On 14 September 2010 the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) delivered its judgment in Akzo Nobel.1 The judgment and its preceding opinion focused on the application of legal professional privilege to communications between a client and in-house legal counsel. The less-emphasized aspect of the case was the Court's decision to exclude all lawyers qualified outside of the European Union (EU) from the application of legal professional privilege.2 Because the application of legal professional privilege to lawyers from third States was not the focus of Akzo Nobel, the issue was lost in the extensive debate surrounding privilege and in-house legal counsel. The Court unfortunately missed an opportunity to reshape EU privilege law in acknowledgement of its negative consequences on the EU human rights framework and also on the EU's relationships with countries which do not apply a similar bright line rule. These implications will be discussed below with a particular emphasis on the EU's obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and its relationship with the United States (US).

By the end of 2011, China will have been a member of the World Trade Organization (the WTO) for a decade. While China has undergone dramatic changes to implement commitments contained in its Protocol of Accession,1 debate continues as to whether China has adequately complied with its obligations under the WTO Agreements in both letter and spirit. Some of this debate remains in the political arena, where China is censured over such issues as currency controls and or equality of access for foreign firms like Google; however, it is in the legal arena, and specifically within the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body, that some of the most controversial issues are raised, both against and by China.

The technique of ‘evolutive interpretation’ is well known in public international law.2 It is particularly associated with treaty regimes like that of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).3 The currency of this technique of interpretation has, however, been less evident in general public international law. It is not insignificant therefore that the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in a case about navigational and related rights has now made unambiguously clear that, where the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where the treaty is one of continuing duration, the parties as a general rule must be presumed to have intended those terms to have an ‘evolving meaning’.4

‘Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?’ It is to answer this question that the General Assembly of the United Nations (‘UNGA’) requested an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’). The request, adopted in October 20081 and initially sponsored by Serbia, was triggered by the declaration of independence of Kosovo issued on the 17 February 2008.2 Some two years later, on the 22 July 2010, the ICJ delivered its Advisory Opinion.3 By a 10–4 vote, the ICJ found that the declaration of independence of Kosovo did not violate international law.

In the Cases C-585/08 Peter Pammer v Reedere Karl Schluter GmbH & Co and C-144/09 Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v Oliver Heller, the CJEU considered the applicability of article 15(1) (c) of Regulation EC 44/2001 (Brussels I) vis-à-vis the use of web sites in commercial communications with consumers domiciled in other Member States. Article 15 of Brussels I contains special rules which determine the jurisdiction of disputes concerning ‘protected’1 consumer contracts falling within its scope. Articles 15(1)(a) and (b) apply where either the contract is subject to an instalment credit arrangement or where the contract is for a loan to finance the sale of goods respectively. These two recent cases were concerned with article 15(1)(c), itself previously regarded by the Commission as the ‘philosophy of Article 15.’2 The connecting factors in article 15(1)(c) apply in two situations.3 The first is where the seller concludes contracts as a result of commercial activities entered into in the Member State of the consumer's domicile. The alternative applies when a business ‘directs’ its professional or commercial activities to the Member State of the consumer's domicile and a contract is concluded as a consequence of those activities. Article 15(2) also (currently) provides that a non-EU defendant corporation which has a branch or agency in a Member State that contracts with a consumer may be regarded as domiciled in that Member State. The cases are important as for the first time references were made to the CJEU to specifically consider and interpret the extent to which a business' web site should be construed as ‘directing [commercial] activities’ towards consumers domiciled in other Member States. Essentially, what kind of activity should be construed as directing activity when a seller or his agent uses a web site with the intention to facilitate contractual activities with consumers located in a Member State?