peterson, J. E., Oman in the Twentieth Century: Political Foundations of an Emerging State (New York: Barnes and Nobel, 1978), p. 20.Google Scholar
6 Shākir, Amīn, Mustaqbal al-Khalij al-'Arabī (?, 1971), p. 32.Google Scholar
7 Landen, Oman since 1856, pp. 52–58.Google Scholar
8 Shākir, Mustaqbal al-Khalīj, pp. 33–34. See also al-Nahār (Beirut), September 17, 1974.Google Scholar
9 Hamad assumed the title of ‘Sayyid.’ The title ‘Sultan’ did not come into official use until the nineteenth century. See al-Bahārnah, Husayn Muhammad, Duwal al Khalīj al-'Arabī al-Hadīthah (Beirut: Kutlat Mu'ssasāt al-Hayāt, 1973), p. 27.Google Scholar
10 For the most comprehensive analysis of the origins of the Sultanate and its relationship to the Imāmate, see ‘Umān fi al-Mahāfel al-Dawliyyah (Beirut: Dār al-Yaqthah, 1966), pp. 97–100.Google Scholar See also Peterson, Oman, pp. 26–27 and 101–103.Google Scholar
11 Gwadar reverted to Pakistan in 1958.Google Scholar
12 The ‘coast of ‘Umān which today forms much of the Union of Arab Amirates (UAA) was an integral part of the ‘Umānī Imāmate during the Ya'rubi era. When civil war wracked 'Umān in the eighteenth century, the northern coastal region drifted away and fell under the control of local tribes, principally al-Qawāsim. Under the energetic leadership of R¯shid ibn Matar, the Qawāsim tribe officially asserted its independence circa 1741, and carried on as a separate dynasty from its stronghold in Rās al-Khaymah (Shākir, Mustaqbal al-Khalij, p. 43).Google Scholar The independence of the Qawāsim was eventually recognized by the Masqatī Sultan Ahmad ibn Sa'id (Nawfal, Sayyid, al-Khalij al-'Arabī aw al-Hudūd al-Sharqiyyah li al-Watan al-'Arabī [Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 1969], p. 253).Google Scholar See also Hawley, Donald, The Trucial States (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1971), pp. 90–117.Google Scholar
13 The factors that figured prominently in the imperial and commercial success of the Bū Sa'ids are explained in Landen, Oman since 1856, pp. 61–62.Google Scholar
14 On the evolution and consolidation of British power in 'Umān, see ibid., pp. 163–268, and Kelly, J. B., Britain and the Persian Gulf 1795–1880 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 260–289 and 500–575.Google Scholar
15 Nawfal, al-Khalīj al-'Arabī, pp. 44–45 For the texts of all the agreements signed by the Sultans of Masqat with the British Government between 1798 and 1958, see 'Umān fī al-Mahāfel, pp. 365–367.Google Scholar
16 A complete listing and description of British military bases in ‘Umān and the rest of the Gulf appear in Ridā, 'Ādel, ‘Umān wa al-Khalīj Qadāyā wa Munāqashāt (Cairo: Dār al-Kātib al-'Arabī, 1969), pp. 32–35.Google Scholar
17 Concerning the strategic significance of Masirah, see The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), Feb. 13, 1975, and n. 48, below.Google Scholar
18 'Umān fī al-Mahāfel, p. 168. Anglo-'Umāni relations and the extent of London's influence over Masqat are canvassed in Peterson, Oman, pp. 139–151.Google Scholar
19 The following are good examples: Rida, 'Umān wa al-Khalīj; Shākir, Mustaqbal al-Khalīj; Nawfal, al-Khalij al-'Arabī; Sa'īd, al-Khalīj al-'Arabī; Hāfez and Shirqāwī, Qadiyyat 'Umān.Google Scholar
20 It is almost comical that the British always maintained that their dealings with 'Umān were based on a footing of equality and mutual respect. For a good analysis of the causes and nature of 'Umān's economic decline, see Landen, Oman since 1856, pp. 109–159.Google Scholar
21 The traditional Western explanation tends to minimize the British role and depicts the separation of Zanzibar from Masqat in 1861 as a natural development of 'Umāni domestic political squabbles (see ibid., pp. 199–202 and 272–277. The last Arab Sultan of the Bū Sa'īd dynasty in Zanzibar, Jamshīd ibn 'Abd al-Jabbār, was overthrown in the coup d'état of 1964 executed by Obeid Krumeh. Zanzibar subsequently joined Tanganika to form modern Tanzania.
22 'Umān fī al.Mahāfel, p. 54.Google Scholar
23 Landen, Oman since 1856, p. 205. Landen, however, makes no connection between the opposition to the Sultan in Masqat and the latter's subservience to Britain. The same point also escapes J. E. Peterson in his brief consideration of the ill-fated offensive launched by the tribes of the interior against Sultan Turkī ibn Sa'id in 1883 (Peterson, Oman, p. 29).Google Scholar
24 Oman, p. 41.Google Scholar
25 The full text of al-Sīb treaty appears in 'Umān fī al-Mahāfel, pp. 130–131. It is noteworthy that in the pourparlers leading to the Treaty, the tribal leaders demanded the withdrawal of all British troops from 'Umān and an end to British control of the sea. The British were so alarmed by the insurrection that they moved to overhaul the Sultan- ate's administration. Peterson, Oman, pp. 30–31.Google Scholar
26 The economic difficulties of the Sultanate, aggravated by the Great Depression, played a role in the downfall of Taymūr (Mallakh, Ragaei El, ‘Economic Requirements for Development, Oman,’ The Middle East Journal, 26, 4 (Autumn 1972), 417–418.Google Scholar
27 al-Nahār (Beirut), July 28, 1970, A description of Sa‘id’s personality and reign appears in Peterson, Oman, pp. 52–59.Google Scholar
28 Ibid.
29 Mustafā, 'Awnī, Saltanat al-Zalām fī Masqat wa 'Umān (Beirut: Dār al-Ādāb, 1964), p. 16. Sa‘īd’s partiality for al-Luwāthyā and Indians emanated from his firmly anchored belief that they were largely free from infectious leftist ideologies, therefore politically trustworthy. Concentrated in the capital and principal port of Masqat, and blessed with royal favors, the Luwāthyā-Indians enjoyed a veritable commercial monopoly (al-Nahār (Beirut), Aug., 22, 1970).Google Scholar
30 Musafā, Saltanat al-Zalām, p. 22.Google Scholar
31 When permitted internal trade was subject to custom levies as high as 300 percent. (al-Nahār (Beirut), Aug. 22, 1970).Google Scholar
32 al-Rayyis, Riyād Najīb, Sirā' al-Wāhaāt wa al-Naft Humūm al-Khalīj al-'Arabi Bayn 1968–1971 (Beirut: al-Nāhār al-Khidimāt al-Sahafiyyah, 1973), p. 238.Google Scholar
33 al-Nahār (Beirut), July 28, 1970.Google Scholar
34 Mustafā, Saltanat al-Zalām, p. 33.Google Scholar
35 al-Rayyis, Sirā' al-Wāhāt, p. 233. Included on the prohibition list were soccer and smoking.Google Scholar
36 Mustafā, Saltanat al-Zhalām, p. 45.Google Scholar
37 al-Rayyis, Sirā' al-Wāhāt, p. 243. Sa'id, however, was married only once, to a Zufārī woman who bore him the present Sultan, Qābūs.Google Scholar
38 For details, see Peterson, Oman, pp. 183–184.Google Scholar
39 'Umān fi al-Mahāfel al-Dawliyyah. Originally published in French and translated into Arabic, the report canvasses the roots and nature of the conflict in 'Umān, the historical relationship between the Sultanate and Imāmate, and the views of rival parties from Britain and the Sultan to the followers of the Imām.Google Scholar
40 In the mid-sixties, the traditionalist-radical struggle in the Arab world shifted from Syria and 'Irāq to the Arabian Peninsula (The Gulf: Implications of British Withdrawal, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Special Report, Series No. 8, [Washington, D.C., Feb. 1969], p. 38).Google Scholar
41 Concerning the degree of popular support which the PFLU enjoyed in the mountains of Zufār, there is the eyewitness account of the journalist al-Jin¯hi, Sa'īd Ahmad, Kunt fi Zufār, Mushahadāt fī Ard al-Thawrah (Beirut: Dar ibn Khaldūn, 1974). The Tribal shift from traditionalism to radicalism in 'Umāln is also noted by Peterson, Oman, p. 165.Google Scholar
42 A glossary of the various pronouncements and official declarations made by the PFLU appears in al-Jhabhat al-Sha'biyyah li Tahrir 'Umān wa al-Khalīj al-'Arabī, Wathā'q al-Nidāl al-Watani, 1965–1974 (Beirut, Dar al-Talī'ah, 1974).Google Scholar
43 Ibid., pp. 6–7; al-Rayyis, Srā' al-Wāhāt, p. 252; and Peterson, Oman, pp. 188–189.Google Scholar
44 The British Ministry pro forma denied the involvement of British personnel in the overthrow of Sa'īd, but expressed satisfaction at the change of leadership in 'Umān (al-Nahār (Beirut), July 29, 1970).Google Scholar The ouster of Sa'id apparently was approved by the Conservative Government of Edward Heath in order to head off a total collapse of the Monarchy, something that the initial success of the PFLU in Zufär made a distinct possibility (ibid., Aug. 24, 1970). See also Owen, R. P., ‘Developments in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman,’ The World Today, 26, 9 (09 1970), 379–383.Google Scholar
45 See Qābūs's, interviews with al-Ahrām (Cairo), 12 I, 1972Google Scholar, and with Rayyis, Riyād al in al-Nahār (Beirut), 03 22, 1973.Google Scholar
46 Ibid., March 21, 1973; The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), May 4, 1976;Google ScholarThe Middle East Monitor, 1, 5 (04, 1972), 1.Google Scholar
47 al-Nahār (Beirut), March 21, 1973;Google ScholarThe Christian Science Monitor (Boston), Jan., and 29, Feb. 2, Sept. 10, Dec., 17, 1975;Google ScholarThe Middle East Monitor, 3, 9 (May, 1973), 1–2, and 9 (May, 1974), 1–3.Google Scholar
48 Concerning some of the reforms initiated by Sultan Qābūs, see al-Bahārnah, Duwal al-Khalīj, pp. 80–81 and 145–147; El Mallakh, “Economic Requirements for Development, Oman,’ pp. 442–427; al-Ahrām (Cairo), Dec., 1, 1972;Google Scholarand The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), Aug. 24, 1976. Following the apparent military collapse of the PFLU, Sultan Qābūs has arranged for the British evacuation of Mairah island. This conciliatory gesture was probably intended to deflect Arab nationalist resentment against the continued presence of Iranian forces in 'Umān – yet another indication that Qābūs has been skillfully attempting to balance military imperatives against natiopal susceptibilities (The Middle East Monitor, 7, 8 [April, 1977, 3).Google Scholar