The WTO Appellate Body has so far authorized public appeal hearings as the exception, not the rule: it is limited to those instances in which the main parties request it. Such authorization constitutes a very positive development for the WTO dispute settlement system, for it enhances the transparency of the system at its highest stage. Indeed, the Appellate Body is becoming a leading actor in the formation of international law1 owing to the fact that it is the most active international court of the world, the relevance of the issues it deals with and the fact that it is at the apex of a dispute settlement system with permanent and exclusive jurisdiction over 153 States. Nonetheless, it is not in tune with inter-state international adjudication where the trend concerning hearings is, for good reason, geared towards openness and transparency, not privacy, as the rule.

This article examines a number of major developments in international law and State policy regarding nuclear weapons which have occurred over the past two years.

However, in order to understand the context and significance of these developments, I must first very briefly address what has gone on previously in this area of international relations.

I have argued elsewhere that over the course of the decade ending in 2008 the original balance of principles underlying the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which comprises the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation legal regime, has been distorted, particularly by nuclear-weapon-possessing governments, led by the United States, in favor of a disproportionate prioritization of non-proliferation principles, and an unwarranted under-prioritization of peaceful use and disarmament principles.1 I also argue that this distortion of principled balance by nuclear weapon states has resulted in a number of erroneous legal interpretations of the NPT's provisions.

In its decision in the Arrest Warrant case,2 the International Court of Justice studiedly refused to address systematically the legality and ambit of a purported exercise in absentia of universal criminal jurisdiction by one State over a government minister of another State. This, coupled with the dicta of certain judges with reservations as to the scope of universal jurisdiction3 and the (at best) lukewarm support for such jurisdiction displayed by certain other judges,4 might be taken as a discouragement to States to engage in similar exercises of jurisdiction. However, the contemporary trend in many developed States in favour of taking measures of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction to apprehend and punish the alleged perpetrators of serious international law crimes, coupled with the entry into force of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, indicates that more such attempts are quite likely to be made. Within a year of its decision in the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ again found itself the forum for a similar dispute. On 9 December 2002 the Republic of the Congo (‘the Congo’) filed an Application instituting proceedings against France5 in circumstances notably resembling those that had prompted the Democratic Republic of the Congo (‘the DRC’) to act against Belgium. Again, the Applicant was an African State protesting against an alleged abuse of universal jurisdiction and failure to respect immunities on the part of its European former colonial ruler. Despite the prima facie similarity between the two cases, however, the chances that the eventual decision in the Certain Criminal Proceedings case will go beyond the Arrest Warrant case to elucidate the doctrine of universal jurisdiction are very slight. This note is confined to considering the circumstances behind the Congolese Application and Request for the Indication of a Provisional Measure, and the Court's response thereto in its Order of 17 June 2003.

The last time this column appeared1 there was considerable discussion about the proposals being considered at the then ongoing intergovernmental conference (IGC). Not surprisingly the proposals of the UK government in its Memorandum on the Court of Justice were not adopted in the Treaty of Amsterdam. No institutional changes have been made in relation to the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. So the approval of their Rules of Procedure is still subject to the approval of the Council and their terms of office are still six years but can be renewed.

The eventual product of the International Law Commission's (ILC) work on state immunity hasbeen in the form of a Convention. This prompts the question whether widespread ratification (or accession etc) will be necessary for clear rules of international law on state immunity to become firmlyestablished or whether a substantial codifying effect could be achieved even if the Convention does not attract a great number of parties. The latter has sometimes been said of much of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. As the law on state immunity has undergone much of its substantial development by practice of national courts (albeit that the piecemeal adoption and implementation of treaties has played some part), could this process not simply continue with the Convention providing guidance or a model? If the trend from absolute to restrictive immunity could occur by development of customary law, are there not still adequate means of consolidating customary law without the need for states actually to become parties to the treaty?

International lawyers interested in international investment law and treaty interpretation issues should consider the international award recently delivered by an ICSID Tribunal in the case of Spyridon Roussalis v Romania.1 The case arose out of the privatization of a Romanian warehouse company (SC Malimp SA). On 23 October 1998, another Romanian company (Continent SRL) entered into a share purchase agreement with the Romanian authority for state assets recovery (AVAS) to purchase 372,523 shares in SC Malimp SA, or the equivalent of a 70 per cent interest in the company. Following the acquisition of SC Malimp SA, the name of that company was changed to SC Continent Marine Enterprise SA (or ‘Continent SA’ for short).

It has rightly been observed that every society “faces a delicate problem when it has to determine how its judges are appointed, especially the members of the senior courts and tribunals”. For, while it is usually recognised that judges should be independent, at the same time those in power may prefer judges who are not too independent, in the sense that they more or less share the general political orientation of government.

This paper outlines recent developments in regional cooperation within the Gulf of Guinea region leading to the recent establishment of the Gulf of Guinea Commission. The huge interest generated among the major oil-producing multinational corporations, the newer independent producers and the participating States in the Gulf of Guinea necessitates a critical assessment of the Treaty Establishing the Gulf of Guinea Commission. This paper adopts a comparative analysis with pre-existing regional and institutional bodies having similar aims and objectives. The aim is to ascertain whether and to what extent the emergent regime can facilitate a sustainable and responsive regime for the anticipated explosion of exploitative activities in this resource-rich and strategic littoral zone. This paper, thus, places the existing regime in the context of international best practices for multinationals and governments involved in oil and gas exploration and production. The author identifies certain imperatives for the consideration of both the corporate and sovereign interests in the world's newest resource Eldorado.

The law and legal system of Mauritius are an unusual hybrid and a remarkable instance of comparative law in action. As a consequence of its history, as an overseas possession of France from 1715 to 1810 and as a British colony from 1814 until it achieved independence within the Commonwealth in 1968, its law and legal system reflect the legal traditions of both its former colonial rulers. In general terms, Mauritian private law is based on the French Code Civil while public law and commercial law are based on English law: an example of what has recently been labelled a “bi-systemic legal system”. The Constitution, a version of the Westminster export model, was originally monarchical. It was amended in 1991 and Mauritius became a republic within the Commonwealth in 1992.

Regulatory competition in company law has been extensively debated in the last few decades, but it has rarely been discussed whether there could also be regulatory competition in partnership law. This article fills this gap. It addresses the partnership law of the US, the UK, Germany, and France, and presents empirical data on the different types of partnerships and companies established in these jurisdictions. The main focus is on the use of a limited liability partnership (LLP) outside its country of origin. It is also considered whether some regulatory competition can take place in the law of limited partnerships.

This article considers the positive evolution of international law in the past century, and the emergence of a rules-based multilateral system under the UN Charter, which has, inter alia, enabled formerly colonised peoples to exercise their right to self-determination and prohibited the use of force in international relations. The author reaffirms his faith in the ability of international law to provide a common language for the international community to face successfully common challenges, such as poverty, global warming, and the protection of privacy rights in the era of social media and artificial intelligence. Looking beyond traditional beneficiaries and duty-bearers of international obligations, the author makes a case for all actors to engage in respecting, upholding and promoting international law.