The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement1 was concluded following multi-party negotiations on Good Friday, 10 April 1998. It received 71 per cent approval in Northern Ireland and 95 per cent approval in the Republic of Ireland in the subsequent referenda held on Friday 22 May, the day after Ascension. To some, it must have seemed that the timing was singularly appropriate following 30 years of “The Troubles”, which were perceived as being between a “Catholic minority” and a “Protestant majority”. While there are some minority groups identified by their religious affiliation that do require rights relating only to their religion, such as the right to worship in community,2 to practise and profess their religion,3 to legal recognition as a church,4 to hold property5 and to determine its own membership,6 some minority groups identified by their religious affiliation are properly national or ethnic minorities–religion is merely one factor which distinguishes them from the other groups, including the majority, in the population. One example of the latter situation is to be seen in (Northern) Ireland where there is, in fact, untypically, a double minority: the Catholic-nationalist community is a minority in Northern Ireland, but the Protestant-unionist population is a minority in the island of Ireland as a whole.7 The territory of Northern Ireland is geographically separate from the rest of the United Kingdom. The recent peace agreement addresses a whole range of issues for Northern Ireland, but included are, on the one hand, rights for the populations based on their religious affiliation, their culture and their language and, on the other, rights with respect to their political participation up to the point of external self-determination. It is a holistic approach. Like any good minority rights agreement,8 it deals with both standards and their implementation and, like any good minority rights agreement, it is not a minority rights agreement but, rather, a peace settlement.

On 25 April 2012, after years of negotiations delayed by halts and setbacks, the Food Assistance Convention was adopted—the latest in a series of agreements that since 1967 have regulated the international provision of food aid. Great expectations have been placed on the adoption of the Convention. In particular it was hoped that the Convention would answer the call for a new system of food aid governance, introduce more effective mechanisms to address world's food insecurity and, ultimately, improve and modernize the rules applicable to food aid. This article provides the first critical commentary of the Convention's text, assesses the strengths and weaknesses of its provisions and considers whether and how the Convention has modified the architecture of international food aid regulation. The article also indicates where amendments to the rules might be needed to make the international regulation of food aid more effective. The article concludes that the Convention is, on balance, a positive instrument that could improve governance and adequacy of food assistance. The Convention is also important for the international human rights discourse on how States can fulfil their obligation to assist countries in need in that it offers guidance on how to meet such obligation in the specific context of the right to food. States should therefore be urged to sign and ratify it.

This article consists of a comparative study of the basic principles underlying the rules of jurisdiction in private international law in commercial cases in the law of the European Union, the United States and England. It considers the objectives which these rules seek to achieve (protection of the rights of the parties and respect for the interests of foreign States) and the extent to which these objectives are attained. It takes tort claims, especially in the field of products-liability, as an example and considers which system has the most exorbitant rules. It suggests explanations for the differences found.

A. Szakats, “The Influence of Commonwealth Law Principles on the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods” (1966) I.C.L.Q. (July) 749–779.

In the July issue of I.C.L.Q. on p. 749, note 6, and on p. 779, reference was made to the Donaldson Committee and it was quoted that in their view “there was no demand or need for any changes in the law as contained in the Sale of Goods Act.” As source, L. A. Ellwood, “The Hague Uniform Laws Governing the international Sale of Goods,” Some Comparative Aspects of the Law Relating to Sale of Goods, I.C.L.Q. Suppl. Publication No.9 (1964), pp. 38–42, was referred to. In fact no such comment was made by the Committee. The author expresses his regret for the error. [The Board of Trade point out that the passage cited by Dr. Szakats summarised the views of H.M. Government on the original Draft Law, which was issued through the League of Nations before the second World War. Editor]

This article makes a case for an international convention on expert determination (ED) and Dispute Boards (DBs) that would require its Contracting States to recognise agreements on ED/DBs and enforce ED/DB decisions. Whilst strong, the case for the convention may not be compelling as there are arguments against it. But at least the time has come for the international legal community to start thinking about and debating the need for such an international regime. This article takes the first step towards imagining this international regime by evaluating a number of key issues relating to its scope of application.

Eweida and others considered the claims of four religious individuals whose employers had rejected their requests for accommodation of their religious practices at work, and who had failed in their attempts to contest those decisions before English courts. However, as a judgment it speaks to a wider array of questions of principle, particularly the appropriate interpretation of Article 9 claims. The case provided the ECtHR with an opportunity to clarify a number of discrete doctrines and interpretative approaches within Article 9 jurisprudence, and the Court decided to use this occasion to elucidate the issues raised by the applicants' cases.

The Parties to the Paris Agreement have committed to communicate successive ‘nationally determined contributions’ (NDCs) to the global response to climate change. Each NDC is expected to reflect the Party's ‘highest possible ambition’ (HPA) on the mitigation of climate change. This article envisages the possibility of taking HPA seriously: that is, of approaching it as an effective legal standard. It shows that, in some circumstances, the HPA standard can help to assess whether a State has complied with due diligence obligations on climate change mitigation.