Article 9 of the Treaty of Rome, as amended by the 1992 Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty), declares that the European Community “shall be based upon a customs union which shall cover all trade in goods and which shall involve the prohibition between Member States of customs duties on imports and exports and of all charges having equivalent effect”.1 The principle was thereby established of the free movement of goods within the European Community. The Treaty does not define “goods” for the purposes of the Articles (9 to 37) which make up the Title dealing with “Free Movement of Goods”, but the European Court of Justice has held that “goods” means “products which can be valued in money and which are capable, as such, of forming the subject of commercial transactions”. From this it is clear that works of art are included in the “goods” that are intended to circulate freely within the Community.

The Orthodox position on the legal effect of treaties in English law is easy to state. Treaties are entered into by the Executive acting under prerogative powers. The exercise of these powers is not, even in the post-GCHQ2 dispensation, a matter within the jurisdiction of the courts, so that the desirability of entering into a treaty cannot be challenged in the courts.3 However, since any prerogative power must be exercised campatibly with legislation, if there is an extant statutory restriction upon making a particular treaty or providing a particular procedure as a condition upon which the prerogative power may be exercised, then compliance with the statutory provisions is a matter for the courts.4

Where a pregnant woman travels and subsequently gives birth to a child abroad, should the left behind father be able to petition for the ‘return’ of his child under the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction? An affirmative answer would not only presuppose that the abduction of the child had been in breach of the father's actually exercised rights of custody, but would also depend on which country, if any, the child was habitually resident in immediately before the ‘abduction’.

The 1985 European Communities Directive on Product Liability1 aims to harmonise member State product liability rules and to improve the level of protection of victims by basing the liability of producers for physical injury and damage to personal goods on the proof that the victim's damage was caused by a defect in the product supplied. On 19 May 1998, ten years after the deadline for transposition, France finally enacted legislation incorporating the Directive into national law.2 The Directive was incorporated into English law by Part I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987.

The European Court's efforts to locate the outer limits of Article 30's control of national measures have been discussed before in these surveys of current developments in EC law.1 The Court was tempted to use Article 30 to catch a wide range of measures that affected trade even where the rules applied in an even-handed manner to all traders. The most notable example of this expansionist trend was found in the so-called Sunday trading cases, in which Article 30 was exploited to challenge rules restricting commercial activity in England and Wales even though the rules did not put cross-border strategies at any particular disadvantage. The Court pursued an erratic course before finally ruling the laws compatible with Article 30.2 Academic comment, though nuanced in its detailed appreciation of the Court's stance, was largely convinced that Article 30 had been extended beyond both its intent and necessary function in the process of market integration.3

This article addresses some of the changes in international law and foreign relations law which have impinged on the operation of the State Immunity Act 1978 in the first 40 years of its operation and some of the ways in which it has been supplemented by judicial decisions. It addresses, in particular, the initial need for legislation in this field, the circumstances in which agents of a State may be entitled to immunity, the relationship between State immunity in domestic law and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the relationship of State immunity and rules of jus cogens, and the respective scope of State immunity and principles of non-justiciability.

The concepts of jurisdiction and applicable law have been traditionally regarded as separate inquiries in private international law: a court only considers the applicable law once it has decided to adjudicate a matter. While such an approach still generally applies in civil law jurisdictions, in common law countries the concepts are increasingly intertwined. This article examines the relationship between jurisdiction and applicable law in two key areas: applications to stay proceedings on the ground of forum non conveniens and to enforce foreign exclusive jurisdiction agreements. While courts generally apply the principle that jurisdiction and applicable law should coincide where possible, there are circumstances where a court may retain jurisdiction despite a foreign governing law or may ‘trust’ a foreign tribunal to apply the law of the forum. This article seeks to establish a framework by which courts may assess the role of the applicable law in forum determinations.

The 1951 Refugee Convention does not apply to a person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that ‘he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ (Article 1(F)(c)). To date, this exclusion clause has generally been interpreted by courts, commentators and UNHCR in a static manner which fails to take into account developments in international law and practice. This paper considers the ‘evolutive approach’ to treaty interpretation, generally, and applies this approach, alongside standard rules of treaty interpretation, to Article 1(F)(c). This paper challenges a number of assertions commonly made regarding this clause, and concludes that it should be interpreted to the effect that conduct amounting to serious or sustained human rights violations, such that would constitute ‘persecution’ for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention, meets the standard for exclusion under Article 1(F)(c).