Ferrari's book is a welcome addition to the still limited literature on the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) experience which, unlike any other specific response to a disease, played an important role in reshaping modern governance and consolidating key assumptions about the world around us. The ‘mad cow’ crisis began in 1986 when the unfathomable bovine brain disease was identified, but was then reignited with the shocking discovery a decade later that it could pass, and had passed, to humans despite the controls put in place. Scientific confirmation in 1996 that there was a human form of BSE led to political panic and further undermined the then exhausted Conservative Party rule. The retrospective lessons of the experience went far beyond agriculture. The problem was perceived to be one of openness and independence: perhaps government was too dependent upon lobbies and financial interests such as agriculture and, whilst utilising scientific advice, did not allow their independent voice to have influence. Less widely recognised, but even more importantly, the political lesson of the BSE experience was to henceforth tend to avoid being seen to downplay risk, based on the retrospective view that the danger could, and should, have been announced before it was scientifically confirmed. Better to overestimate even apparently limited risks than be caught again committing the now cardinal sin of downplaying them, or simply remaining silent. This is not so much a new-found principle of risk aversion as a variation on an age-old political truism of, above all, making sure that the next crisis is ‘not on my watch’.

This article discusses the European Union health-care policy from a human rights law point of view. It departs from the analysis of international and European human rights documents in order to identify core elements and principles associated with the right to access health-care services. These elements and principles are then used to distinguish between individualist and communitarian views of health-care rights and to argue that a human rights approach to the right to access health-care services promotes a communitarian view of this right whereas European Union health-care policy has been promoting an individualist view of this right.

The ‘Great Writ’ of habeas corpus has long had an iconic status as the ‘writ of liberty’ which ensured that no person could be detained in prison without being put to trial by a jury of his peers. According to the traditional version, popularised by Whiggish constitutional writers from the late seventeenth century onwards, the English constitution as embodied in the common law had, since time immemorial, striven to protect the fundamental rights of Englishmen and women, which included the right to personal liberty. The common law had supplied the writ of habeas corpus, which secured the provision of Magna Carta, that no freeman be imprisoned save by the judgment of a jury of his peers. In the course of the seventeenth century, the Whig version ran, kings with an absolutist bent sought to undermine ancient liberties, by claiming prerogative powers to imprison without trial, and by appointing supine judges who would not protect people's liberties. It took the triumph of Parliament to restore and perfect them. For William Blackstone, one of the key statutes which secured ‘the complete restitution of English liberty’ was the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, ‘that second magna carta’. As Blackstone put it:

International human rights law attaches the right of health care to the person. States, however, predicate this right on membership in the national community and access to publicly subsidised health care is normally contingent on national membership. With this in mind, this article considers the significance of a human rights approach to access to health care and undertakes a comparative study of health-care provision for irregular migrants in France and the UK. Irregular migrants are ineligible for national membership because they have breached immigration laws. Consequently their right to health care may only arise from international human rights law. This comparative study, however, shows that states resist the idea of a right to health care for people they regard as a threat to national sovereignty. Yet the author posits that the exercise of the government's immigration power may be reconciled with the realisation of irregular migrants' human right to health care.

In recent years, assisted reproductive technologies have played an important role in shaping the lives of many individuals throughout the world. Their promise to make people become parents is believed to fulfil the most elementary interests a person may have. It is argued and legally acknowledged that such interests constitute with much significance a person's self-identity and sense of belonging to the living society, also constituting her reproductive liberty or the right to procreate. Despite their significance and importance, access to these technologies and to fertility care specifically may not always accord with the principle of equality and justice. It will be argued that, in some cases, such unequal access reflects various forms of discrimination between different groups in society. It is the purpose of this article to show that such a phenomenon is the result of an underdeveloped and unregulated area of law, characterising many Western countries. Specifically, it demonstrates conceptual deficiencies in so-called ‘procreative liberty’ with regard to the content and scope of the right to procreate, the values underlying such a right, and the legal and social institutions supporting and securing it. The article highlights these deficiencies, making them more evident when the notion of ‘reproductive liberty’ applies to positive and modern attempts to become parents, especially but not exclusively those brought by men.