In the past decade, the practice of investor–State arbitral tribunals addressing investment protection in the context of armed conflict and military occupation has expanded. This has prompted a growing interest in the relationship between international investment law and international humanitarian law (IHL), two regimes with markedly different relationships to war—IHL more pragmatic and international investment law more idealistic. This article argues that, while its lack of pragmatism might render international investment law ineffective in changing how war is conducted, it is the regime under which States are most likely to be held liable for the conduct of war. This is a result of its more robust primary obligations, more effective enforcement mechanisms and large awards of damages. Nevertheless, comparing international investment law and IHL does also reveal some similarities—the legacy, it is argued, of a time when the laws of war were more about protecting private property and neutral commerce than civilians. Putting these two regimes together in this way exposes international law's uneven distribution of protection in war.

This article examines reactions to the South China Sea and Chagos Marine Protection Area arbitrations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in particular concerns about the potential widening of Part XV jurisdiction and its impact on the dispute resolution system's consent basis. It argues that assessing the impact of such cases involves a characterization of both the function of Part XV and of international judges. Ultimately, it suggests that the best test of whether UNCLOS case law has gone too far is the reaction of States in designing dispute settlement under the new Agreement under UNCLOS on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction.

On 7 December 2022, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a treaty known as the Beijing Convention governing the recognition abroad of the international effects of judicial sales of ships. This article explores the rationale for a specific Convention on this issue, and its interaction with other relevant international conventions. It then analyses the recognition approach adopted by the Convention and evaluates its potential strengths and weaknesses. While some provisions might need further consideration, the overall conclusion is that the Beijing Convention has the potential to strengthen the legal certainty of the purchaser's title obtained via this sale mechanism and thus help debt recovery. Although common law jurisdictions might find it at odds with some of their features, the expected benefits from ratifying it seem to outweigh these issues and are already prompting a steady number of signatures, including those of China, the European Union and Singapore.

The United States and United Kingdom have carried out a series of strikes upon Yemeni territory since January 2024. The acting States have justified these on the basis of the right of self-defence in response to the series of attacks that have been perpetrated by the Houthi group in Yemen against various commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea. On the face of it this was a relatively straightforward justification. Yet, when subjected to analysis it becomes evident that not only is the justification itself not clear, but that the law governing the actions—the jus ad bellum—is not sufficiently settled to provide clear parameters by which to assess the legality of the strikes. Furthermore, the strikes themselves, and the purposes for which they were undertaken, may have set a precedent with unforeseeable consequences.

This article suggests a new interpretative framework for Article 27(2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits sexual violence against women in armed conflict. One specific aspect of this norm is particularly controversial: the notion of ‘honour’ has often been criticised as an obsolete concept linked to an outdated view of female morality. In the absence of a definition of the term, this article examines whether the gendered limitations of the norm can be overcome and the extent to which an evolutive interpretation of the concept is feasible. It argues that the concept of ‘honour’ can be treated as a generic term that is subject to evolutive interpretation, allowing for a renewed and gender-sensitive understanding to be developed, aligned with the concept of human dignity.

In 2023, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) launched an updated version of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct. The changes represent substantial and potentially far-reaching implications for business, particularly in the areas of climate change and biodiversity. This article examines the 14 climate-related complaints filed under the Guidelines prior to the adoption of the 2023 Update, showing how many of these cases illustrate the potential interlinkages between the human rights and climate change dimensions of the Guidelines. The article then discusses how the updated provisions may influence future complaints concerning climate change. Based on this analysis, the article concludes that the Guidelines could have been strengthened by the explicit integration of climate change into the scope of corporate human rights responsibilities under the Guidelines.

This article analyses the challenges that online marketplaces and e-commerce pose to traditional product liability doctrines. It uses a comparative perspective to examine whether an online platform can be liable to a consumer for a defective product purchased on its platform, and the adaption of product liability law to this challenge in a series of jurisdictions. It reflects on the role of litigation and regulation, focusing on Europe and the United States, and considers reform in a number of jurisdictions in this area. It concludes with proposals for increasing the accountability of online marketplaces for products sold on their websites.

The Parties to the Paris Agreement have committed to communicate successive ‘nationally determined contributions’ (NDCs) to the global response to climate change. Each NDC is expected to reflect the Party's ‘highest possible ambition’ (HPA) on the mitigation of climate change. This article envisages the possibility of taking HPA seriously: that is, of approaching it as an effective legal standard. It shows that, in some circumstances, the HPA standard can help to assess whether a State has complied with due diligence obligations on climate change mitigation.

As the human right to a healthy environment is codified around the globe, some systems still lag behind. One noticeable straggler is the Council of Europe, which is currently undergoing its fourth attempt to recognize the right. This article examines the proposals tabled within this system in light of overarching debates about climate justice and environmental rights, before focusing specifically on the spatial and temporal limits of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the institutional features of its Court. First, the article describes what the author sees as the current liminal moment in the development of human rights law, a time of transition in which established legal concepts can be questioned or reaffirmed. Second, it sketches recent proposals for locating and conceptualizing the right to a healthy environment within the Council of Europe. Evaluating different options, it makes the case for including this right in the ECHR. Third, the article discusses the right's potential to reshape the spatial and temporal limitations on legal subjectivity and Convention protections. These proposals come at a crucial time when the system's ability to protect human rights from environment-related impacts is being tested by climate litigation. The article understands these developments as interrelated and discusses whether current proposals could deliver on demands for climate justice by extending protection to future generations and for extraterritorial environmental impacts.

The dichotomy between jurisdiction and admissibility developed in public international law has drawn much attention from arbitrators and judges in recent years. Inspired by Paulsson's ‘tribunal versus claim’ lodestar, attempts have been made to transpose the distinction from public international law to investment treaty arbitration, yielding a mixed reception from tribunals. Remarkably, a second leap of transposition has found firmer footing in commercial arbitration, culminating in the prevailing view of the common law courts in England, Singapore and Hong Kong that arbitral decisions on admissibility are non-reviewable. However, this double transposition from international law to commercial arbitration is misguided. First, admissibility is a concept peculiar to international law and not embodied in domestic arbitral statutes. Second, its importation into commercial arbitration risks undermining the fundamental notion of jurisdiction grounded upon the consent of parties. Third, the duality of ‘night and day’ postulated by Paulsson to distinguish between reviewable and non-reviewable arbitral rulings is best reserved to represent the basic dichotomy between jurisdiction and merits.

The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War provides a practical and effective framework for the protection of civilians in international armed conflicts that has retained its relevance for 75 years since its adoption. As with all treaties, its ‘object and purpose’ has a concrete impact on how its terms are interpreted, giving insights into the ordinary meaning of the text and allowing the aim of the Convention to be fully realized. This article asks and answers a series of questions to elucidate the role of the object and purpose in treaty interpretation and how to identify the object and purpose of a given treaty before focusing on the specificities of international humanitarian law treaties. On that basis, it determines that the overall ‘object and purpose’ of the Convention is to protect civilians during armed conflict, including in circumstances where they are subject to permissible measures of control and security. The article then demonstrates how that ‘object and purpose’ assists with the resolution of specific, well-known interpretive dilemmas including the determination of protected status under the Convention and the application of provisions premised on the existence of a Protecting Power.

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are international organizations subject to the law of international responsibility. Yet, the relationship between their accountability mechanisms and the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO) remains unclear. Understanding this relationship is essential in fully realizing the right to remedy in the development finance context. A comparative analysis of these legal frameworks clarifies that notwithstanding their different rationale, scope and functions, the two are not normatively conflicting and both serve to control public power. While the accountability mechanisms correct the ARIO's State-centric orientation by granting legal standing to project-affected people, they have their own deficiency concerning the actions they can prescribe to MDBs upon a finding of noncompliance. Highlighting that the MDBs’ mandate to ‘do no harm’ and pursue sustainable development is left unfulfilled by the accountability mechanisms’ deficient remedial function, this article identifies specific ARIO provisions to complement rather than undermine the MDBs’ accountability system. The ARIO's residual character, combined with the proposition that remedies arise not only from wrongful conduct but also from harm suffered by one party due to another's risky activities, justify this complementarity.

This article offers a reconstruction and assessment of the emerging rebellion of European constitutional courts against the exceptionless supremacy of European Union (EU) law. It presents the ontological theories of supremacy and how the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) overcame the first two major challenges of its history: the existential challenge of canonizing the general doctrine of supremacy and the Solange challenge of national fundamental rights. It provides an account of the emerging ultra vires challenge, including its root cause and evolvement, and provides an assessment and sets out proposals. The article demonstrates that the crux of the matter is not the primacy of EU law but the interpretive primacy of the CJEU. It argues that the rebellion was triggered by the perception that the CJEU case law features a declining normative and an increasing policy character. The debate about the CJEU's evolutionary interpretation, in a certain sense, parallels US constitutional law's debate between originalism and the living constitution, with the difference that the EU is a pluralist legal order.

Remote-access cyber espionage operations against activists, dissidents or human rights defenders abroad are increasingly a feature of digital transnational repression. This arises when State or State-related actors use digital technologies to silence or stifle dissent from human rights defenders, activists and dissidents abroad through the collection of confidential information that is then weaponized against the target or their networks. Examples include the targeting of Ghanem Al-Masarir (a Saudi dissident living in the United Kingdom), Carine Kanimba (a United States–Belgian dual citizen and daughter of Rwandan activist Paul Rusesabagina living in the United States) and Omar Abdulaziz (another Saudi dissident living in Canada) with NSO Group's mercenary spyware. This practice erodes human rights, democracy and the rule of law and has a negative impact on targeted communities, including social isolation, self-censorship, the fragmentation and impairment of transnational political and social advocacy networks, and psychological and social harm. Despite this, international law does little to restrain this practice. Building on momentum around the regulation of mercenary spyware and transnational repression, this article elaborates on how States could consider regulating dissident cyber espionage and streamlines a unified approach among ratifying States addressing issues such as State immunity, burden of proof, export control and international and public–private sector collaboration.

This article revisits the overlooked field of comparative environmental law. It examines contributions to this field from the late 1960s to 2022, highlighting the methodologies proposed, their shortcomings, the main aspects and angles taken by the literature, and the curious lack of engagement by experts in comparative law proper with environmental law systems. On the basis of a structured examination of the literature, the article extracts four main aims or purposes that may guide this line of research: (i) clarifying the initial system by contrasting it with a foreign system; (ii) using the basic conceptual features of a known system to analyse and understand a foreign unknown system; (iii) evaluating and fine-tuning a system or an aspect thereof; and (iv) extracting analytical categories that can serve to map the entire field or areas of it.

The health of the planet and its life forms are under threat from anthropogenic climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss, and the extreme weather events, heatwaves and wildfires that accompany them. The burgeoning field of planetary health studies the interplay between humanity and the Earth's biosphere and ecosystems on which human health depends. Scholarship on law from a planetary health vantage point remains scarce. This article fills this gap by delineating the conceptual building blocks of a planetary health law, which, in its latent form, is dispersed across various hard and soft sources of international environmental law and global health law that converge on the right to a healthy environment, and, to a lesser extent, rights of nature emerging in various domestic jurisdictions. It elucidates how the fragmented regimes of international environmental and global health law could be developed in more coherent ways, driven by an overarching concern for the integrity of the planetary foundations of life.

In its updated Commentaries on the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) embraces the ‘external’ interpretation of Article 1 common to the four Geneva Conventions, according to which States have certain negative (complicity-type) and positive (prevention/response) obligations to ‘ensure respect’ for the Conventions by other actors. This interpretation has been gaining support since the 1960s, though the ICRC's new Commentaries have served as a catalyst for some States recently to express contrary views. This article focuses on two major methodological shortcomings in the existing literature, offering a much firmer foundation for the external obligation under common Article 1. First, it demonstrates the overwhelming support in subsequent practice for external obligations. Previous studies have failed to explain the method by which this practice is taken into account, given the existence of some inconsistent practice. This article addresses this general question of treaty interpretation, critiquing the approach of the International Law Commission that relegates majority practice to supplementary means of interpretation and proposing instead a principled approach that better fits and justifies the judicial practice here. Secondly, the article challenges two common assumptions about the travaux: first, that an original, restrictive meaning was intended, and secondly that the travaux of Additional Protocol I offer no support for external obligations. Given the ubiquity of military assistance and partnering, these findings have far-reaching consequences for the liability of States.

In the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) on ‘the general principles of law’ in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, one question has given rise to an inordinate amount of controversy: does this category of principles include principles formed within the international legal system or does it embrace only principles derived from national legal systems? In the draft conclusions adopted on first reading in 2023, the ILC accepts the existence of general principles of law formed within the international legal system, but only in a very narrow manner. Prominent commentators have argued that such a narrow approach is correct. It has been contended, furthermore, that the category of general principles of law formed within the international legal system is an innovation of the ILC's, and one that lacks any real support in State practice. These views are based on assumptions to the effect that the traditional view concerning the meaning of Article 38(1)(c) was that it referred only to general principles of law derived from national legal systems. The present article takes issue with these assumptions. It seeks to prove, by an analysis of the position in 1920 when the Statute was drafted, of the practice of States, both before and after 1920, and the writings of leading commentators, that general principles of law formed within the international legal system are no less part of ‘general principles of law’ than general principles of law derived from national legal systems.

During the COVID-19 pandemic the international community repeatedly called for the equitable distribution of vaccines and other medical countermeasures. However, there was a substantial gap between this rhetoric and State action. High-income countries secured significantly more doses than they required, leaving many low-income countries unable to vaccinate their populations. Current negotiations for the new Pandemic Treaty under the World Health Organization (WHO) attempt to narrow the gap between rhetoric and behaviour by building the concept of equity into the Treaty's substantive content. However, equity is difficult to define, much less to operationalize. Presently, WHO Member States appear to have chosen ‘access and benefit-sharing’ (ABS) as the predominant mechanism for operationalizing equity in the Treaty. This article examines ABS as a mechanism, its use in public health, and argues that ABS is fundamentally flawed, unable to achieve equity. It proposes other options for an equitable international response to future pandemic threats.

The article explores the interpretation of the right to a healthy environment by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights as an autonomous right under the American Convention on Human Rights. It places this development in the context of transformative constitutionalism in Latin America and examines it against the background of the Court's broader case law. The article argues that, even though this is an important judicial innovation, there are three challenges with the approach of the Court. The first relates to the individual and collective dimensions of the right; the second to the link between this development and the Court's previous jurisprudence; and the third to the corresponding reparations. The last part of the article seeks to explore ways in which the Court could offer further guidance on the contours of the right and its relationship with civil and political rights.