Images of widespread looting were the first to come from Baghdad following the entry of US forces into the Iraqi capital city in April 2003. In particular, it is hard to forget the powerful images of smashed display cases, empty vaults, and desperate staff in the Iraqi National Museum. Worse still, the National Library was burnt down. The looting of the Iraqi National Museum took place between 8 April, when the security situation prompted staff to leave the museum, and 12 April when some of them managed to return. Despite early pleadings with US forces to move a tank to guard the museum gates, US tanks did not arrive until 16 April.1 Cynics would say that the protection of the Oil Ministry appeared to take priority at the time.2 Early reports estimated that around 170,000 items went missing from the Iraqi National Museum in Baghdad.3 This figure was completely exaggerated and the Bogdanos enquiry established that over 13,000 items had been stolen and about 3,000 recovered by September 2003.4 This article seeks to determine to what extent the US can be held legally responsible for the looting, and then to examine the international legal framework in place to facilitate the recovery and return of the items stolen from the Iraqi National Museum and other Iraqi cultural institutions

The European Court of Human Rights has decided in the last three years five cases dealing with state or international immunities.1 Although the facts differed, the arguments of the applicants were much the same. They contended that allowing a foreign State or an international organisation to claim immunity in a civil action in proceedings in the defendant State violated the applicants' rights to access to a court for the determination of a civil right.2 The European Court accepted the claims in principle but concluded in each case that the limitation imposed on the right of access was for a legitimate reason (the protection of State or international immunities, a condition for effective co-operation between States or with international organisations) and was proportionate to this aim, because in each case, the grant of immunity was required by international law and that in each case there was the possibility of the applicant using another procedure to try to assert his rights, action in the courts of the foreign State or under the special staff regime of the international organisation.

The current international law applicable to the cooperative development of petroleum resources imposes few procedural requirements on States. In the event of a failure to agree, they may choose to make further efforts at developing cooperative arrangements, or go ahead independently anddevelop the resource. Recent bilateral agreements in the North Sea and the Caribbean seek to move beyond the cooperation established under bilateral delimitation treaties. They indicate a willingness to design innovative legal frameworks in which different, sometimes diverging interests may be managed. Nonetheless, early experience suggests that, in the event of a breakdown, unilateral action may follow.

On 1 March 2001 Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental Responsibility for Children of both Spouses (Brussels II) entered into force.1 In the United Kingdom at least this significant step went relatively unnoticed. Nevertheless, the Regulation marks a new departure for the European Community and is likely to be but the first in a series of instruments dealing with family law issues. This article will use an analysis of the evolution of the Brussels II initiative to explore how and why the European Community has been able to move into an area not innately associated with traditional European goals.2 It will then reflect on the wider impact of the Regulation and any future initiatives for private international law and family law in Europe.

This article explores the issue of norm conflict in the context of specific multilateral agreements that are administered and enforced by the World Trade Organization (WTO), namely, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Any discussion of norm conflict between treaty provisions must necessarily draw a critical distinction between an apparent conflict, on the one hand, and a real conflict, on the other hand. An apparent conflict is one where the content of two or more norms is at first glance contradictory, yet the conflict can be avoided, most often by interpretative means. A real conflict represents an irreconcilable divergence between norms which cannot be interpreted away and can only be solved by the application of a conflict rule. The notion of intra WTO conflict is largely unexplored and consequently under-theorized. It is explored here not as an abstract notion, but rather against the backdrop of the institutional and normative environment of the WTO. It is submitted that intra WTO norm conflict is hardly likely to arise as a legal issue under WTO law. This is because the normative and institutional environment of the WTO militates against treating overlapping WTO provisions as situations of real norm conflict. This environment allows for, and potentially mandates a judicial approach to intra WTO conflict that accords with the telos of the single undertaking nature of WTO rights and obligations. In the result, intra WTO conflict will possibly never be real; will often be deemed as merely apparent; and will sometimes be avoided.

The core provisions of the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations are deceptively simple: a contract is governed by the law chosen by the parties (Article 3(1)); to the extent that the parties have not made a choice, a contract is governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected (Article 4(1)). However, within these provisions there are a number of problems. First, Article 3 provides that the parties’ choice may be either express or ‘demonstrated with reasonable certainty from the terms ofthecontract or the circumstances of the case’. This gives rise to potentially difficult questions about what constitutes an express choice and uncertainty as to the dividing line between, on the one hand, cases where the parties have made a choice (albeit not an expressone) and, on the other, cases where the parties have not made a choice at all. Secondly, the general principle in Article 4 is supplemented bya presumption (in paragraph 2), 1 which may, incertain circumstances, be disregarded (under paragraph 5). The operation of the presumption is problematic and the relationship between Article 4(2) andArticle 4(5) controversial.

Public participation in international environmental decision-making can seek to fulfil different goals. This article explains how these goals can affect the design and appraisal of participatory processes and highlights the under-recognised value of law in determining the objectives of public participation in international environmental forums. A doctrinal analysis finds that substantive goals are most prominent in current international environmental law, but that a normative rationale for public participation could be gaining more formal endorsement through the growing legal recognition of linkages between procedural human rights and environmental protection.

The Syrian civil war has highlighted the phenomenon of foreign fighting, in which individuals leave their home State to join an armed conflict overseas. The predominant paradigm for regulating foreign fighting, centred on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178, is based on counterterrorism, which in essence treats foreign fighting as a form of terrorism. This paradigm is largely reflective of the domestic legislation of the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Australia. This article argues that this approach is problematic, and that an alternative paradigm based on the international law of neutrality and related domestic legislation provides a better means for regulating foreign fighting.

This article challenges the widely held view that WTO Members are not permitted to impose trade restrictions on other WTO Members in the form of countermeasures for breaches of international law. It cautions that this generally held view has wider implications for international law and multilateralism because countermeasures are a significant means of enforcing and preserving the normative integrity of international obligations outside the WTO, including erga omnes and erga omnes partes obligations. Arguments supporting their ‘displacement’ must be based on clear evidence, which this article shows to be lacking. This article also attempts to allay the (understandable but perhaps exaggerated) concern that such countermeasures might undermine the predictability of the WTO system. Trade countermeasures for breaches of extra-WTO obligations are subject to stringent conditions under customary international law and to judicial scrutiny by means of WTO adjudication, both of which minimise the space for abuse and the risk of unpredictability.

Maritime interceptions continue as a fundamental dimension to external border controls against irregular migration, as seen most recently in Australia's institution of Operation Sovereign Borders in late 2013. The practice of developed States has highlighted the varied application and interpretation of four bodies of international law: the law of the sea, search and rescue obligations, refugee obligations and international human rights law. This article assesses this practice and the use of laws, highlighting the fragmentation of international law that has resulted. A proposal is presented to harmonize these laws and reconcile the divergent policy perspectives of different stakeholders.

Cyberspace is now acknowledged not only as the newest domain of warfare, but also as a space vital to economic, educational and cultural development for all States. This thin consensus ignores the fundamental fact that the backbone of cyber infrastructure—submarine telecommunication cables—is not (for the large part) located within sovereign territorial jurisdiction. The radically increased reliance of States upon submarine data cables emphasises their vulnerability to damage by malicious acts, accidents, or natural phenomena. Faced with these problems, legal analysis has tended to identify gaps or deficiencies in the law, and propose the creation of new legal instruments. The contribution of this article is twofold. First, it expands the frame of analysis to include deliberate damage to cables not only in peacetime but under the law of armed conflict. Second, rather than treating the legal framework as inherently deficient, it considers the extent to which existing rules and principles can be progressively developed, interpreted, or creatively applied to close perceived gaps. This article surveys the existing law specific to the protection of submarine cables and assesses how general principles of the law of the sea, State responsibility, the law on the use of force, and the law of armed conflict apply to this problem. It thus considers in turn the applicable ‘law of peace’, the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.

The protection of foreign investment by treaties often clashes with the State's sovereign right to investigate economic crimes committed by investors. This article examines the different approaches taken by tribunals to questions concerning admissibility and jurisdiction, applicable law, the standard of review, the burden and standard of proof and deference to actions taken by domestic courts and regulators related to economic crimes. It concludes that investors should not automatically be deprived of treaty protections and their access to investment arbitration blocked. The arbitration agreement, being autonomous from the main contract (or the relevant treaty), should, as a rule, remain valid even if the conduct of investors is tainted by economic crimes. The article calls on investment tribunals to reflect in their awards on the contributory fault of the parties when representatives of States and investors are both complicit in economic crimes. To achieve greater legal certainty and procedural efficiency, a new generation of investment treaties and the practice of investment tribunals should draw on not only applicable domestic law but also existing sources of international law concerning economic crimes or national best practice.